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Abstract 
This thesis addresses the question of how actors of the EU’s security policy were 
able to say ESDP at the turn of the 21st century. Despite previous attempts to 
implement a security policy at the EU or EC level, ESDP was first launched in 1999 
and became operational in 2003. The very interest of the thesis is how central EU 
actors – who were responsible for the institutional development and implementation 
of ESDP – understood security; that is: what they perceived as referent object, what 
they perceived as threats or as security problems, and how this made possible the 
implementation of a security policy at the EU level. By asking these questions the 
thesis does what discourse analysis is best in: discourse analysis enables the 
researcher to discover the underlying rationalities which led EU actors to presume a 
security policy as being necessary at the EU level.  
This argument on discourse analysis is derived from Nicolas Onuf’s work, which 
most plausibly conceptualises the role of language in the construction of social 
reality. The thesis starts from a constructivist perspective arguing that actors’ 
behaviour is based on their identity and that they perceive the world from this 
intersubjective perspective. The rational of security is based on this intersubjective 
perspective and constructed by relating identity to the perception of threats or 
security problems. This relation of threats and referent objects lead to the 
construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of security. These 
processes of social interaction take place through language and can best be studied 
from a discursive perspective.  
The concept of security established at the EU level leading to the institutionalisation 
of ESDP is understood to be a result of this type of social interaction. Overtime, it 
led EU actors to a robust construction of the EU as an international actor in the field 
of security facing dynamic security problems by a cooperative and multilateral 
approach but also by using civilian and military capabilities.  
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Introduction 
 
In the summer of 2003, the European Union (EU) conducted its first out-of-area 
military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 1,800 military 
personal were to establish security in Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province. The 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provided the framework for the 
French lead battle group to support the United Nation (UN) mission in the DRC. The 
operation was deployed in the name of the EU without assistance from the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The operation itself was a remarkable 
achievement in the development of a foreign – and especially – a security policy at 
the EU level. For the first time, the EU’s tool box was equipped with military and 
civilian capabilities to support the EU’s external action. Despite previous attempts to 
implement a security policy at the EU or European Community (EC) level, ESDP 
was first launched in 1999 and only became operational in 2003.  
The puzzling question is what kind of security policy do relevant EU actors call for 
when they say ESDP? Do they call for defence policy in a traditional sense, is the 
concept of security underlying ESDP designed to carry out interventions and if so 
what would be the goal of such interventions, how is the EU’s concept of security 
linked and intertwined with other policy fields, what are the security challenges 
which are to be faced by the EU’s security policy, and who or what is the referent 
object of security?. All these questions can be subsumed in one general question of 
what is the rational of the security policy established at the EU level and how did the 
meaning of security change over time to enable the implementation of the EU’s 
security policy especially between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s?  
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I argue that the implementation of a security policy in form of ESDP was a strong 
sign of change of the EU’s self-perception as provider of security and stability, not 
only within the EU but on the international stage. This change did not only affect the 
rationale of security implemented at the EU level it made it possible. Prior to the 
launch of ESDP, the EU member states understood security as national defence. (see 
Pilegaard 2004: 28) In this regard, NATO was important, its institutional outlook 
changed over time to include out-of-area operations to establish peace and security 
on the international level. (see Terriff et al. 2002: 9-10) Despite this alternative, the 
meaning of security dominant in EU discourses enabled the implementation of a 
security policy at the EU level by inaugurating ESDP. Relevant actors, including 
those of the European Council, the Council and its sub-bodies, engaged in processes 
of reasoning on the meaning of security. This affected the rationale of security which 
then enabled the outset of EU institutions as well as the EU’s equipment with 
military and civilian capabilities and their use in support of the EU’s external action 
in the field of security.  
The very interest of the thesis is how central EU actors – who were responsible for 
the institutional development and implementation of ESDP and decision-making 
processes within ESDP – understood security; that is: what they perceived as referent 
object, what they perceived as threats or as security problems, and how this made 
possible the implementation of a security policy at the EU level. By asking these 
questions the thesis does what discourse analysis is best in: discourse analysis 
enables the researcher to discover the underlying rationalities which led EU actors to 
presume a security policy as being necessary at the EU level. The institutional 
development of ESDP and the treaty revisions decided by the Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs) as well as the growing number of ESDP operations deployed 
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since 2003 prove the fact that the decision to implement a security policy was the 
result of a political process centrally lasting from the mid 1990s until the mid 2000s. 
Taking the argument of social constructivism and discourse analysis seriously, this 
process is a strong sign of changes in actors’ social reality. In other words, relevant 
EU actors over time changed or developed their understanding of security and the 
need to establish a respective policy at the EU level. 
This process is exactly what the thesis intends to analyse. Hence, the thesis is not 
about ESDP as an institution: its decision making processes, its bodies and their 
competences, its military and civilian capabilities and its standardised procedures, 
and certainly not a review of implemented operations which has been done 
elsewhere. (see Smith 2004a; Gourlay 2004; Smith and Webber 2008; Steward 
2008). This project explicitly analyses the meaning of security, how it developed and 
changed over time and how discursive practices enabled relevant EU actors to 
presume that a security policy had to be established at the EU level, how the EU was 
perceived as reference object of security, how threats or security problems were 
constructed, and how this led to a special rational of security policy as being 
interlinked with the EU’s external policies and especially development policies.  
In other words, the thesis focuses on the context in which the implementation of 
ESDP became possible. Context here is the social reality in which relevant actors 
find themselves and which consists of intersubjectively shared meanings. In this 
context, actors make sense of external actors or phenomena from their 
intersubjective perspective which can lead to the construction of threats or security 
problems which then leads to the construction of appropriate rules applicable to 
situations of insecurity. This complex as part of actors’ social reality can best be 
analysed from a discursive perspective taking into account relevant texts constituting 
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the institutionalised discourses on security established at the EU level representing 
the common language of relevant EU actors. 
Following this argument, at the very heart of my thesis rests the assumption that 
reasoning takes place through the use of language affecting actors’ understanding of 
the world and their position within it. Taking this assumption seriously, the recent 
implementation of ESDP could only have become possible based on a changed 
understanding of security and the perception that the EU became responsible for 
security policy. Therefore, the thesis in particular addresses the question of how 
actors, responsible for decision-making processes within, and in regard to, the EU’s 
foreign and security policy were able to say ESDP at the turn of the 21st century. 
This question will be divided into two sub-questions: first, how were the different 
meanings of security constituted, and second, how did these meanings change over 
time? The meaning of security can be analysed within the intersection of identity 
constructions and respective perceptions of threats, leading to rules applying in the 
case of insecurity. It can be argued that these rules were formally and informally 
institutionalised within ESDP.  
The thesis hypothesises a link between identity constructions and the formation and 
exploitation of institutions by following a theoretical argument of discursive 
approaches which convincingly argued that discourses enable certain policy options 
and disable others. The meaning of security established within discourses at the EU 
level therefore led to a certain type of security policy institutionalised at that level. 
The research concentrates on discourses which took place in the highly 
institutionalised setting at the EU level, in particular the European Council, the 
Council and its sub-bodies, for example the General Secretariat, the Permanent 
Representatives’ Committee (COREPER) the Political and Security Committee 
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(PSC) or the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM).. It rigorously 
applies a discursive approach to the texts produced by these institutions and involved 
actors analysing the inherent constructions of subjects, objects and their relations. 
Overall, the thesis will show that over time, the EU was constructed as an 
international actor finally responsible for security policy.  
The approach identifies and analyses moments of change and explains these 
moments by its differentiated conceptualisation of change. What the thesis does not 
is an in-depth genealogical analysis of where meanings in use came from and how 
other discourses influenced the institutionalised one. Analysing influences of other 
discourses is a very complex undertaking and can only be the second step following 
the results of this thesis, although the institutionalised discourse on security most 
likely had been influenced by a variety of other discourses outside of the institutional 
framework of the EU, e.g. national discourses, elite discourses, and discourses within 
NATO etc. First of all, this research project discovers moments of change and 
explains these moments based on a differentiated conceptualisation of change. At the 
same time, the thesis points out discourses which were very likely to be the source of 
influence by referring to secondary literature. 
In order to conduct the research, I will use a constructivist account to analyse 
discourses on the meaning of security. The approach starts with the assumption that 
humans seek reasoning through the use of language and thereby produce order. The 
‘order’ of interest constitutes the meaning of security. It relates EU identity 
constructions to the EU’s perceptions of threats and established rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case on insecurity. These rules have been institutionalised within 
ESDP. In order to analyse these constructions, I will analyse processes of reasoning 
during three different periods of time, beginning with the years 1996-7 as the final 
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moment prior to an EU decision in favour of ESDP, followed by the years 2000-1, 
including the IGC of Nice and its follow up process but leaving out the period 
following the events of 11 September 2001 as constituting a crisis of discourse, and 
finally 2003-4, in which the first ESDP operations were deployed. I will demonstrate 
that at the very beginning the EU did not consider it their responsibility to act 
externally in the domain of security policy. This changed over time by the 
reconstruction of meanings constituting EU identity and its perception of threats. In 
the end, the meaning of security enabled the EU to construct rules for its security 
policy to use civilian and military capabilities in support of its approach to tackle 
development, poverty, conflict and crisis. 
Traditional approaches in international relations theory understand security as an 
objective given, affected by the international system or fixed interests of actors. Such 
a concept is ill-suited to understand the internal logic of security policies as a 
research object. Therefore, I argue that security is as much influenced by actors’ 
intersubjectivity as any other social interaction. This argument is based on the 
theoretical assumption that humans’ behaviour is based on their understanding of 
themselves – identity – and their understanding of the world surrounding them. (see 
Wendt 1999: 337-43; Kratochwil 1989) Following this argument, security is best 
understood as a relational concept shaped by social interaction. (see Buzan et al. 
1998)  
The meaning of security is composed by three dimensions. The first is identity and 
hence the definition of the self. The second is the perception of threats from this 
intersubjective perspective. The third dimension is rules which define appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity. The relation of these three aspects constitutes the 
meaning of security which enabled EU actors to presume a security policy and hence 
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ESDP necessary. All three dimensions are mutual constitutive through social 
interaction.  
Social interaction takes place through the use of language as the medium through 
which humans seek reasoning and thereby find, or produce, order in the world. (Onuf 
1989: 39) Processes of reasoning can best be analysed utilising discourse analysis. 
According to Foucault, (Foucault 1989) discourses provide a range of possible 
articulations which promote a limited range of meanings. (see Larsen 2004: 65) The 
underlying argument is that in the social world, reality does not exist a priori. 
(Derrida 1978: 279)  Actors understand the world surrounding them only by giving 
meaning to reality. This does not lead to a perfect description of reality but to how 
actors understand the world. (see Zehfuss 2002: 197-207) Actors’ social reality 
enables certain policy options accordingly, whereas others are either understood as 
being inappropriate or just not possible. (see Diez 1999: 603) Following Onuf’s 
argument that humans are discourse dependent, (see Onuf 1989: 38) the analysis 
allows this research project to discover the rationale of security and to understand 
how it developed over time to finally enable actors to implement ESDP and conduct 
EU’s security policy accordingly.  
In order to address the research question this project is divided into five chapters. In 
the first chapter I will start by locating this project in the existing literature. I will 
show that a reasonable amount of literature has argued that socialisation processes 
take place on the EU level affecting actors’ behaviour in developing an EU foreign 
and security policy. (see Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Øhrgaard 1997, 2004; Smith 
2004) Authors have argued that these socialisation processes pushed the CFSP and 
ESDP to be more than intergovernmental but less than supranational. Thereby, they 
contrast other literature which perceives EU’s foreign policy as exclusively state 
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driven, reflecting the lowest common denominator or being a tool to balance the 
power of the United States (US). (see Gordon 1998; Peterson 2005; Posen 2006)  
My research project picks up on the findings of the first literature and reflects its 
finding from a discursive perspective. This can be done by transferring the concept 
of socialisation into discourse theory. What, for example, neo-functionalism calls 
socialisation in discourse analysis is conceptualised as social interaction through the 
use of language. Language plays the important role for actors to produce common 
sense, to intersubjectively share meanings and hence ordering the world. Thereby, 
the literature above supports the argument that processes of social interaction on the 
EU level produce meanings which are different to those on the national level. In this 
light, another body of literature uses discourse analysis to conduct research on EU 
foreign policy. (see Larsen 2000a, 2000b; Sjursen 2004) Especially Larsen 
recommends “research which more directly uses a discourse analytical theory and 
method”, in order to produce knowledge of the EU’s foreign policy. (Larsen 2004: 
78) By following this recommendation, my project explicitly focuses on the meaning 
of security and how it changed over time to enable EU actors to presume a security 
policy and hence ESDP necessary to be implemented at the EU level.  
The literature review directly leads the chapter to the debate on the theoretical 
approach implemented throughout this project. I will argue for a discursive approach 
rooted in assumptions of social constructivism. On the one hand, through language, 
actors make sense of the world and thereby construct their social reality which they 
take for granted and which guides their behaviour. On the other hand, language and 
the meanings constituted by actors’ social interaction serve as an almost ideal field 
of research providing access to actors’ rationalities. Both aspects have been most 
convincingly recognised and conceptualised by Nicolas G. Onuf. Therefore, the 
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theoretical account of this project starts with his assumptions. Also, I apply the 
theoretical concepts of identity and identity constructions which are based on 
discourses about them to conceptualise the EU’s self and its self-perception of bein 
an international actor. Then, I conceptualise security as a relational meaning which 
relates identities to the perceptions of threats from the intersubjective perspective. 
(see Buzan et al. 1998: 21) Together, they lead to the construction of rules of 
appropriate behaviour applying to situations of insecurity. The relational concept of 
security enables the analysis to focus in more detail on three different discursive 
fields: the first is on European integration, the second on global challenges and the 
third on international order. The area in which these discursive fields overlap 
includes discourses which constitute the meaning of security established within 
discourses taking place within the highly institutionalised arena at the EU level. This 
perspective helps the analysis to be located in space – to be connected to a certain 
area, region or group of people. As stated above, relevant discourses are those which 
are institutionalised at the EU level and include processes of reasoning connected to 
at least one of these three fields. In the last section of the theory chapter, I provide 
the methodology used to analyse discourses and argue for the relevance of official 
documents and texts used for the analysis. This includes a section conceptualising 
change as a central concept of the thesis, a section on research techniques and a 
section on the actual research strategy.  
The analysis is located in time by identifying three key events or periods which 
marked constitutive moments – like IGCs – in the development and implementation 
of ESDP. Documents of these key events or key periods are publicly taken and 
represent common agreements on how to proceed in the field of security. These 
public statements of agreement and their status as products of the institutionalised 
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cooperation which sometimes are even legally binding underline the importance of 
each period analysed within this thesis.  
The first period is 1996-7 as the run up to the IGC of Amsterdam and the latest 
period prior to the EU agreement on establishing a security policy on the EU level. 
The second period is 2000-1, representing i) the final year prior to the IGC of Nice 
and ii) the starting date of the post Nice process leading to the Laeken declaration 
and the Convent on the Future of Europe as the beginning of process of recasting EU 
identity in a moment of identity crisis. Apart from that, it needs to be noted that this 
period ends with 11 September 2001, erupting into a discursive crisis on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism leading to new constructions of threats and 
more forceful constructions of EU identity as juxtapositioning self and other. The 
third period is 2003-4, the years of the first deployments of ESDP civilian and 
military operations and the decision on the first ever European security strategy 
mainstreaming ESDP into the EU’s external action. In the empirical chapters I will 
analyse the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats, and the 
construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in situations of insecurity during each 
period.  
The system of the empirical chapters will be interrupted by a chapter focusing 
explicitly on the first half of 2003. At this time, a discursive crisis unfolded on the 
way of how to proceed with Iraq. This interim chapter will deconstruct processes of 
sense making on the war on Iraq, the EU’s role in this regard, and proposals on 
ESDP made during the time of crisis. The chapter will maintain that the dominant 
discourse was robust on the meaning of security, contrasting with contrary 
arguments which are prevalent in the literature.  
 
Barnutz Introduction 11 
 
Throughout the empirical analysis I will show that despite the fact that constructions 
of EU identity remained relatively stable, central meanings were re-constituted over 
time. EU identity was stabilised by building up on EU core principles like 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the 
meanings of integration, cooperation and responsibility. However, it changed in a 
variety of other meanings which finally enabled the EU consider it its responsibility 
to solve crises and conflict outside of the EU and act as a security actor on the 
international stage accordingly. Furthermore, I will show that changes in the 
construction of EU identity affected the construction of threats. Most importantly, in 
2000-1 the EU perceived development and poverty to be security relevant and 
potentially leading to conflict. This perspective was not evident in the discourses of 
the period 1996-7. In the period 2003-4, the construction of threats was also strongly 
affected by processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. 
These processes led the EU to more forcefully differentiate between ‘self’ and 
‘other’ and to understand security threats as systematically being affected by 
dynamism influencing unattached problems and making them worse. This 
perspective finally enabled the implementation of civilian and military capabilities 
on the EU level and the implementation of procedures of how to use them.  
These findings will bring this project to the conclusion that ESDP became possible 
based on changes of the EU’s self-perception affecting the construction of threats 
and rules of appropriate behaviour. Also, it will show that the rationale of security 
which enabled EU actors to implement ESDP built up on the logic that security was 
a problem interrelated with development and poverty, and that other security 
problems were in one way or the other related to both these problems. This led the 
EU to the understanding that conflict prevention and crisis management added to 
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development policy conducted by other means – using civilian and military 
capabilities to stabilise states in order to pave the way for effective development 
policies.  
Chapter I 
 
Constructing Security 
1. Literature Review 
A missing piece of literature on ESDP is one which understands ESDP as a social 
construction. My research project will address this and, as I argue below, thereby 
enhance the knowledge of ESDP in a specific way.  
In this regard, I will first show that the existing literature on European integration 
points to a gap which understands the institutionalisation of ESDP based on 
processes of what neo-functionalism, for example, calls socialisation taking place on 
the EU level. Arguments have been brought forward by authors of neo-
functionalism, sociological institutionalism and social constructivism. (see Øhrgaard 
1997, 2004; Smith 2001, 2004; Juncos and Reynolds 2007)  
While developing these arguments I also intend to introduce the approach of 
discourse analysis to the subject field of EU security policy. In particular, neo-
functionalism identifies processes of socialisation underway at the EU level shifting 
loyalties of involved (national) actors towards the EU level. These are very strong 
findings. From a discursive perspective they point to the existence of processes of 
social interaction through the use of language. Language can not be seen as separate 
from socialisation but as having socialising functions. (see Ochs and Schieffelin 
2009: 296) Following March and Olson, socialisation can be understood as “the 
development of codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of 
acting on them”. (March and Olsen 1998: 948) Translated into a discursive approach, 
socialisation is understood as the process of social interaction by which through 
language actors develop common ways of reasoning and common understandings, 
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perspectives and identities. (see Simhandl 2007: 40-1; Milliken 1999b: 229; Kitchen 
2009: 101) These processes rest in the centre of interest of this thesis because 
through social interaction, humans construct the social reality in which they find 
themselves and of which the meaning of security is a part. Situated in this 
intersubjectively shared social reality, only certain policy options are available to 
actors whereas others do not exist. This social realty accounts for the meaning of 
security established in discourses connected to the highly institutionalised arena at 
the EU level. And it is this meaning which enabled EU actors to implement ESDP as 
the EU’s security policy at that level. 
In this regard, literature utilising discursive approaches identifies change in the 
rationale of security in Europe. This literature is informed by the linguistic turn in 
social constructivism, highlighting the importance of language for the construction 
actors’ identities and their knowledge of the world, arguing for a discursive approach 
in order to analyse change in the construction of EU identity, the reference object of 
security and the best practice of security. (see Larsen 2000b; Sjursen 2004)  
I will show that although discursive approaches have been used to analyse aspects of 
these constructions, the literature will benefit from a perspective analysing the 
meaning of security on which the implementation of ESDP as a security policy on 
the EU level became possible. In the second part of this chapter, I will develop the 
theoretical approach of the analysis. I will start by arguing that security is as much 
influenced by actors’ intersubjectivity as every other social interaction. This 
argument helps the chapter develop the theoretical approach informed by social 
constructivism and discourse analysis by which security can be understood as a 
relational concept.  
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1.1 ESDP and social interaction at the EU level 
So far, two main theories of European integration, i.e. intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism, have been applied to explain the institutional development of 
CFSP/ESDP. The most prominent scholars are Philip H. Gordon utilising 
intergovernmentalism and Jacob Øhrgaad utilising neo-functionalism. They are 
fundamentally divided as to what they understand by integration and the purpose of 
CFSP/ESDP. In terms of intergovernmentalism, integration only occurs when 
perceived gains of member states’ cooperation outweigh the potential costs of losing 
sovereignty. (Gordon 1998: 164) If member states expect higher outcomes while 
cooperating on the EU level, they delegate sovereignty to the EU. (see Moravcsik 
1993) The same holds true for cooperation within the framework of CFSP. (Gordon 
1998: 166) The reason why CFSP is failing or at least why it is underdeveloped, 
compared with the economic cooperation on the EU level, can be explained on this 
basis. Member states are very reluctant to delegate sovereignty in the field of foreign 
and security policy since, for a long period, they did not expect higher outcomes. It 
was only the end of the Cold War that so shifted the circumstances that at least large 
member states perceived higher gains from cooperation. (see Gordon 1998: 170-1) 
Although Gordon focuses exclusively on CFSP, it can be argued that his findings can 
be applied to ESDP as well. Gordon narrowly defines the purpose of CFSP. 
According to him, the purpose of CFSP is to deal with international crises and the 
stabilisation and defence of European security. This is almost identical with the EU’s 
security policy of today.  
However, the findings of neo-liberalism would led to a totally different research 
design than implemented in this thesis because it assumes the national level – 
national interests – as the most important independent variable to explain the EU’s 
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policy including the field of security. While intergovernmentalism concentrates 
particularly on national interests and the lowest common denominator outcomes, it 
lacks to recognise what neo-functionalism defines as integration. Neo-functionalism 
conceptualises integration as the process of implementing a particular quality of 
cooperation which takes place through socialisation. The experience of advanced 
cooperation in one field can lead to further cooperation in another field. The quality 
of cooperation can be measured in different mechanisms, e.g. esprit de corps (Nuttall 
1992: 16), coordination reflex, knock-on-effect (Hill 1982: 199), spill-over 
(Schmitter 1969: 169) and acquis politique as a more or less formally codified 
common position. (Øhrgaard 2004: 30-4) The process of integration is, therefore, 
influenced by these mechanisms of socialisation and starts as soon as cooperation 
reaches a certain level. In this sense, CFSP is a success, since it now includes closer 
cooperation compared with the initial European Political Cooperation (EPC) of 
1970. EPC was a platform to discuss and coordinate foreign policies of participating 
EC member states. This cooperation has evolved qualitatively. It has expanded into 
such political fields as security and defence, which were previously not included. In 
this regard, neo-functionalism understands ESDP as part of European integration 
which again is just a special form of socialisation.  
The level of integration can be analysed by neo-functionalism, since it recognises 
cooperation as a quality of its own. The definition of integration therefore 
differentiates neo-functionalism from intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism 
pays little attention to the process of integration. It is unable to reach beyond a state 
centric perspective. In contrast, neo-functionalism discovers processes “whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose 
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institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”. 
(Haas 1958: 16) The level of integration is not a matter of member states’ interests 
but a matter of how specific groups and individuals perceived their interests and 
values as being best reflected. (see Haas 1958: 5) Depending on their perception, 
actors integrate or disintegrate. Integration can shift the centre of gravity of 
individual interests and values from the national to the European level. (see Haas 
1958: 11; Øhrgaard 1997, 2004)  
However, both approaches are similarly under-theorised, when regarding the origin 
of interests and values. They are more or less taken as given, as a pre-text of action 
and interaction. This is a problematic constrain of both theories because they are 
unable to recognise and understand change in these central categories. This seems to 
be a problem especially in regard to neo-functionalism, since it uses socialisation as 
a concept leading to integration. Through processes of socialisation, loyalty’s centre 
of gravity can change since “it should be possible to detect even subtle changes in 
member states’ definitions of […] interests”. (Øhrgaard 2004: 33) If that is true, 
socialisation can not be exclusively understood as a one directional process creating 
new structures of cooperation on the EU level. New structures alone do not shift 
loyalties. If the focal point of loyalties shifts, this has a huge impact on the interests 
and values of the group in question – in other words, it changes collective identities. 
This argument is also brought forward by sociological institutionalism. (see Lewis 
2000; March and Olsen 1998) Ana Juncos and Christopher Reynolds have 
implemented such an argument in regard to the role of the PSC of the EU plaid 
within ESDP. (see Juncos and Reynolds 2007) Also, the findings of Michael E. 
Smith are very helpful. He identifies areas in which these shifts are recognisable. 
(see Smith 1998: 8-30) Smith argues that empirical data on decision-making 
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procedures provides evidence that “the EU foreign policy system, largely through 
socialization processes, produced its own rules to fill in the gaps left by the original 
intergovernmental bargain.” (Smith 2004bb: 98) Whereas the EU foreign policy 
system builds up on unanimity and, in some fields, qualified majority voting, the 
policy outcomes rarely represent lowest common denominator. He argues that “the 
preference-outliers often adapt their positions in favour of the common one rather 
than veto such decisions”. (Smith 2004bb: 97; Nuttall 1992: 12) Therefore, EU 
foreign policy formation did not exclusively follow formalised rules of decision-
making but intersubjectively shared rules and common interests or identities which 
lead to certain behaviour which does not follow the logic of national interests. (see 
Smith 2004bb: 122; Hopf 1998; Whitman 1998)  
As a result, Smith argues that the process of institutionalisation of EU foreign and 
security policy can best be analysed from a constructivist perspective analysing 
social interaction and discourse practices. (Smith 2004b: 122; Smith 2001) This 
perspective allows research to recognise actors’ reasoning on available solutions 
“based on their collective definition of the problem”. (Smith 2004b: 102) In this 
view, the institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP has enabled institutionalised 
discourses which produce intersubjective meanings affecting actors’ identity and 
their view of the world. This “new reference point” constitutes a new social reality in 
which participants see themselves as colleagues, somewhat independent from their 
national background, acting in a common project. (see Smith 2004b: 102, 106) This 
research project in particular picks up on this argument and translates it into a 
discursive approach. Here, socialisation is conceptualised as social interaction 
through the use of language which then produces common sense or in other words 
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intersubjective meanings which constitute actors’ social reality and limit what can 
and can not be said. 
In sum, the arguments developed by Øhrgaard as well as Smith provide a central 
argument for the relevance of the research question explored in this thesis. Both 
show that the development of an EU foreign and security policy was more than 
intergovernmental but less than supranational. (see Wessels 1982: 15) This contrasts 
other arguments on CFSP and ESDP which followed positivist perspective in saying 
that both policies are only about lowest common denominator outcomes. (see Hyde-
Price 2006: 231; Harpaz 2007: 105)  
Øhrgaard’s findings evidence nothing less than that, in regard to CFSP and ESDP, a 
process of socialisation is underway. This is even further supported by Smith, who 
argues that social interaction and discursive practices need to stay at the centre of 
research on how change took place in the EU foreign policy system, including 
security policy and ESDP. By translating socialisation into a discursive approach, it 
is this process of social interaction through the use of language which rests in the 
focus of my research project. Compared with neo-functionalism, the underlying 
theoretical account goes a step further. My research project argues that processes of 
socialisation mutually constitute agency and structure. Thereby, they shape actors’ 
identity and their understanding of the world. (see later and Onuf 1989: 86; Wendt 
1999; Katzenstein 1996a) Accordingly, this enables certain policy options and 
disables others. Even when such an argument has also been brought forward by 
sociological institutionalism, in the following section I will argue for a constructivist 
approach and the linguistic turn in social constructivism.  
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1.2 European Security 
The literature I have gathered under the header ‘European security’ approaches the 
topic from a linguistic perspective. It starts by a similar assumption as discussed 
above, highlighting the role of language as an important force in the social 
construction of European security. (see Wæver 1996: 107) It thereby pushes the 
argument a bit further by arguing for actors’ discourse dependencies. (see Onuf 
1989: 38) In the following, I will present two different approaches to European 
security, whereas the first by Helen Sjursen takes on a communicative perspective 
and the second, by Henrik Larsen, analyses discourses as context constituting actors’ 
intersubjectivity. (see Sjursen 2004; Larsen 2000b) The discussion of both 
approaches will evolve into the argument that the research question of this project 
needs to focus on the meaning of security underlying the institutionalisation of 
ESDP.  
The starting point of Helen Sjursen’s article is that the “core rationale of security 
policy can change”. (Sjursen 2004: 112) If that is the case, the meaning of security 
and according policies are not exogenously given but dependent on actors’ social 
interaction. (see Wendt 1992) She argues that the shift from traditional approaches to 
a wider understanding of security, including not only military security, can best be 
understood from a constructivist perspective. Her assumption is based on two 
observations. First, traditional approaches to security come from a state-centric 
perspective. Since the wider security concept includes ‘comprehensive security’, 
‘human security’, ‘de-securitization’, ‘soft power’ and ‘soft security’, (see Sjursen 
2004: 107) state-centric perspectives overlook important aspects of security, since 
nation-states are not the only referent objects of security. (see Sjursen 2004: 108) 
Second, the understanding and practice of how security can best be achieved has 
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changed. Security is pursued by multilateral approaches, collective institutions, and 
legally binding agreements. (see Sjursen 2004: 108) The decision in favour of certain 
means is based on a normative outset regulating appropriate behaviour. Both 
assumptions lead Sjursen to conclude that a “conception of actors as 
communicatively competent is helpful” in understanding security. (Sjursen 2004: 
112) New concepts of security do not necessarily include national security interests 
and balance of power as important guidelines for actors’ behaviour but include 
normative standards to conduct security policy. (see Sjursen 2004: 111) 
Later in the text, Sjursen argues that Europe’s approach to security is particularly 
driven by the wider understanding of security. (see Sjursen 2004: 118-2) She relates 
her argument to the debate on Europe as a civilian or normative power. (see Duchêne 
1972, 1973; Manners 2002, 2006) From a communicative perspective, it is plausible 
that the EU acts as a normative power because this is what actors think they ought to 
do. (see Sjursen 2004: 122) For example, empirical research could show if and how 
“arguments and public deliberation […] can make a difference to international 
security”. (Sjursen 2004: 122) Whether or not civilian power Europe can make a 
difference depends not only on its own lack of coherence in foreign policy but also 
in the limited role of international law. The EU could be successful in acting 
exclusively as a civilian or normative power only if international law was 
enforceable. (see Sjursen 2004: 122) However, Sjursen argues that although the 
international level lacks a high quality of legally binding laws, it is different for 
Europe. (see Sjursen 2004: 123) She uses this to argue that European security has 
changed in two ways: first, the reference object of security has shifted away from 
exclusively focusing on nation states to include individual citizens. Second, practices 
have changed by which security is established.  
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Therefore, Sjursen’s article contains two important arguments. First, language is 
important in understanding actors’ behaviour and the context in which this behaviour 
takes place. This argument leads Sjursen to utilise a communicative perspective 
which understands action based on actors’ valid verbal claims – which can only be 
valid in reference to a specific context. Second, in order to understand security, it is 
important to understand how security is constructed. According to Sjursen’s 
perspective, security is either constructed through a legal order or it purely follows 
the interests of actors. Here, Sjursen takes on two different perspectives: i) without a 
common judicial order, communicative acts potentially turn out to be nothing other 
than moral arguments to cover interests which are different to these claims. (see 
Sjursen 2004: 122; Eriksen 2001) Thereby she implicitly implements the difference 
between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. (see Smith 
2004b: 99) And ii) Since, within Europe, legal sources link politics to human rights, 
international law and fundamental freedoms, actors are able to make normative 
claims in security policy because the legal context validates these claims. As a result, 
her focus is on the EU’s internal security policy rather than its external behaviour. 
We see here fundamental differences in Sjursen’s approaches and the one applied in 
this thesis. Sjursen argues that the observed change in security policy is based on a 
normative, meaning moral, shift which becomes possible only under a common 
judicial order. In this scenario, the context is nothing other than the legal system. 
Since the international sphere does not have such a legal system, change in security 
policy is not possible – or at least it is hard to verify because moral claims can 
always be a cover-up for actors’ real interests. In contrast, I especially focus on the 
context, the social reality, which provides meaning to actors’ behaviour. The social 
reality provides the boundaries and logics of actors’ rationale of security, which are 
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constructed by processes of sense making through social action and interaction. 
These processes generate intersubjective meanings which affect and shape actors’ 
understanding of the world surrounding them. This does not implement a normative, 
let alone moral argument. 
In Sjursen’s perspective, two different logics of actors’ behaviour are at work, the 
first is rationality and the second is normative or moral behaviour. She intends to 
analyse individual speech acts only in regard to the second logic, since claims can 
only be validated when the context provides normative standards of behaviour – 
preferably legally binding standards. But why not make it an empirical question of 
whether or not discursive practices exclusively produce normative, meaning moral, 
knowledge? I argue that actors’ behaviour is essentially dependent on their 
understanding of the world surrounding them, and it is doubtful that this exclusively 
contains categories of normative or moral behaviour in Sjursen’s sense.  
In order to understand how actors’ behaviour becomes possible, the construction and 
outset of their social reality needs to be analysed. I argue that this can best be done 
by analysing the language in use, which provides meanings to social action and 
interaction understood as the process of socialisation.  
In contrast to Sjursen, Henrik Larsen’s approach is very close to this perspective. He 
not only focuses on the context in which action takes place but also  focuses on how 
this context affects the EU’s external behaviour. (see Larsen 1997b, 2000b, 2004) He 
sees language as an independent force constituting meaning. (see Larsen 2004: 62-3) 
Actors’ understanding of their social world is established by these meanings. There 
is no meaning “residing outside language”. (p.64) In order to understand the social 
world and actors’ behaviour within it, Larsen argues for discourse analysis. “[T]he 
basic assumption […] is that meaning can be studied by studying language.” (Larsen 
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2000a: 338) His discursive analysis is based on Foucault (see Foucault 1989) and 
says that discourse needs to be understood as a limited range of possible statements. 
This limited range also affects actors’ behaviour, enabling particular policy choices 
while disabling others. (see Larsen 1997a)  
The analysis is led by three “analytically distinguishable bundles of theoretical 
claims”. (Milliken 1999b: 228, see also 231) First, discourses are systems of 
representation. They provide meaning to reality and thereby construct the social 
reality in which actors find themselves. Second, discourses produce subjects and 
objects. By producing relationships between subjects and subjects on the one hand 
and subjects and objects on the other hand, discourses establish order and a system 
of power. This order constrains actors’ behaviour. Third, discourses are open to 
change. It is only by articulation that meanings are (re-)produced which makes 
discourses potentially instable. Research needs to analyse those forces which 
stabilise and maintain dominant meanings. Such an analysis needs to include the 
search for alternative discourses which are silenced or constrained by hegemonic 
discourses. Equipped with these three theoretical claims, discourse analysis will be 
able to analyse social reality. 
The theoretical claims above are taken from Larsen’s chapter in the book edited by 
Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen. (see Tonra and Christiansen 2004) He argues 
for the need of further research on European foreign policy from a discursive 
perspective. In earlier attempts, Larsen has applied discourse analysis to different 
aspects of European integration, although his research methodology was less explicit 
than for which he argued in his 2004 chapter. (see Larsen 1997a, 1997b, 2004) 
Larsen focused on how national backgrounds have shaped European policies. (see 
Larsen 1999)  He also analysed whether a common language was used to discuss 
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security in the EU Council. (see Larsen 2000a) He concluded that the meaning of 
security relevant in the context of the Council was understood as security of the 
European continent but lacking an external dimension going beyond this sphere. (see 
Larsen 2000a: 344-47) Even if actors in the Council recognised security problems 
beyond this contiguity, the EU more or less only contributed to international security 
by stabilizing the European continent. (p.347-8) In addition, he reached the 
conclusion that the EU understood itself as a civilian power promoting its liberal 
values. That was understood as a contribution to international security based on the 
thesis of democratic peace. (see Larsen 2000a: 353) 
Summary 
Overall, I have shown in the literature review that my research project will add to the 
literature on European integration and European security while analysing processes 
of social interaction on the EU level connected to the field of security policy. 
Larsen’s findings can be used to further argue for the gap in literature in four ways. 
First, although he analysed the common language of security, the question is how 
this common language changed over time and how it enabled EU actors to 
implement ESDP at the end of the 20th century? This question is puzzling and of 
even more importance today, since the EU not only implemented an EU security 
policy by the time of ESDP’s inauguration but implemented its first civilian and 
military operations in 2003, which showed the effects of the EU’s security policy on 
the ground. This dynamic and the change or development in the meaning of security 
has not been explained by Larsen. He showed that prior to 2000, when the article 
was published, the EU had a security dimension exclusively focusing on security 
within Europe. This conclusion does not seem to fit the later period, when the EU 
used civilian and military capabilities in the DRC. I will also show that the EU 
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implemented a concept of security which was strongly connected to development 
policy reaching beyond the European continent as early as 2000 and 2001. 
Therefore, the question is how the meaning of security has developed in order to 
enable actors to implement ESDP. 
Second, Larsen used a very broad concept of security. For him, European 
enlargement counted as a security policy of the EU. Since he showed that actors 
claimed enlargement to be security relevant, his findings were absolutely correct. 
But, my research project will narrow down the focus explicitly on the meaning 
security which enabled actors to impelement a rather hard power like security plicy 
within ESDP. The project is situated between, so to speak, Larsen’s work and the 
notion of security applied by scholars of the strategic culture focusing on the use of 
force exclusively. (see Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2005; Rynning 2003)  
Third, the advantage of this narrow perspective is that my project provides room to 
systematically analyse the construction of security. I argue that this can best be done 
by understanding security as a relational concept. The meaning of security is 
constituted through the relation of identity and the perception of threats from this 
intersubjective perspective. Larsen’s approach was missing an explicit 
conceptualisation of how the meaning of security is constructed. 
Fourth, due to his broader understanding of security, his findings were very general. 
This may also be due to a methodological weakness. In his research, he had 
identified subjects and objects implemented in the dominant discourses on European 
security within the EU Council. To understand in depth how subjects and objects as 
well as how they were situated towards each other, the analysis needs to focus on the 
established order and power relations between them. (see Doty 1993: 306) Subject 
positioning can be analysed focusing on binary oppositions and their creation of 
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power relations. (see Milliken 2001: 143) Also, dominant discourses need to be 
identified and reflected in relation to underlying discourses and how they 
conceptualise subjects and objects differently. These and further methodologies will 
enhance the research capacities of discursive approaches. They will be implemented 
throughout this thesis. In the following I develop the constructivist approach and its 
linguistic dimension implemented throughout this thesis  
2. Discourse and Social Reality 
In this section I develop my theoretical account of constructivism in order to analyse 
how central EU actors, responsible for the institutionalisation and implementation of 
ESDP, perceived security. The approach needs to address the following questions: 
how was the referent object of security constructed; how were the threats or security 
problems constructed with which the referent object was confronted and how did this 
make possible the implementation of a security policy at the EU level?  
The theoretical part is organised in five sub-parts: the first addresses actors’ 
discourse dependency and the importance of meanings for actors’ interaction. The 
second part develops the theoretical groundwork of my approach. The main 
argument of this part points to security as being as much influenced by actors’ 
intersubjectivity as every other social interaction. The third part develops the 
understanding that security is socially constructed. It argues for a relational 
conceptualisation of security relating identity constructions to the perception of 
threats and the construction of rules applying in the case of insecurity. In the fourth 
section, this concept is related to the meaning of security constituting ESDP. It 
develops a map of discourses which are relevant to the meaning of security enabling 
a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The map can be divided into 
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three discursive fields: i) European integration, ii) global challenges, and iii) 
international order. This leads my argument to conceptualise that discourses are 
connected to time and space. Following this conceptualisation I will discuss the most 
dominating narratives in each field. This straightens the focus on relevant aspects of 
the meaning of security. The fifth part provides the methods of how to analyse the 
meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. In 
this part I will develop a set of research methods by which I will analyse documents, 
speeches, and other texts relevant to my question. It serves to unfold the methods I 
will use to rigorously apply the discursive analysis to relevant texts. Finally, in the 
summary I will conclude the key points of my approach in order to prepare the 
reader for the empirical analysis. 
2.1 Constructivist Account 
My approach rests on four central assumptions: discourse dependency (see Onuf 
1989: 38) – language as the practice of social interaction –, intersubjective meanings 
as discursively upheld rules and knowledge, mutual constitution of agency and 
structure, and collective identities which affect actors’ understanding of themselves 
and the world surrounding them. The important pre-assumption of my analysis is 
that actors can only make sense of the world through the use of language. (see 
Foucault 1991: 58) Language plays an important role in defining intersubjective 
meanings. Meanings are the centrepiece to access reality – or rather what is 
perceived as such. In the following sections of this chapter I will develop my 
theoretical account in five steps: i) argue for discourse dependency, ii) present the 
basic theoretical assumptions, iii) conceptualise security as a relational complex, iv) 
connect the research to time and space, v) develop the research methods. Finally, the 
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conclusion provides a summary of my approach to highlight the most important 
aspects. This will lead into the analytical sections of this thesis. 
2.1.1 Discourse Dependency 
Humans are not able to know all features of the world independent of discourses 
about them. They are discourse dependent. (see Onuf 1989: 38) This position is the 
basic theoretical assumption of my thesis. Humans are language users. They use 
language to make sense of the world, to communicate and, therefore, interact with 
each other. (see Hansen 2006: 18-9) “Through the medium of language, mind 
subordinated world.” (Onuf 1989: 39) This quote reflects the ontological perspective 
of discursive approaches which can be located in post-positivist perspective of 
constructivism and post-structuralism. (see Hansen 2006; Milliken 1999a; Campbell 
1992; Doty 1996; Neumann 2001; Simhandl 2007) The question is not to deny the 
existence of ‘reality’. ‘Reality’ refers to the material existence of the world and all its 
features. Instead, the ontological position starts with the assumption that humans can 
not know reality independently from making sense of it. (see Burr 2003: 81-2) 
Making sense means to produce knowledge about reality. (see Angermüller et al. 
2005: 8) Humans make sense of the world through language. (see Foucault 1984: 
127) Language is the medium through which humans seek reason and thereby find, 
or produce, order in the world.(see Onuf 1989: 39)  
Producing order is the effect which this thesis intends to analyse. Finding order can 
be understood as in particularly applicable to natural phenomena as an outcome of 
natural laws. But these natural laws are not applicable to social life. Social life is 
constituted by social interaction of humans. This interaction does not follow natural 
laws. It is fundamentally characterised by meanings given to action and interaction. 
(see Foucault 1984: 403) For example, in British working life when someone refers 
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to a ‘tea-break’ it does not necessarily mean that the person will drink tea. The 
meaning of the sentence is that the person is a member of staff who will have a 
break, interrupting her working day. In that break she may or may not drink and eat 
something. The fundamental meaning is, however, that the person during that break 
will not be available for business purposes. She refers to a widely accepted practice 
on which she legitimately can claim not to be available. Through that sentence she 
defines herself as a valuable member of staff who can rightfully claim a break. 
Thereby, she participates in a commonly established practice ordering working life.  
The example shows that ‘producing order’ is the effect of humans’ sense making. 
Sense making is the process by which humans apply meaning to reality. (see Onuf 
1989: 127; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 59; Crossley 1996) These meanings are not 
‘out there’, available in the ‘real world’. The underlying claim is that individuals do 
not act based on objective, independent knowledge of the world. (see Potter 1996:13; 
Berger 1966) Their knowledge of the world is intersubjective, produced and 
reproduced through social interaction via the use of language. The argument is that 
language can not be grounded in anything but language, because grounding depends 
again on “linguistic conventions and presuppositions”. (Crossley 1996: 41; 
Wittgenstein 1953: 20) It is through the use of language that agents produce and 
reproduce their understanding of reality. Through the interaction of actors, meanings 
become intersubjectively shared and constitute actors’ social reality. (see Derrida 
1978: 279) This logic denies that world and words are independent from each other. 
Instead, it sees them as mutually constitutive. (see Luckmann and Berger 1966: 94) 
Here, world again refers to the intersubjective knowledge of it. Mutual constitution 
of world and words means that while agents use language to make sense of the 
world, at the same time they define how the world is ordered, who they are and 
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where they see themselves positioned in the world. In other words, “the world of 
‘things’ has no meaningful structure except in connection with the standards we 
employ to ascribe qualities to it”. (Shapiro 1981: 20) This process of sense making 
leads to an intersubjectively held understanding of the world, including rules and 
knowledge of how to act and how to reason. (see Berger and Luckmann 2002: 48) 
These knowledge and rules are taken for granted as reality, as the objective truth of 
the world. (see Giddens 1984: 37, Giddens 1984: 321-2) Agents act within their 
social reality based on rules and their knowledge of it. From this perspective, agents 
are context bound, since rules and knowledge enables only particular options of 
behaviour, whereas others are either inappropriate or just not available from the 
agent’s perspective. (see Diez 1999: 603) 
The only way agents can learn rules and gain knowledge about the world is through 
social interaction. Through social interaction actors “reproduce the conditions that 
make these activities possible”. (Giddens 1982: 2, see also Wendt 1999) Social 
interaction is first and foremost communication, the process of giving meaning to 
reality. For example, the conditions that make activities possible are those defining a 
master as the ruler and the slave as the dominated object. (see Wendt 1999: 25) The 
context and practice of the relationship – and hence the rules immanent to both 
agents – are produced and reproduced through language. (see Butler 1997: 5) 
Without a meaning, interaction would not be possible because agents would not 
know in which interaction they are involved, what they should expect from it, or how 
they should behave. Hence, it is fundamentally important that meanings are 
communicated. Only through their communication, can meanings define and 
redefine conditions of action and interaction. In other words, the situation in which 
‘words subordinated world’ is that of intersubjectively shared meanings. This is the 
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condition where not only one agent but a group of people uses a particular meaning. 
Meanings only make sense to different actors when they are shared among them.  
2.1.2 From Discourse to Social Reality 
In the above, I have used notions like language, meanings, and discourse, without 
defining them in detail. At the first glance they might look interchangeable, but they 
are not. In the following I will first clarify these three notions. Second, I will address 
the question how intersubjective meanings can be understood as discursively upheld 
rules and knowledge. This is the fundamental part of my theoretical approach. It 
shall clarify how social structures are constituted through discourses. Here, the 
aspect of contestedness and change will be discussed to enable the analysis to 
recognise changes in the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU 
level and within ESDP. This leads, third, to the perspective that agency and structure 
are mutually constituted. This discussion will shift the focus from social structure to 
agents and their identities. This will lead the chapter into the next sub-section 
conceptualising collective identity as a category of stable and consolidated 
definitions of the self and its immanent rules of behaviour. The section on identity 
then leads me to the conceptualisation of social processes by which actors perceive 
other actors or phenomena as a security problem or as a threat.  
To start with the first point, Onuf has argued that humans are language users and that 
“through the medium of language, mind subordinated world”. (Onuf 1989: 39) The 
process of ‘mind subordinating world’ is fundamentally related to the use of 
language. (see Crossley 1996: 38) Language, here, is just the written or spoken 
words which together – following a particular grammar – build English, German, 
Portuguese etc. The rules of a particular language are shared among a group of 
people. They use that language to communicate with each other. Language is the 
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vehicle through which communication becomes possible. But this dimension of 
communication is only one dimension of social interaction. It is not the focus of this 
analysis. 
Meanings are another dimension of communication. They are the focus of this 
analysis. Meanings are always joined with language. Meanings can be defined, 
redefined and stabilised only through the use of language. The difference between 
meaning and language is a qualitative one. Language is not only representative but 
also performative. (see Foucault 1984: 82) Whereas language is the ‘medium’, 
‘meanings’ are the result of ‘mind subordinating world’. Meanings are (re-)defined 
within discourses. A discourse describes the process of making sense of the world. In 
the literature, different concepts of discourse exist. Especially for Foucault and 
scholars using or referring to his work, discourse is much more than an analytical 
concept. (see Foucault 1984) Their notion of discourse is close to what I call 
meaning. However, I will use ‘discourse’ as an analytical concept to distinguish 
between different processes of sense making. In other words, discourse can be 
defined “as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, 
dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being”. (Phillips and Hardy 
2002: 3; Parker 1992) The purpose is to be able to distinguish between dynamics of 
social interaction and their analytical account. With the notion discourse I intend to 
categorise different process of (re-)defining and stabilising meanings. Whereas 
meanings are the crucial parts of discourses which define rules, knowledge and 
identities as parts of the social reality. 
Whereas discourse is an analytical concept to categorise different aspects of social 
life, meanings have ontological status in constituting social reality. Intersubjective 
meanings are the cornerstones of social reality. (see Onuf 1989: 43; Cortese and 
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Duszak 2005: 11, 24-5) Foucault argued that “we must conceive discourse as 
violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on 
them”. (Foucault 1984: 127) From here, it follows that ‘making sense’ is not only 
labelling something as master or as a tea-break. Making sense is also ‘doing’. (see 
Kratochwil 1989: 8; Holtgraves 2001: 10-12; Austin 1975) It is doing in the sense 
that through the use of language and the definition of meanings, rules are defined 
and knowledge established which again affect actors’ behaviour. This aspect leads to 
the second sub-section on the fundamental parts of my approach. 
Meanings are the cornerstones of constructing social reality. (see Onuf 1989: 43) 
They constitute effects, they make them possible. (see Wendt 1992: 403; Wendt 
1999: 25) The meaning which we give to the world mutually constitutes rules and 
knowledge. Meanings describe objects, properties, characters, roles, or processes. 
Through that description, meanings at the same time tell how to deal with objects or 
how to behave in a specific situation. Also, meanings establish knowledge about 
what they describe. Meanings mutually constitute rules and knowledge. These rules 
and knowledge affect actors’ behaviour in a specific context. But, meanings develop 
this force only when they are intersubjectively shared.  
The process of defining and redefining meanings through the use of language is a 
continuous process. Meanings do not exist out there, independent or ‘free floating’. 
They need to be articulated. (Diez 1999: 609; Guzzini 2000: 164) Meanings can be 
redefined and re-established only through their articulation. A meaning not 
articulated would no longer form a part of social reality. It would not be practiced 
and would then be forgotten. In this sense, meanings have a dual quality as 
structuring and as constructed. Or in other words, they are reflexive.  (see Giddens 
1979: 69) On the one side, meanings provide meaning to action and thereby affect 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 35 
 
actor’s behaviour. On the other side, they only have this force through their 
articulation, through their practice. Meanings essentially lie in the practice. (see 
Taylor 1993: 58; Wiener 2004: 191-2) Through this process, meanings become 
intersubjectively shared. 
This reflexive process could be criticised as being self-referential. It certainly does 
not establish a causal mechanism in which one exists prior to the other. That would 
mean that meanings exist prior to action and therefore cause a particular action. It 
would establish meanings as independent variables and make them exogenously and 
pre-fixed. Reflexivity highlights the duality of both: structuring and constructed. (see 
Giddens 1979: 69; Wiener 2004: 191) The process of defining and redefining 
meaning can be understood as a path which can take different directions. (see Diez 
1999: 607; Derrida 1978) During the process in which intersubjectivity is 
established, different interpretations battle with each other to become the meaning in 
practice. Meanings are contested when their definitions are not fixed or already fixed 
meanings are being contested by new definitions. (Diez 1999: 602-3; Connolly 1993) 
If actors’ understanding of the world is intersubjective, then different understandings 
of the world exist. Otherwise, the understanding of the world would be objective 
because every single individual would share it. The understanding would then exist 
exogenous to interaction. But, since meanings which form actors’ understanding of 
the world are intersubjective, different interpretations of certain aspects at least co-
exist. Contestedness is the process in which a meaning becomes (more widely) 
intersubjectively shared through social interaction. (see Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 897; Payne 2001: 38-9) Meanings are defined and redefined until they reach a 
status of relative stability. On the way to that stability they are contested, their 
definition and redefinition battles for stability with other meanings or interpretations.  
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This process opens up the possibility for change. It is very likely that sense making 
by different actors produces different perspectives onto the world. But sense making 
here is defined as essentially a process of interaction, as an open process which is 
constantly constructed and set together to be (re)defined over time. (see Diez 1999: 
610; Laclau and Mouffe 1985) How the process develops is not fixed prior to its 
construction. The process of humans’ sense making is responsible for the definition 
and redefinition of meanings. The question why the process develops in a certain 
way is of lesser importance to my analysis. Such questions have been addressed by 
critical approaches. (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 48-54; see Cox 1981; 1983)  
However, I am interested in how the meaning of security established at the EU level 
changed over time, making possible the EU’s approach to foreign but especially to 
security policy. In this regard, two different concepts of change are essential: first, 
that by which meanings are contested and finally become fixed and intersubjectively 
shared. In other words, change takes place as development when marginalised 
discourses gain more support – based on structural circumstances or speech acts. 
Second, discursive crises take place when new developments do not fit already fixed 
meanings. The word crisis shifts the focus to short periods of times in which changes 
can be observed. Both concepts of change will be discussed later in the section on 
research methods. 
While meanings are intersubjectively held, they mutually constitute rules and 
knowledge. Rules and knowledge are discursively upheld. Intersubjective rules give 
meaning to actors’ behaviour, (see Guzzini 2000: 155) since agents take the social 
reality for granted and behave accordingly. In this sense, rules are “collective 
expectations”. (Katzenstein 1996b: 7) They order the social world and humans’ 
interaction. For example, when someone claims “I’m having my tea”, everybody 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 37 
 
expects him to take a break from work, not to attend a business meeting. The rule is 
collectively shared and re-constructed through the practice. (see Guzzini 2000: 166) 
Everybody expects the same result from following the rule. 
In the literature, two or sometimes three different notions have been used to describe 
these regulative and constitutive effects. These notions are rules, norms, and ideas. 
(see Kratochwil 1989: Ch 1; Checkel 1993, 1999; Finnemore 1996; Jepperson et al. 
1996: 54; Thomson 1993; Wendt 1999: Ch. 6) However, I will use the notion ‘rules’ 
exclusively as have a regulative and a constitutive effect.  
Katzenstein argues to differentiate between norms and rules. Norms serve as 
standards of behaviour. They are regulative, whereas rules are constitutive. He 
argues that rules define actor’s identity. (see Katzenstein 1996b: 5) The difference 
between regulative and constitutive is hard to distinguish empirically, and it 
therefore can only be an analytical one. But even on that level, rules and norms are 
difficult to distinguish. Therefore, rules always have a regulative and constitutive 
effect simultaneously. (see Onuf 1989: 86; March and Olsen 1998: 951) That is what 
Wendt described as “the nature of each is a function of its relation to the other”. 
(Wendt 1999: 199) Wendt used this description to clarify the effect of mutual 
constitution of agency and structure. This effect will be discussed in detail below. 
Here, it serves to illustrate the difficulty – or impossibility – to differentiate between 
regulative norms and constitutive rules.  
Social reality is ‘organised’ through rules which are mutually constituted by actors 
while they make sense of the world. This establishes a social structure which 
‘organises’ the relation between actors. In turn the social structure is organised 
through rules. They establish “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a 
given identity”. (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54; see Katzenstein 1996b: 5) This quote 
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makes it clear why regulative and constitutive effects are not distinguishable. Rules 
are related to a given identity. If they are related to a given identity they include 
aspects of this identity. Therefore, as a matter of parsimony rules have constitutive 
and regulative effect. 
From here, the question follows why actors behave in accordance with rules? The 
state of the art literature in the field of international relations theory gives a fairly 
clear answer. The logic of appropriateness argues that action is rule-based because 
rules are associated with “particular identities to particular situations”. (March and 
Olsen 1998: 951) The logic is contrasted by the logic of expectations of 
consequences by which rational actors choose among alternatives based on their 
interest with the aim to maximise their own gains. (March and Olsen 1998: 949) And 
finally, it is argued that the logics are not mutually exclusive but that actor’s 
behaviour almost always carries elements of both. (March and Olsen 1998: 952) 
The perspective taken within this thesis is somewhat different. It focuses on the 
politics of discourse and its force not to cause but to enable action. (see Diez 1999: 
605) Building on the work of Nicolas Onuf, the thesis focuses on the logics of action 
and interaction established through language constituting social reality. In other 
words, the rational of how to behave in a given situation is located in the discourse. 
It is more than possible that rules are established within discourses requiring interest 
driven behaviour or which require the logic of appropriateness. To develop this 
argument it is essential to remind the reader of the very starting point that agents 
produce order through their practice by using language. This reproduces rules with 
such a high consistency that they are taken as “objective properties”. (Onuf 1989: 
60) Thus, applying to rules and following their guidance becomes perceived as 
rational behaviour. Onuf understands rational behaviour as being based on rules 
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which organise social life. (see Onuf 1989: 60) It is rational in the sense that 
behaviour is examined to be proper and collectively expected. At the same time, this 
behaviour mutually (re)constitutes identities. ‘Rational’ behaviour – understood as 
following objective properties of actors’ social reality – stabilises those rules already 
in practice. It strongly stabilises the social reality in place which is taken for granted 
and accepted as reality. (see Luckmann and Berger 1966: 37) 
Rules do not govern everything that is social. Humans can make choices by deciding 
whether or not to follow a rule. Also, social reality is not so simple that in a given 
situation, actors only have one rule at their disposal. But rules govern the 
construction of a situation in which humans make choices about their behaviour. (see 
Onuf 1989: 261) Individuals are able to make choices. They are able to foresee and 
to countenance alternatives. (see Elster 1979: 4-28) Furthermore, in the process of 
making choices actors must deal with uncertainty. (see Onuf 1989: 261) Uncertainty 
can depend on two reasons. First, the actor who chooses has a weak knowledge. 
Second, the decision is also effected by other actors who make their choices by 
anticipating the decision of the first actor. Their decisions might affect each other in 
an unpredictable way. (see Onuf 1989: 261) In other words, the social structure in 
which individuals make choices affects these choices. Individuals make sense about 
how to choose within the boundaries of their social reality. The process of choosing 
within social ‘boundaries’ is called reasoning. (see Kratochwil 1989: 11-2; Onuf 
1989: 96) Reasoning is a process of choosing from available means to achieve ends, 
goals, or objectives. (see Onuf 1989: 258-9) Reasoning is based on intersubjectively 
held meanings which constitute social reality. Therefore, reasoning always takes 
place in a given set of rules and knowledge which is the discourse about them. This 
defines what is perceived as rational behaviour which may include behaviour 
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following the logic of consequences and appropriateness. The very central argument 
is, however, that both depend on actors reasoning which again is located within the 
discourse. As argued above, discourses and their inherent meanings enable certain 
behaviour and disable others.  
Here, the discussion has reached a point in which it is necessary to develop the 
relationship between rules and actors more thoroughly, because I frequently referred 
implicitly or explicitly above to the process of mutual constitution of agency and 
structure. The relation between the two is important in developing a concept of 
collective identity which is central to my analysis. It is central since it serves as the 
foundation on which threat constructions become possible, which again is 
constitutive for the meaning of security. In the light of the discussion above, the 
purpose of the following section is to clarify the mutual constitution of agency and 
structure. Thereby I will develop a concept of collective identity and develop how 
collective identities are crucial for the relation between ‘self’ and ‘other’. This 
finally will lead me to discuss how threats are constructed and how this depends on 
collective identities respectively. I further argue that the relation of the two 
establishes a social structure defining appropriate behaviour in a situation of 
insecurity. This social structure constitutes the meaning of security which is 
institutionalised with ESDP. 
2.1.3 Collective Identities and the Construction of Threats 
In the following I am going to discuss how collective identities affect actors’ 
behaviour. I first highlight the importance of the context in which actors find 
themselves. Second, I refer to the literature on the formation of collective identities. 
Here, I will conceptualise two different dimensions of identity, the internal and 
external dimensions which are understood to play different roles in identity 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 41 
 
formations. Then I discuss how collective identities affect actors’ behaviour. I 
especially focus on how identities enable the construction of threats. This is 
important to answer my research question on the meaning of security. 
I have introduced rules as discursively upheld by intersubjective meanings. The 
process of social interaction not only constitutes rules as social structure, at the same 
time it affects actors in their behaviour, their constitution and their existence. (see 
Jepperson et al. 1996: 41) Social reality and actors penetrate each other in a process 
of mutual constitution. (see Giddens 1984: 1-2; Checkel 1998: 326) In this sense, 
Wendt has argued that identities are a reflection of actors’ socialization. (see Wendt 
1992: 404) Within the process of sense making, agents interact with each other 
through the use of language by which identities are continuously constituted through 
conversation. (see Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 35)  
Collective identities provide actors with a particular understanding of the world 
surrounding them. (see  Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Wendt 1994) They are 
constitutionally related to the process of sense making which identities reflect. 
Collective identities “affect the way in which members interpret and react to issues” 
facing them. (Hardy et al. 2005: 61) It is very likely that actors are involved in 
different processes of sense making. Therefore, they are members of various ‘we’-
groups or communities. Accordingly, actors can hold multiple identities which apply 
in certain contexts. (see Katzenstein 1996b: 24-5; Marcussen et al. 1999: 103; 
Neumann 2001: 144) Identities define appropriate behaviour as well as collective 
expectations for those acting within – as a member of – a particular ‘we’-group. 
Therefore, they are reflexively connected with rules of actors’ social reality. Also, 
equipped with their intersubjective perspectives, actors approach the world outside 
of ‘their’ groups. (see Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Wendt 1994; Hardy et al. 2005) 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 42 
 
Identities establish a particular understanding of the world shared by members of the 
community. The community is a domain in which actors share understandings of 
themselves and each other, which then leads to predictable and replicable patterns of 
action within a specific context. (see Hopf 1998: 199)  
Identity formation necessarily presupposes the existence of alternative others. 
Collective identities by definition include a dimension of “boundary drawing”, 
(Wendt 1999: 74) because they apply only to members of a defined community. If 
that is the case, identities have an internal as well as an external dimension. For this 
thesis, both dimensions are important. In contrast to Wendt, the concept of identity 
formation does not presuppose the existence of identities outside of discourse and 
hence outside of the social interaction through the use of language. In other words, 
identities are given meaning to them by articulations of group members constituting 
the group as an actor in a particular social field. (see Larsen 2002: 287) 
As a first step, I will discuss different processes of identity formation. The literature 
includes at least three different approaches dealing with identity formations. They 
can be called ‘liberal constructivism’, ‘symbolic interactionism’, and ‘critical 
constructivism’. (see Rumelili 2004: 30-1) In regard to identity formation and its 
relation to the ‘other’, they conceptualise the external dimension of identity 
formation differently. I will discuss the approaches in order to develop an 
understanding of how identities make possible threat constructions while referring, 
in a second step, to Rumelili’s heuristic definition of inclusive and exclusive 
identities. (see Rumelili 2004: 29) 
The approaches vary in the degree of how far identity formation is dependent on its 
relation to a significant ‘other’. The question is whether “identity requires 
difference”. (Campbell 1992: 69; see Rumelili 2004: 35) Critical constructivism 
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understands identity as a process of juxtapositioning. (see Doty 1996: 136) This 
logic does not have a behavioural dimension to it. (see Rumelili 2004: 29) Instead, 
juxtapose means that a positive term always and necessarily establishes its negative 
counterpart. This logic is immanent to discourses which are the only way through 
which humans can understand the world surrounding them. (see Foucault 1989: 151) 
Foucault has pointed out this effect. The argument is that language is unable to 
preserve stable meanings over time. (see Neumann 1996: 160) “[C]ontradiction is 
always anterior to the discourse [and] then functions […] as the principle of its 
historicity.” (Foucault 1989: 151) In this view, othering is immanent to discourses 
since through juxtaposing, meanings reach higher stability. From this perspective, 
discourses always produce two identities, the moral superior as ‘self’ and its negative 
‘other’. For example, David Campbell has analysed the importance of the significant 
‘other’ to the construction of an US foreign policy. (see Campbell 1992)  
In contrast to this approach, symbolic interactionism does not recognise such a 
dynamic. It understands identity formation “as a process of socialisation through 
which an individual comes to see herself in the way others do”. (Rumelili 2004: 30) 
Here, the meaning of ‘others’ is different to that of the critical approach. Within 
symbolic interactionism, ‘others’ are members of the same group as the individual in 
question. The approach does not conceptualise the external ‘other’ as being 
important for identity formations. In contrast to critical constructivism, in which 
‘othering’ is the only way of identity formation, symbolic interactionism does not at 
all recognise the external ‘other’ as relevant.  
The somewhat middle ground is provided by liberal constructivism. It argues that 
collective identities are generated by interaction within a given social structure 
constituted by norms, institutions, ideas, and collective meanings. (see Rumelili 
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2004: 30-1; Jepperson et al. 1996) It also establishes behavioural implications of 
self/other relations as a continuum ranging from negative to positive. (see Rumelili 
2004: 34) This continuum measures whether identities are developed so that states 
can positively ascribe to each other. If they can, a collective identity is formed which 
leads to a security community through which anarchy can be defeated. (see Mattern 
2000: 299; Adler and Barnett 1998) Although the approach to security communities 
strongly supports the argument that identities contribute to security, it does not 
address the question how identities make possible threat constructions because it 
focuses on the positive side of association. 
A way out is provided by Bahar Rumelili, who has introduced two heuristic concepts 
of identities which affect group relations. Both concepts are helpful for the 
conceptualisation of processes of threat construction. She calls the concepts inclusive 
and exclusive identities. (see Rumelili 2004: 33) The interesting point about these 
concepts is that they are related to different types of discourses responsible for 
particular relations to the ‘other’. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The concept thereby takes 
note of the post-structuralist understanding of juxtapositioning, but recognises, at the 
same time, the importance of group internal sense making processes. This serves my 
approach to collective identities and the construction of threats.  
The process of sense making as social interaction is important regarding the group 
internal logic of identity formation. Social interaction is communication through the 
use of language and leads to intersubjectively shared meanings. It leads to a common 
understanding establishing rules which perform regulative as well as constitutive acts 
leading to a particular identity. In this sense, identities are not particular about 
boundary drawing. They are produced alongside the definition of a social structure 
which relates different actors within a group or community. This process does not 
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include a process of othering which juxtapositioning imposes. (see Foucault 1989: 
151) Identities, and the appropriate behaviour inherent to this identity, are not 
produced by a process of ‘othering’. They are based on an internal socialisation 
process. But external behaviour also depends on this way of identity construction, 
since the identity in question provides an understanding of the world surrounding it. 
In other words, the social reality certainly does not end at the boundaries of the 
collective identity. As soon as identities also regulate external behaviour, they need 
to correspond to this external sphere.  
Keeping that in mind, othering may well play an important role regarding the 
relationship between collective identities and the outside or ‘other’. ‘Othering’ is 
assumed as an inherent characteristic of discourses by which identities are stabilised. 
However, it seems to be impossible to combine the two epistemological perspectives 
of i) group internal sense making and its importance to identity formation with ii) 
othering as an internal logic of discourses. But Rumelili has provided a way out by 
developing his heuristic definition of inclusive and exclusive identities, on which I 
will draw in the following. 
Inclusive identities “embody a conception of difference based on acquired 
characteristics”. (Rumelili 2004: 37) The logic behind this concept is that identity 
formation rests on rules and knowledge to which ‘others’ can positively ascribe. In 
this sense, the other is less ‘self’. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The formation process of 
the inclusive identity follows the logic of socialisation of group members. It rests on 
internal processes of ‘producing order’. (see Onuf 1989: 39) In contrast, exclusive 
identities “are defined around some inherent characteristics”. (Rumelili 2004: 37) 
The logic here is that the other is non-self. A barrier exists which makes it 
impossible for the other to ascribe to the identity and its inherent rules. The process 
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which leads to exclusive identities could be explained in terms of juxtapositioning. 
However, up to this point, it is difficult to develop categories of rules which apply 
only to the one but not to the other kind of identity. The difference between inclusive 
and exclusive identity can not rest exclusively on their types of rules. The important 
aspect is instead the way in which identities are socially constructed and how they 
are politically contested. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The analysis of the social 
construction of identities and the analysis of whether and how they are politically 
contested can best be done by analysing the discourses which define the meanings of 
identities.  
For example, the identity of the EU has always been defined by following the logic 
of an inclusive identity, understanding enlargement as being at the heart of European 
integration. In the 1990s, EU understood itself as “a ‘widening’ organization in so 
far as any ‘democratic nation’ of Europe was a potential member“. (Fierke and 
Wiener 1999: 722) The identity of being democratic includes a number of rules to 
which actors can positively ascribe. From this perspective, it was possible to 
understand former communist countries in Middle and Eastern Europe as being less 
‘self’ and not ‘other’. This identity enabled the success of a massive European 
enlargement during the last 10 or so years. Today, the EU includes 27 member 
states. But the inclusiveness of EU identity seems to be contested especially vis-à-vis 
the question of membership of Turkey. Member states discussed whether or not the 
draft constitution should include a reference to Christianity as early as the European 
Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003. (see European Convention 2003: 3) 
Although the final draft did not include that reference, the debate showed that the 
definition is contested of whether or not European identity is neutral in regard to 
religion. The argument for Christian roots as important for EU identity is frequently 
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used as an argument against Turkish EU membership. (see Die Welt 2006; Financial 
Times 2006) In this regard, it seems that EU identity shifts from an inclusive to an 
exclusive definition – at least in regard to Turkey’s accession. This can also be seen 
by the growing importance of geography in the definition of EU identity. Even 
though geographic references always played a role in the definition of EU identity, it 
was not a central part of it. (see Fierke and Wiener 1999: 722) Geography served as 
a reference to an area only rudimentarily defined but did not impose clearly defined 
boarders to the geographical reach of EU identity. Again, the example of Turkey 
shows a shift here. Geography plays a greater role in relation to the question of 
whether Turkey should be allowed to join the EU. In this context, Turkey is not 
regarded as part of Europe geographically. (see International Herald Tribune 2006) 
Based upon this, the question is whether Turkey can become a member of the EU or 
if by definition Turkey is disabled to apply for EU identity. The example shows how 
identities can include inclusive and exclusive characters. Within the discourse on EU 
identity, it seems to be contested whether the inclusive or exclusive definition 
produces order in Europe.  
Both concepts, inclusive and exclusive identity, assume an important role of 
collective identities in affecting the construction of threats. It thereby refers to a 
wider debate on collective identities. In the following I will show in what way this 
debate is relevant. In the literature, collective identities are assumed to affect 
interstate structures, normative structures, institutions, and regimes. (see Jepperson et 
al. 1996: 62-3; Adler and Barnett 2000) In this vein of literature, threats are 
conceptualised as being constructed. “Since what constitutes a threat can never be 
stated a priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction 
of an Other, and theorized at that level.” (Hopf 1998: 199) The construction of 
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threats can be conceptualised following the logic of intersubjectivity. Intersubjective 
meanings provide a particular understanding of the world to actors. Equipped with 
this perspective, actors approach the world surrounding them. Intersubjective 
meanings provide “a system that already contains the objects one can speak about 
and the relationships one can invoke”. (Shapiro 1981: 132) The identity of actors 
then not only defines who “we” are but also the boundaries of the ‘self’ against the 
‘other’. “[A]ctors infer external behaviour from the values and norms governing the 
domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners”. (Risse-
Kappen 1996: 367; Doyle 1986: 1161) If these values and norms – or in my terms 
‘rules’ – are different to the ‘self’, they can be perceived as ‘other’ and as a potential 
threat.  
The literature discussed above assumes two important aspects which affect the 
relation between ‘we’-groups or communities and the external spheres. That is, on 
the one hand groups’ intersubjective perspective onto the world, and on the other the 
interpretation of the other’s behaviour. Depending on the contestedness of identities, 
they are either constructed as inclusive or exclusive identities. The purpose of this 
section was to illustrate how, based on the conception of collective identities, threat 
constructions become possible. In the literature, these conceptualisations assume that 
identities affect state relations. (see Jepperson et al. 1996: 62; Wendt 1994; 
Katzenstein 1996a; Risse 2000) A similar role is given to collective identities in this 
thesis. The difference is that I am not sticking to the state level but take seriously the 
findings of the literature on CFSP and ESDP, which identified processes of 
socialisation on the EU level. These processes are central to this analysis. This does 
not mean that national discourses are totally kept out of the picture; National and 
European levels are inseparable, also in regard to identity formations, to an ever 
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larger extent. (see Wæver 1996: 125-6; Banchoff 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999) These 
processes and discourses will be reflected in the institutionalised discourses on the 
EU level. Those institutionalised discourses reflect the production of collective 
identities on the EU level and more explicitly within the European Council, the 
Council and its supplement bodies. In order to answer my research question, these 
discourses are central. Accordingly, I transfer the effects ascribed to collective 
identities onto the EU level, arguing that the meaning of security is constituted 
through the perception of threats from the EU’s intersubjective position leading to 
rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The next section will focus 
on how this relation can be analysed. 
2.2 The EU: actorness, identity and institution 
In the following, I will bring together the theoretical discussion of collective identity 
to the research object: the EU. I discuss the special characteristic of the EU’s 
collective identity as being constructed not only as an international actor but as an 
international actor in the field of security. This aspect is centre piece for the research 
question. I will clarify the notion of international actor in reference to the existing 
literature which discusses the question of whether the EU is a civilian or a military 
actor. Basically, the literature conceptualises the character of the EU’s external 
action in the field of security as the hard case for judging on the EU’s civilian or 
military character. Therefore, the debate is very helpful in clarifying what remains in 
the centre of the thesis’ analysis.  
In addition to this aspect of what is out there in the EU’s external action empirically, 
the following discussion leads to a theoretical argument. The literature intends to 
answer the question on the EU’s actorness by analysing the means and ends of the 
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EU’s external action. This is putting the cart before the horse, when considering the 
theoretical discussion on discourse dependency and collective identity above. The 
following discussion will bring me to the conclusion that the analysis of the EU’s 
actorness and the effects on its behaviour needs to focus on the discursive practices 
of the EU’s self-perception, especially in relation to security policy. Such an analysis 
brings back in the argument of social constructivism that collective identities and 
their immanent rules help to understand actors’ behaviour. In regard to ESDP, 
behaviour can be translated into the institutionalisation of informal and formal rules 
of how to conduct security policy in accordance with the EU’s self-perception. The 
argument that the discursive practice of identity formation enables certain behaviour 
is derived from the literature on discourse theory arguing that dominant 
interpretations enable certain policy choices and disable others. 
Actorness 
The process of integrating military means at the EU level has fuelled a debate on 
how to categories the EU’s external presence. The literature can be subsumed under 
the header ‘actorness debate’ or ‘performance debate’. The central questions are 
whether or not the EU can be understood as an international actor and, if so, how this 
actorness can be conceptualised. The debate on EU’s actorness focuses on the 
external performance of the EU. This performance has been categorised in two 
different ways. The starting point of both is that the EU is an international actor. The 
first category focuses on the reason why the EU can be conceptualised as an 
international actor, whether the EU is an actor by presence, opportunity or capability. 
(see Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). The second category 
distinguishes the nature of actorness, whether the EU is a civilian power (Duchêne 
1972; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005), military actor (Bull 1982; Smith 2000; Treacher 
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2004) or a normative power (Diez 2004; Manners 2002, 2006). Both strands of 
literature do not exclusively focus on ESDP. Sometimes, ESDP is only a foot note.  
However, the literature, especially on civilian versus military actor, has been fuelled 
by the inauguration of ESDP and the availability of military means. This 
development has been interpreted as change in the EU’s external action. The 
question of the character of the EU’s actorness is discussed from this perspective. 
The literature approaches the nature of the EU and how the EU acts by applying 
previously defined typologies which are re-calibrated in the light of empirical 
findings.  
Treacher, for example, defines the EU as a military actor by opportunity. He argues 
that initiatives to establish a security and defence policy within the framework of the 
EC/EU have long been discussed but not established by member states. (Treacher 
2004) He argues that in the second half of the 1990s, external factors offered the 
opportunity to establish a security and defence pillar within the EU. The logic of this 
analysis is taken from the actorness debate of Bretherton and Vogler (2006), who 
argue that actorness can occur in three different ways: first, by presence, which is 
conceptualised as the relationship between internal developments and external 
expectations. Second, opportunity is when external factors enable or constrain actors. 
Third, capability is the combination of the above two. Actorness by capability is 
understood as the capacity to act effectively to external expectations and 
opportunities. (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 5)  
Treacher argues that the EU became an actor in security and defence by opportunity. 
Although the EU and its member states were unable to solve the conflicts in Ex-
Yugoslavia, internationally, the EU was expected to do so. External expectations 
were based on the economic power of the EU and the EU’s external behaviour as 
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being an international actor in economic terms. Also, the conflicts in Ex-Yugoslavia 
took place at the EU’s ‘back door’. Since the EU effectively implemented stability 
not only in Western Europe but also in Middle and Eastern Europe, the EU was 
expected to do the same in the Balkans. (see Treacher 2004: 53, 56) Furthermore, 
Treacher argues that the US reduced their capabilities to take care of Europe’s 
security and defence at the end of the Cold War. This opened up the opportunity for 
the EU and its member states to organise security and defence differently by 
inaugurating ESDP at the EU level. Based on this institutional development, 
Treacher argues for the EU being a military actor by opportunity. 
In contrast, the concept ‘Civilian Power Europe’ has been reviewed in regard to the 
‘militarisation’ of the EU, arguing that despite this development the EU remains a 
civilian actor centrally based on the civilian ends of the EU’s external action. The 
concept civilian actor has been introduced by Duchêne. (Duchêne 1972, 1973) He 
observed that the than EC gained socio-economic power to conduct its foreign 
policy. Furthermore, he identified a general tendency of change in the international 
sphere from power politics backed by military capabilities towards a growing 
importance of trade policy as foreign policy. (Bull 1982: 150) In this regard, civilian 
power is contrasted by military power. The dividing line cuts across whether or not 
the actor in question has military means at its disposal to serve military ends. (Smith 
2004: 1-2) The dichotomy is implicitly created in front of the blue print of the 
traditional nation-state, who is expected to be militarily capable in order to be 
powerful at the international level.  
The literature on civilian actor argues for the necessity to overcome this perspective. 
The debate includes an implicit normative judgement which says that civilian power 
is good and which necessarily means military power is bad. (see Sjursen 2006: 236) 
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That judgement is contrasted by Stavridis arguing that the EU strengthened its 
civilian nature through its military capabilities. (Stavridis 2001a: 47-8; Stavridis 
2001b). Despite its military capabilities the EU was active in civilising security 
policy. (see Lodge 1993: 233-4) Using Bull’s article on the concept of civilian power 
(1982), he argues that, in the case of the EU, military capabilities back the very 
civilian ends of its foreign policy. This is a character not seen before and it makes 
the EU different to nation-states. Whereas early contributors to the debate on civilian 
power contrasted civilian actorness to the foreign policy of traditional nation-states, 
Stavridis and others contrast it to the US’s foreign policy since the 1990s. (see Diez 
2004: 7) This comparison remains implicit, since no attempt has either openly 
discussed or empirically proved this contrast. (see for example Stavridis 2001b: 20)  
The dispute of whether to define the EU as a civilian or military actor remains 
unsolved, not in the least because it is unclear whether to focus on the means or ends 
of the EU’s external action. On the one hand, military capabilities are important to 
understand the EU as an international actor in the field of security. In this vein of 
literature Hedley Bull, as a responder to Duchêne, points out the importance of 
military capabilities in order to evaluate actorness. The logic is that the EC/EU can 
only implement its own foreign policy when the EU is militarily capable to act 
autonomously – especially autonomously from the US. (Bull 1982: 154) In this 
view, ESDP enables the EU to conduct its own foreign and security policy, which 
makes the EU autonomous from the US. Hence, the EU is a military actor by 
capability. (Smith 2000, 2004; Treacher 2004) On the other hand, authors argue that 
this view focuses too much on means rather than on the civilian ends of the EU’s 
external action. (Stavridis 2001b; Whitman 2002; see also Maull 2000).  
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Identity 
Overall, the civilian vs. military actor dichotomy tries to develop a concept of 
actorness while being relatively blind on international relations theory and its 
contribution to the debate. (Whitman 2002: 3) The problem of the civilian vs. 
military actor literature is that it starts by analysing the EU’s behaviour and derives 
at the conclusion that the EU accordingly represents a certain type of actorness. 
Thereby, the literature reverses well established arguments of international relations 
theory, such as those of social constructivism which argue that collective identities 
and their immanent rules help to understand the EU’s behaviour. The collective 
identity defining the EU’s actorness is upheld by discursive practices and its inherent 
meanings are constituted through this practice by relevant actors within the EU. (see 
Larsen 2002: 286) Therefore, I argue that the EU’s international actorness in the 
field of security, as an aspect of the EU’s identity, needs to be analysed with a 
discursive perspective in order to develop insight of how the EU perceives itself as 
the referent object of security, how its role as a security actor is constructed and how 
it reasons on the way to establish a security policy at the EU level. The analysis 
discovers the dominant logics of the EU’s actorness in the field of security as well as 
how and why the EU perceived it necessary to establish a security policy at the EU 
level accordingly. 
Institution 
Therefore, the thesis conceptualises security as a relational concept. (see Buzan et al. 
1998: 10) This concept is developed in the following section. Basically it argues that 
the perception of an external actor or phenomenon as security relevant or as a threat 
is enabled by the boundaries of the actors’ understanding of the world and hence 
their collective identity. The construction of security problems or threats are 
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sidelined by the implementation of rules which reflect what is perceived as 
appropriate in the case of insecurity, again within the limits of the actors’ collective 
identity. These rules are discursively upheld, which provides them with the 
discursive power to affect relevant EU actors in their policy options. Although this is 
a theoretical argument of discourse theory, (see Fairclough 2003: 8; Diez 1999: 603; 
Wæver 2002) the perspective opens up the possibility to argue that discourses on the 
meaning of security enabled the institutionalisation of formal and informal rules of 
security policy at the EU level.  
In other words, the theoretical perspective assumes that the attempt of relevant EU 
actors to establish and institutionalise a security policy at that very level is based on 
their reasoning on the EU’s external role and their perceptions of the security 
problems and threats. These actors take part in discourses on security, and it is these 
discourses and their dominant interpretations of the world which enable and at the 
same time limit actors’ policy choices. And, it is these discourses which need to be 
analysed in order to discover the rational of the EU’s security policy. Therefore, a 
rigorous analysis of the discursively upheld meaning of security provides answers to 
the research question of how ESDP became possible at the turn of the 21st century. In 
order to do so, the following sections will closely develop how security as a 
relational concept and its practice within discourses can be conceptualised. 
2.3 Conceptualising the Social Construction of Security 
In this section, I develop the research design with which I approach the analysis of 
the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
This section will again be divided into four sub-sections. Based on the theoretical 
discussion above, I will first conceptualise how the social construction of security 
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can be understood. Security always establishes a relation between a community and 
its external surrounding which is perceived as i) seriously threatening the actor’s 
compliance with core elements of his identity, ii) threatening the identity itself, or iii) 
threatening the physical existence. In each case, certain rules of appropriate 
responses apply in arguing for the use of particular means and ways of reaction.  
The second section identifies relevant discourses in regard to the meaning of 
security. Based on the conceptualisation of the social construction of security, I will 
identify three fields of discourses which are important for the meaning of security. 
These fields are i) European integration, ii) international challenges, and iii) 
international order. Within the first discursive field collective identities are 
constituted. The second discursive field especially affects the perception of the 
outside world as threatening or as a security problem. This perspective is based on 
the EU’s intersubjective understanding of the world. Based on the relation between 
EU identity and perceived threats, social order is produced. This social order is 
reflected within the third discursive field and establishes rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity.  
In the third section I will exemplarily show how processes of sense making are 
connected to a particular time and space. Relevant discourses are connected to a 
particular space in the sense that utterances take place within institutionalised 
discourses bound to the formal structures of the EU. In regard to time, the connection 
can be conceptualised in relation to each discursive field. The discursive fields are 
streamlined by particular stories or particular moods, or in other words, narratives. 
These narratives impute an underlying logic onto processes of sense making. The 
purpose of this section is to further clarify the map of discourses which will be 
analysed. I will develop discursive narratives for the most important aspects of the 
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social construction of security. Relevant narratives are on European identity, global 
challenges and appropriate means of responses. They serve as a starting point of the 
analysis. At the same time, these narratives can be understood as having hypothetical 
status. They will be contested throughout the analysis.  
In the final sub-section I will visually show how the three discursive fields overlap 
and point out the area in which the meaning of security is constituted; relating 
identity constructions, the perception of threats and the construction of rules. 
Following this section, I will develop the research methods to analyse the meaning of 
security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
2.3.1 Security 
In order to conceptualise the social construction of security, the most fundamental 
question to answer is: how can security be understood? Following the logic of my 
theoretical approach, security can only be understood as a social construction. 
Security establishes a relation between a self and a significant other. (see Buzan et al. 
1998: 21) Security is relational in the sense that it relates reference objects to threats 
which are perceived as such from the reference object’s perspective. (see Buzan et 
al. 1998: 10) The reference object is a group or community with a given identity. 
Collective identities are the most relevant aspects with which to discuss whether or 
not a group or community perceives something as a threat. Actors approach the 
world surrounding them from the perspective of collective identities. (see Marcussen 
et al. 1999: 103) This may lead to the perception of others as a threat. Something is 
perceived as a threat because it is understood to be different, not understandable, 
negating, or in contrast to certain aspects of the identity. This is dependent on the 
social construction of the collective identity and the processes of sense making on 
external factors which are different to this identity. This does not necessarily mean 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 58 
 
that threats are only and exclusively those phenomena which are perceived to 
physically attack the group or community in question. The construction of security 
starts much earlier. For example, I will show that the EU perceived poverty as a 
threat or security problem, since it was understood as potentially leading to conflict. 
Conflict again was perceived to jeopardise achievements made by the EU’s 
development policy. Therefore, in 2000 and 2001, security policy was understood to 
support the EU’s development policy as a last resort in stopping crisis and conflict 
from further harming the achievement of the EU’s development policy. These rules 
stabilised the self-perception of the EU as being an international actor in the making. 
As a starting point, the probability of threat constructions can be measured based on 
the established type of identity. Identity types can be inclusive or exclusive and 
define whether or not it is possible for others to become more ‘self’. From this 
perspective, the behaviour of an ‘other’ or an external phenomenon is interpreted and 
probabilities of behaviour or effects are ascribed to it. For example, if EU identity is 
constructed as an inclusive identity containing democracy as a core principle, then 
states which also have built their identity on such a core principle would not be 
perceived as a threat from the EU’s perspective. The second important aspect of 
whether or not threat constructions are likely concerns the political contestedness of 
collective identities as well as perceptions of the other’s behaviour. Political 
contestedness provides further characters and traits to collective identities which 
enable or disable threat constructions. Contestedness takes place when aspects of EU 
identity which were not part of its external behaviour become important for the EU’s 
external behaviour. EU identity constructions in regard to Turkey’s EU membership 
can serve as an example of political contestedness.  
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Overall, threat constructions establish the relation between a referent object and an 
‘other’ and thereby constitute the intersubjective understanding of security. This 
intersubjective understanding is “one key to understanding behaviour”. (Buzan et al. 
1998: 31) It constitutes social order including rules ordering actors’ behaviour in the 
situation of insecurity. In regard to the EU, these rules are institutionalised within 
ESDP. They address conditions for action and the use of force, cooperation with 
other institutions, and the objectives which are envisaged by the EU’s security 
policy. In this sense, ESDP is a reflection of the process of sense making on 
European security. 
2.3.2 Mapping the Fields 
The social construction of security includes three dimensions: collective identity as 
referent object, perception of the other’s behaviour or external phenomena form the 
intersubjective position of the community in question, and rules of appropriate 
responses applying to the situation of insecurity. The meaning of security is 
interwoven with different processes of sense making taking place in one of these 
three dimensions. It is understood as a contextual concept, which can be fluid and 
change over time and space. (see Browning and Joenniemi 2004: 706) They refer to, 
and build up on, each other and thereby (re)define the meaning of security. For 
example, a discourse on intervention refers to a particular meaning of security and 
thereby stabilises this meaning in a manner of mutual constitution. Intervention only 
makes sense when the behaviour of state ‘A’ is perceived as breaking international 
rules of action and interaction. This would lead to a construction of threat only when 
other collective identities encompass international law as core principles. From such 
an intersubjective perspective, the behaviour of state ‘A’ would be perceived as 
threatening these core principles. As a consequence, this would establish the rule to 
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intervene in the situation when state ‘A’ acts against or breaks rules of international 
law.  
In accordance with this three dimensional concept, meanings which add to the 
construction of security fall into three different discursive fields. As an analytical 
tool, discursive fields gather similar discourses which can be subsumed under a 
common header. In regard to my analysis, they fall into the three fields of i) 
European integration, ii) international challenges, and iii) international order.  
Discursive fields help to anchor discourses in time and space. First, the connection of 
discourses to space is most easily conceptualised by defining a forum in which 
discourses take place. Within the EU, discourses on security are institutionalised 
within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Accordingly, 
relevant actors are from the political elites of EU member states and EU institutions 
which have been involved in the institutional development of, and policy making 
within, ESDP. Second, apart from that, processes of sense making are connected to a 
particular time. This connectedness can be expressed in narratives which have 
streamlined processes of sense making during particular time episodes. Time 
connectedness is again an analytical tool to characterise, in broader terms, processes 
of sense making. In other words, narratives are nothing else than meanings which 
strongly dominated processes of sense making over a long period of time and on a 
high level of intersubjectivity. Dominant meanings affect other processes of sense 
making because they disable other ways of interpretations. In the literature, this 
effect has been discussed as power of discourses. (see Foucault 1980: 119) This is 
relevant to my analysis, since I am analysing three different periods of time, e.g. 
1996-7, 2000-1, and 2003-4. Discourses of these periods are constrained by 
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particular moods of sense making, by narratives which were dominant during their 
time. 
2.3.3 Narratives as Story Tellers 
In the following, I will consider the narratives for all three discursive fields. By this, 
I intend to prepare the field of research and ‘hypothesise’ the most relevant dynamics 
with which the analysis will be confronted. This serves three goals. First, I will 
clarify the borders of all three discursive fields and thereby clarify which discourses 
have to be analysed. Second, I make explicit my perspective on the field of research 
and add a deductive perspective to it. Third, the narratives shall serve as propositions 
or hypotheses mapping the expected dynamics at work in the construction of the 
meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The 
empirical analysis has to clarify whether the proposed narratives prove to be 
dominant. 
a European Integration 
The discursive field on European integration includes a variety of discourses on 
concepts applying to the political, social, legal, and economic order within the EU. 
Discourses can be found on integration, political union, democracy, common market, 
and so forth. Discourses may vary in connotations over space, including national 
borders. The discursive field on European integration is streamlined by an 
understanding of political unity which goes further than applying solely to an 
effective economic cooperation within a common market. The process of European 
integration has brought peace and unity to the rivalled European continent. Without 
European integration, conflict lines between great European powers would cut across 
the continent with a high probability of conflict and war. This is disabled by 
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integration. But integration is more than just a peace project for Europe. The 
meaning of political union is based on the idea that unity is more than the sum of its 
parts. Political unity is about an European identity in favour of political, economic 
and legal cooperation organised through supranational institutions. Member states 
pool their sovereignty within European institutions which are designed to direct 
actors’ objectives towards higher common interests. Political unity goes hand in 
hand with an understanding of democracy and its European form of multilevel 
governance, as well as with the rule of law.  
Furthermore, political unity constructs the EU not as a nation-state but as a member 
of the international community. From this perspective, the EU intends to possess 
similar capabilities as other members of the international community, e.g. nation-
states. This can be seen most clearly within the discourse on actorness. The logic of 
why it is necessary for the EU to conduct the full scale of foreign policy is based on 
the understanding of what is expected from a member of the international 
community. Such a member is expected to include economic as well as political and 
military power in order to conduct international politics. This streamlines the 
construction of the EU as an international actor and refers to the discursive field on 
international order requiring the EU to face its obligations internationally. These 
obligations are created by the international order containing nation-states as their 
constituting units and the UN Charter and international law as containing current 
rules of international action. Since the EU perceives itself as an equal member of the 
international community, the EU has to include all capabilities applying to the 
principle units of this community, e.g. nation-states.  
By and large, within the discursive field on European integration the most relevant 
narrative is the one on political unity. The meaning of political unity refers to other 
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logically interrelated concepts of political and legal order, such as democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, effectiveness etc. This narrative has affected the mood of 
sense making on European integration which led to the construction of the EU’s self-
perception of being an international actor capable of security policy. Based on this 
perspective, it was necessary to have civilian and military capabilities at the EU’s 
disposal to conduct security policy. The question remains whether or not this 
perspective was established during the time periods under review here. For example, 
the analysis will show that especially in 1996-7, EU identity did not include an 
external dimension in the sense of international actor in the field of foreign and 
security policy.  
b) Global Challenges 
The discursive field of global challenges includes discourses on issues, actors, and 
problems which are considered to have the potential of de-stabilising the 
international order, or those which question EU identity as a whole or aspects of it. 
Understanding what makes a global challenge is fundamentally important for the 
meaning of security. Discourses of this field are not necessarily connected to the 
space of the EU. Actors which take part within this discursive field are spread out 
worldwide. The most relevant actors are political elites, scholars, the media, and 
interest groups. Although discourses in this field seem to be free floating, they are 
dominated by different narratives as a matter of space. In regard to my analysis, three 
levels of space can be conceptualised. First, the international level connected to 
international institutions such as the UN may well be one dimension. The second 
level of space could be called the ‘West’ or the ‘transatlantic arena’. Here, discourses 
on global challenges are connected to something which has been called transatlantic 
security community. (see Deutsch 1957; Risse-Kappen 1996) The final and most 
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relevant space is connected to Europe and institutionalised discourses on global 
challenges within the EU institutions. The third level is most important because 
meanings need to be translated onto this level in order to add meaning to security 
institutionalised within ESDP.  
Whereas on these different levels narratives might vary, the meaning of globalisation 
is a narrative spread across these spaces. Globalisation is interrelated with other 
meanings which only make sense and which are possible only in reference to an 
understanding of globalisation. Globalisation here means nothing more than a world 
which becomes more and more interdependent in an economic, political, social, and 
environmental sense. This means that events mostly can not be taken as singular, 
isolated events. They depend on, and are interrelated with, other events, even when 
these links are not easily recognisable. This meaning of globalisation constitutes the 
international system as a complex one, more complex than during the Cold War. The 
international system of the Cold War was characterised by a bipolar confrontation. 
At the end of the Cold War, the meaning of globalisation became the next most 
influential narrative within the discursive field of global challenges. The globalised 
world does not include clear borders of confrontations. Also, the problems arising 
due to global challenges are more manifold, causing conflict and war. In this regard, 
the debate on the ‘new wars’ became possible at the end of the Cold War, even 
though it is contestable whether or not they were a new phenomenon. (see Chojnacki 
2004; Neuman 2004)  
Globalisation makes other narratives within the discursive field of global challenges 
possible. One of the most striking narratives is that of international terrorism. This 
narrative has existed at least since the events in New York and Washington on 11 
September 2001. (see Silberstein 2002) For example, 29 papers submitted to the 
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International Studies Association annual meeting in 2007 included ‘war on terror’ in 
their titles, in 123 papers ‘war on terror’ was quoted in the abstract and a total of 693 
papers are listed under a full-text search on ‘war on terror’. This gives an impression 
of how influential the meaning of international terrorism has become, knowing that 
this is not exclusively true for the academic debate on international studies. The 
narrative has influenced a variety of areas pertaining to social and political life, 
domestically as well as internationally. (see Lavranos 2003: 263; Heupel 2008: 8; 
Cronin 2002: 33; Liese 2007; O'Loughlin 2007; Reitan 2007)  
The narrative of international terrorism is fundamentally interlinked with the 
narrative of globalisation. International terrorism is understood as a global strategy 
interlinking local problems to Western or even American dominance in a globalised 
world. (see Cronin 2002: 38; Schneckener 2004) Only within a globalised world is it 
possible for local impressions or problems such as poverty, religious differences, or 
conflict to be connected to more distanced causes. Without a concept of 
globalisation, interdependence of local and distanced events would not be possible. 
For example, it is very difficult to reconstruct the rationale of the attacks of 11 
September 2001 without the meaning of globalisation. Mostly, objectives are 
understood to address differences in Muslim norms and values vis-à-vis American 
liberal capitalism or the “Zionist-Crusader” alliance. (Nacos 2003: 1) Another 
objective – it was said – was to show that the powerful “United States was not 
invulnerable”. (Schroeder 2001: 34) However, the connection of both ‘ways of life’ 
only makes sense within a globalised world. Distanced events can be constructed to 
have an effect on each other only within an interdependent world.  
Variety over space seems to be important in regard to connotations in the narrative of 
international terrorism. The European perspective seems to be different compared to 
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an American perspective. (see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006: 94) The 
perspectives ascribe different causes to the emergence of international terrorism. The 
EU’s perspective of this problem will be analysed in the empirical chapters. For 
example, I will show that the narrative of international terrorism affected other 
processes of sense making which were not previously connected to a meaning of 
terrorism. This applies to the meaning of dynamic threats. Whereas it might first be 
considered that the construction of dynamic threats was enabled by the narrative of 
globalisation, I will show that the construction of dynamic threats became possible 
only in reference to the phenomenon of international terrorism. Dynamic threats 
encompass, for example, weak states, organised crime, poverty, and non-
proliferation of WMDs. These problems are perceived to depend on each other and 
thereby worsen the seriousness of each.  
The empirical analysis will show how the dynamics of global challenges affect threat 
constructions in Europe and how the meaning of security enabling a security policy 
at the EU level and within ESDP is thereby constructed. Two narratives have to be 
taken into consideration affecting processes of sense making within the discursive 
field on global challenges: globalisation and international terrorism. Connotations in 
narratives and their effects on other sense making processes vary over space. Again, 
institutionalised discourses on the EU level constitute the most relevant space in the 
analysis of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and 
within ESDP. 
c) International Order 
The discursive field on international order includes discourses on international 
cooperation, international organisations, and normative claims of just behaviour on 
the international, regional and domestic level. In regard to my analysis, sense making 
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processes regarding the institutional design of ESDP and the code of conduct 
towards security issues are related to discourses within this discursive field. Two 
narratives seem to be very important within this field: i) nation-states as international 
actors and stabilisers of the international system and ii) multilateralism by which 
nation-states are supported or monitored in their compliance with international law. 
The international system and its structure are constituted by nation-states through 
international law. But responsibility for stability has been widened since the late 
1980s, including international organisations. (see Peou 2002: 51) This widened 
system again has been institutionalised through the UN Charter. Nation-states have 
the responsibility to protect their citizens. Today, it is discussed that if a state is not 
willing or able to take on this responsibility, the UN Security Council can justify 
intervention or peace-enforcement. (see Durch 1993: 9; Morris and McCoubrey 
1999: 130; ICISS 2001: 11-2) Thereby, the meaning of sovereignty has changed to 
be ensured only to those states which take on their obligations by protecting their 
citizens. (see Thakur 2002: 328; ICISS 2001: 12) However, human intervention 
addresses the primary responsibility of nation-states as the stabilising entities of 
international order. The goal of human intervention is to bring back order to nation-
states and to re-establish governance applying to human rights, international law, 
democracy and the rule of law. (see Dobbins 2005: 56) Therefore, the narrative on 
nation-states as stabilisers of the international systems is very important here.  
The meaning of multilateralism also seems to have widespread effects on sense 
making. (see Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003: 836-7) For instance, the UN is a 
multilateral system by which international cooperation is pushed into more coherent 
and stabilising grounds. International cooperation has been institutionalised by 
international agreements such as GATT/WTO. And finally, the EU itself represents 
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multilateralism on a very high level, including supranational institutions and 
decision-making processes. The success of international organisations is based on 
the quality of stability they provide to member states. (see Ruggie 1992: 562-4) 
Multilateralism, therefore, fits the obligation of nation-states to stabilise the 
international and domestic order, as well as being responsible for the protection of 
their citizens. In this regard, multilateralism affects the nation-states’ perspective of 
appropriate behaviour. For example, commitment in resolving conflict and 
sustainable peace initiatives are interlinked with international rules established by the 
UN Charter and reflected in institutional settings such as the UNSC. (see Abbott and 
Snidal 1998: 3-4) Overall, the narrative of multilateralism affects the process of state 
actors’ sense making and gives higher priority to the construction of compliance with 
international norms. (see Risse and Ropp 1999: 237; Chapman 2007: 135) 
Both narratives are very important for the social construction of security 
institutionalised within ESDP. This is especially the case because the EU itself is 
nothing else then an example of effective and successful multilateralism, understood 
as integration. Therefore, both narratives are central in regard to the EU’s sense 
making on security policy. However, the first narrative on nation-states may well 
affect the process of sense making of the EU’s role as an international actor and its 
permissible capacities. This may well correspond with the EU’s self-perception as 
member of the international community. Furthermore, it is interrelated with the 
narrative of multilateralism and the demand to meet institutional and procedural 
requirements established by international norms. (see Risse and Ropp 1999; Checkel 
1997) Therefore, the discursive field on international order is of high relevance in 
regard to the institutional settings and policy-mechanisms of ESDP. Respective 
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processes on sense making may also be affected by discourses on European 
integration understood as the specialised field on political order within Europe. 
2.3.4 Locating the Meaning of Security 
All three discursive fields are relevant for the social construction of security 
institutionalised within ESDP. They affect different dimensions of security: referent 
object/collective identity, construction of threat, and rules of appropriate behaviour 
in the case of insecurity. Within these fields, discourses can be found defining and 
redefining meanings mutually constituting the meaning of European security. The 
fields can be imagined as circles which overlap. The space in which they overlap 
symbolises the space of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU 
level and within ESDP. This model is illustrated below and will guide the discourse 
analysis conducted in the empirical chapters.  
Discursive Fields and the Meaning of Security 
 
In the next section I will discuss the methodological approach of my analysis which 
leads this chapter to its conclusion. 
3. Research Methods 
The thesis analyses the politics of discourse constructing the meaning of security 
which enabled, or made possible, a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 70 
 
The politics of discourse understands discursive practice as political practice. This 
refers to the discussion that humans are language users to “enter a system that 
already contains the objects one can speak about and the relationships one can 
invoke”. (Shapiro 1981: 130) Here, ‘system’ does not mean language as such. The 
‘system’ contains a huge variety of meanings which can be practiced through 
language. Or to put it differently, this system of meanings constitutes a particular 
discursive practice. The analysis of this practice provides insights into political 
structures. They constitute subjects “who have the legitimacy to speak and act in 
such a way that they control […] objects”. (Shapiro 1981: 141) Discourses constitute 
“conceptualizations that are used to understand the phenomena which emerge”. 
(Shapiro 1981: 130; see Foucault 1977: 199) These conceptualizations can change 
over time. Here, the meaning of security changed over time to finally enable a 
security policy at the EU level. The meaning of security first did not and then did 
enable a security policy because meanings limit the range of objects available; they 
constrain the processes of appropriate and rational reasoning, and constitute only 
certain actors as agents of knowledge. This process is the politics of discourses.  
In order to analyse the politics of discourses, this project focuses on the EU level and 
explicitly on the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies, such as 
the general secretariat including the High Representative of CFSP, COREPER, the 
PSC, and the CIVCOM. Together, they constitute the political structure of relevance 
on which level the meaning of security has been (re-)constructed and 
institutionalised within ESDP. 
Apart from a concept of change, Foucault’s quote above includes three aspects of the 
politics of discourse which are central for my analysis: first, the ‘phenomenon which 
emerges’ is European security. The central question of this thesis is how ESDP 
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became possible at the turn of the 21st century. The thesis analyses the meaning of 
security constituting ESDP. Second, ‘conceptualizations’ need to be understood as 
the aspects mutually constituting the meaning of European security in regard to 
identity/referent object, threat construction, and rules of appropriate behaviour in the 
situation of insecurity. In order to analyse these three constitutive elements, the 
thesis will explicitly focus on the EU’s policies relating and adding to the rationale 
of security. Texts on the institutional implementations are of lesser importance than 
those of policy-making because the analysis starts by hypothesising that institutions 
reflect the rationale of security based on a given identity. Therefore, texts on 
institutional implementations will be used to double check the findings in regard to 
rules of appropriate behaviour applying in the case of insecurity. Third, ‘agents of 
knowledge’ are central for the discursive practice because they can legitimately 
establish rules of how security and its aspects can be conceptualised. (see Buzan et 
al. 1998: 31-2) My analysis focuses on how agents of knowledge conceptualise the 
meaning of European security. I have conceptualised agents of knowledge as the 
political elite of EU member states and EU institutions which have taken part in 
processes of sense making on European security within the named institutions. 
Processes of sense making can lead to change in how agents of knowledge 
conceptualise security. Change can be evaluated while analysing the empirical data 
used throughout this thesis. Before I will define relevant empirical data and discuss 
its limits, I develop a concept of change. 
3.1 Change 
The basic argument of the thesis is that the inauguration of a security policy at the 
EU level and the enhanced use of military and civilian capabilities by the EU are 
signifiers for change in the EU’s external action. From a discursive perspective, this 
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highlights change in the process of how involved actors make sense of themselves, 
the world surrounding them and appropriate action facing security challenges 
identified from their intersubjective perspective. Overall, the thesis intends to 
identify changes in the rational of security over time and explain how implemented 
logics enabled a security policy at the EU level. In order to do so, the following 
section develops a concept of change and typologies to identify change in more 
detail. On the very basic level, the first typology of change is development, meaning 
that changes take place slowly over time without one identifiable moment enabling 
change. The other typology is change in the face of discursive crises leading to new 
processes of sense making and thereby changing established ways of reasoning. Both 
will be developed in more detail below. 
First of all, it is important to recall that from a discursive perspective, change is 
expected to be likely. Discourses are less likely to be stable over a longer period of 
time than being affected by change. The reason for that is twofold. The first structure 
based argument is that discourses contest each other because they provide different 
understandings of facts and events. (see Hansen 2006: 32) This contestedness may 
lead to meanings which are stable for a certain period of time until they are again 
contested by other discourses, and earlier marginalised discourses gain more support. 
The second argument is agent based and refers to Onuf’s understanding of speech 
acts. Agents make sense of the world through the use of language. Therefore, they 
produce order in the world. The process of sense making does not take place in free 
space but is indeed socially embedded. Order is only established when its rules, 
boundaries and characteristics are intersubjectively shared which makes social order 
relatively stable. A social order may then be questioned or contested by actors who 
reason about a particular situation and communicate their reasoning through speech 
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acts. Depending on the actors’ position, the context of the speech act and the 
audience, the speech act may be successful in paving the way to, or initiating, 
change. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 26-33) 
The research design of the thesis is directed to identify change on a structural level. 
The thesis is interested in the social order which was established at the EU level and 
which enabled a security policy at that level. The characteristic of a social order 
needs to be intersubjectively shared in order to be relevant, and to be forceful, in 
directing actors’ behaviour. The analysis needs to identify dominant meanings and 
how they changed or how they were replaced by other meanings over time. 
Intersubjectively shared meanings are those which are dominant in a particular 
discourse. Dominance again is a matter of frequency of use and the amount of 
references of the meaning in question to others in order to make sense and in order to 
provide meaning to others.1 Single speech acts are of lesser importance for the 
analysis – even in moments of success – because they become relevant and are 
recognised as soon as they affect the intersubjectively shared social order of a 
European security policy. In other words, speech acts are not as important as the 
discursive structure because they may or may not lead to changes at the structural 
level. Change at the structural level takes place when discursive practices refer to 
changed or altered meanings. These effects are recognised and analysed not only in 
regard to dominant meanings but also in regard to marginalised discourses, which 
are important to identify potentialities of change. Following this research approach, 
the following paragraphs conceptualise change and how it can be identified on a 
structural, discursive level.  
                                                  
1 The section on research techniques will provide a concept of how this can be empirically evaluated. 
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To begin with, change is the moment when potentiality is translated into actuality. 
(see Ringmar 2005: 18) What does this mean in regard to discourse? Actuality can 
only apply to the dominant interpretation of facts and events at a given moment in 
time. Potentialities are meanings which do not gain dominant support by discursive 
practices because of unsuccessful speech acts or because they are part of a 
marginalised discourse. Change in discourses takes place when dominant 
interpretations are different in one period of time compared with another one, hence 
when earlier marginalised discourses gain support and contest established 
interpretations. 
In order to identify change and explain the effects of logics which are newly 
introduced or altered by these changes, the thesis focuses on three moments in time 
in which discourses on the meaning of security changed. The details of the periods of 
analysis will be developed below in section 2.4.3. Here, it is important to highlight 
that they are systematically selected as ‘key events’ in the development of a security 
policy at the EU level. Key events are situations “where ‘important facts’ manifest 
themselves on the political […] agenda”. (Hansen 2006: 32) Key events in regard to 
enabling the inauguration and implementation of a security policy at the EU level 
were those which led to, or circle around, treaty revisions or other formalisations of 
security policies at the EU level. Along this line, the first key event is actually prior 
to the formal integration of a security policy in the EU treaties in the years 1996 and 
1997; the second is the key event of the treaty revision of Nice and the post-Nice 
process of revising the treaties again in the years 2000 and 2001; and the third key 
event is when the EU deployed military and civilian operations for the first time 
under the ESDP umbrella in 2003 and 2004. Whereas the first period will be used to 
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identify the ‘state of the art’ at the beginning of the analysis, the analysis of the 
successive periods will in particular focus on changes to the earlier periods.  
With this approach, the analysis will be able to identify how potentialities turned into 
actualities. How these moments can be identified empirically will be discussed in the 
following. First, I focus on change as development when marginalised discourses 
gain more support. Second, I focus on discursive crises and why and how change 
takes place through processes of sense making in the aftermath of such crises. 
When change is conceptualised as development it highlights the very characteristic 
of discourses which are contested by other discourses at all times but gain support in 
particular moments of time. This may be due to four reasons. First, meanings battle 
for dominance following the argument of contestedness, in the process of becoming 
intersubjectively shared. Dominance then becomes a matter of how widely meanings 
are shared among actors and how stable this dominance is over time. This is a 
structure based argument, highlighting the politics of discourses by which discourses 
enfold power over the way actors make sense of the world.  
The next three reasons for development include a concept of agency. Therefore, 
second, the literature on security communities argues that security communities are 
widened by spreading background knowledge, which is the very identity and 
immanent rules of that security community. (see Adler 2008: 204) The 
conceptualisation of security developed above highlights such a process. Through 
discursive practices, the rational of security is established by relating identity to the 
external world and identifying threats and security problems as well as appropriate 
rules to react from this perspective. Therefore, “members of the community sustain 
and change their identity through arguments about the kinds of threat they face”, 
(Kitchen 2009: 103) about what kind of role the EU should play in the field of 
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security and how this relates to other policy fields and its self-perception of being an 
international actor in security. In other words, change takes place through sense 
making on how the EU should act internationally, what kind of security challenges it 
faces and how the EU should react to these challenges. This is the discursive practice 
of (re-)defining identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of 
insecurity and will be analysed at that level.  
Third, the EU’s security policy is a fairly new tool compared with its external action 
in economic or development terms. Therefore, the EU’s security policy needs to 
correspond to these other policy fields. This is not only true for EU policies but more 
generally for those of all three levels: national, supranational and intergovernmental. 
They need to correspond to each other in order to be coherent and effective. In this 
regard, Veronica Kitchen brings forward a very strong argument that when a 
policymaker tries to obtain support for his policy he uses the logics, phrases and 
arguments already established within the community in question. (see Kitchen 2009: 
103) Hence, arguments to establish a new policy such as the EU’s security policy 
ride the arguments of those already established in order to ensure continuity and 
reassure others. (see Kitchen 2009: 109) This aspect is very important in regard to 
the argument of why ESDP was not only legitimate but necessary to ensure 
continuity of the EU’s policies. The analysis in chapter III shows that the main 
argument of why a security policy at the EU level was necessary was established in 
regard to development policies whose achievements were jeopardised by crises and 
conflicts within or between states. In order for the EU’s development policy to 
remain effective, a security policy was necessary as the last resort.  
Fourth, actors refer to grand designs in order to support their arguments for change. 
In regard to the EU, the grand design of what accounts for an international actor was 
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an international actor which was recognised by the international community. The 
ability to autonomously in the field of security was perceived to be necessary in 
order to be recognised by others. Frequently, references to this grand design could be 
identified in discourses on the meaning of security and almost always establish the 
logic that the EU needs to be able to comply with this archetype actor in order to be a 
full-fledged international actor. 
Apart from change as development, change can also take place in the face of a 
discursive crisis. Two types of discursive crises are important for the analysis. First, 
a crisis occurs when existing meanings are unable to cope with new phenomena and 
experience. (see Diez 2001: 14) Such a situation leads to new processes of sense 
making through which actors try to understand new phenomena and construct 
meanings which fit into their social reality. (see Croft 2006: 8; Croft 2000) This 
aspect of a ‘self-healing power’ is important to conceptualise discursive crisis. In this 
sense, Harbermas argues that “the crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of 
the one who is undergoing it”. (in Koselleck 1988: 104) This is true in two ways: 
first, the actor in question perceives the phenomenon as a crisis based on his terms of 
perceiving the world; and second what he does to overcome or tackle the crisis is 
again enabled by its intersubjective perspective. This aspect of discursive crisis was 
particularly important in the aftermath of the events of the 11 September 2001. The 
construction of international terrorism as a threat was used to argue for a 
fundamental characteristic of threats as being dynamic, and dynamically affecting 
and worsening previously unrelated security problems. This understanding 
strengthened the legitimacy to call for civilian and military capabilities to be 
implemented at the EU level. At the same time, processes of sense making in the 
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aftermath of these events led to a strengthened and more exclusive definition of EU 
identity based on juxtapositioning of self and other. (see Chapter V) 
The second type of discursive crisis relevant to the analysis refers to Habermas who 
defines two different types of crises and of which the second is relevant here. A 
system crisis is characterised by “the exhaustion of techniques” which is in its very 
essence a positivist definition by which “internal contradictions and steering 
difficulties” are recalibrated in order to overcome the crisis. (see Hay 1996: 88) The 
situation in which a group of actors is not able to handle the exhaustion of techniques 
can lead to an identity crisis. An identity crisis occurs when members of a group 
realise that their group and its institutions are undergoing a system crisis. (see Hay 
1996: 89) They “feel their identity threatened”. (Habermas 1975: 3) This definition 
helps to understand how discrepancies between an identity and the ability to apply to 
essential characteristics of this identity can lead to a crisis. For example, in the years 
2000 and 2001, the EU also perceived itself as being an international actor in the 
field of security but realised that it was unable to apply to the characteristics of 
acting as an international actor. (see Chapter III and IV) 
Overall, the six types developed above enable the analysis to identify change and 
evaluate its character. The empirical chapters refer to these types and make moments 
of change more explicit to make findings more comprehensive. In order to do so, the 
following sections provides arguments for the selection of empirical date, of the 
periods of research and the research techniques applied throughout the empirical 
chapters. 
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3.2 Empirical Data 
The thesis intends to analyse the shared understanding of EU actors on what security 
means, the perception of threats and security problems perceived from actors’ 
intersubjective perspective and the understanding of how to face these threats and 
problems. The thesis analyses this shared understanding of relevant EU actors. 
Relevant EU actors are those who have the competence to formulate and revise the 
EU’s security policy, i.e. the European Council, the Council and its supplement 
bodies. It is therefore important to discover the logics of shared understandings that 
constitute actors’ perception and understanding of the world, and which define 
appropriate actions in specific circumstances. (see Gheciu 2005: 27) This is exactly 
what discourse analysis can do. Discourse analysis provides access to the internal 
logics of actors’ reasoning on themselves and the world surrounding them. These 
internal logics are embedded in discourses about them and can be identified by 
analysing subjects and objects and the relations among them as being constructed 
through discourse. (see Milliken 2001 and below) Such an analysis provides answers 
to the questions of how EU identity is constructed, how threats or security problems 
are perceived and how rules of appropriate action in the case of insecurity are 
formulated.  
Before I dig deeper into the research techniques of discourse analysis, I will clarify 
what types of texts count as data for my analysis. First and foremost are texts 
authored by the most relevant actors at the EU level in regard to the EU’s security 
policy. I then argue that relevant texts are those which represent a final agreement, 
an official statement or other official texts produced by these authors. These 
documents represent common agreements of all EU member states gathered at the 
EU level. And since the statements are not only part of the formalised procedure but 
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are also publicly adopted, they are not about “cheap talk” but strongly add to the 
construction of the EU’s identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour – and 
hence the meaning of security. By choosing these types of texts I follow Barry 
Buzan et al. who argue that “if discourse is operative in a given community, it is 
expected to materialize in those texts whenever the debate is sufficiently important”. 
(Buzan et al. 1998: 177) In other words, the discourses on the meaning of security 
and the EU’s action in this regard materialise in official documents produced by the 
most relevant EU actors. At the end of this section, I discuss the advances and limits 
of the strategy to select these texts. 
Relevant EU actors 
These processes of sense making by political elites of EU member states and EU 
institutions are institutionalised at the EU level within the institutions of 
CFSP/ESDP. This includes first of all the European Council. Within the European 
Council, heads of states and governments agree on the general directions of the EU. 
This not only includes the institutional outlook of the EU, which has frequently been 
reformulated during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). In addition, the 
European Council is active in discussing and providing general directions for EU 
policies, including foreign and security policy. Second, from a legal perspective the 
Council of the EU is responsible for the EU’s foreign relation and security policy. 
The Council meets in various settings and brings together the foreign ministers, 
development ministers, defence ministers or ministers of other resources of the 
member states. This is dependent upon the subjects discussed and the structure of the 
member states’ government. The Councils relevant for this thesis are the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council, the External Relations Council as such and 
the Development Council. Finally, the Council is supported by a variety of bodies 
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including COREPER, the General Secretariat, the PSC and CIVCOM. The 
discourses on the meaning of security are institutionalised within these EU bodies.  
Types of documents 
Official documents of these bodies provide access to the institutionalised discourse 
on the meaning of security. Being official, however, is not the only selection 
criterion for a document to be taken into account. In accordance with the concept of 
security, the documents had to meet at least one of three other criterions: first, texts 
which actively and clearly defined or (re-)constituted the EU’s identity; second, texts 
which actively engaged in the construction of threats or security problems as 
problems of or for the EU; third, texts which established or defined reasonable action 
which had to be taken by the EU in order to face defined threats or security 
problems. All official documents of one of the three research periods which applied 
to at least one of the three criterions are taken into account and analysed by a 
rigorous discourse analysis. In the following I briefly define what kinds of official 
documents are incorporated in this selection.  
First, this includes texts and documents of the European Council. The European 
Council is a very powerful agent of knowledge, even if its role in the decision-
making process is not completely institutionalised. However, the European Council 
takes part in the discourse through its Presidency Conclusions and Conclusions of 
the European Council, which can be understood as documents strategically 
summarising the positioning of the EU as a whole and pointing out the way ahead. 
This is also true for the presidency reports which prepare European Council meetings 
and declarations of the European Council, which sometimes were jointly taken by 
other European institutions.  
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Second, the Council of the EU is legally the most relevant body in the domain of 
security policy and is equipped with the most central competencies. The discourse 
analysis of this research project takes into account the conclusions of three different 
Councils, namely the General Affairs Council, the Council on External Relations and 
the Development Council. Furthermore, the analysis includes Council’s decisions, 
regulations, joint actions, and common positions. Differing in their binding force, 
these documents represent policy decisions and their implementations on the 
supranational and intergovernmental level. Finally, the analysis comprises answers 
of the Council to written questions by the European Parliament. All these documents 
provide fruitful access to the institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. 
They represent the discussions of, and decisions on, policies within the domain of 
external relations, foreign and explicitly security policy.  
Third, in order to take into account the whole picture of discourses on the meaning of 
security, the supplemented bodies of the Council and their production of texts need 
to be considered, as well. Therefore, the analysis includes texts and documents of the 
High Representative of CFSP/ESDP, COREPER, PSC, and CIVCOM as central 
institutions in regard to policy formulations in the domain of the EU’s security 
policy.  
Advances and limits 
The thesis is based on these documents in order to discover the internal logics of the 
shared understandings of security established at the EU level. The decision to focus 
on official documents is made in favour of other data and the research method of 
discourse analysis is made in favour of other techniques due to three reasons: first, 
the data includes only those aspects which are commonly agreed upon by relevant 
actors and therefore they are highly relevant in formulating the EU’s security policy; 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 83 
 
second and building upon the first, the documents do not include cheap talk but 
highly binding common statements, not in the least because of their legal status as 
treaty revisions, common decisions and so forth. Third, documents represent the way 
of thinking of the respective period of time without being influenced or biased by 
interviews of individuals taken out of context later in time. Based on these three 
advances, the thesis is able to reconstruct the ways of reasoning on security at the EU 
level dominant at the respective time. Also, the thesis is able to demonstrate that a 
significant change has occurred in the way relevant actors intersubjectively 
perceived themselves, the threats and security problems they face and reasonable 
action in facing these problems. Although such an analysis has its limits, it can be 
assumed that actors who redefined their perceptions also act accordingly, which is to 
say – again – that the reasoning on security enabled the institutionalisation of 
security policy at the EU level. (see Gheciu 2005: 31-2)  
At the same time, the approach has its limits in tracking the sources f influence. The 
analysis focuses exclusively on data produced at the EU level and produced by 
relevant actors. This limits the perspective to the very core of the research question. 
At the same time, it disables the research to identify the sources of influence of 
whether, for example, dominant meanings were imported from NATO discourses. 
As I have argued above, such a tracking is a research project in and of itself. What 
this thesis intends to do is to identify change and explain how new logics, introduced 
by these changes, affected the EU’s security policy. When appropriate, the thesis 
will highlight discourses likely to be the sources of influence by referring to 
secondary literature. 
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3.3 Periods 
The analysis is separated into three periods. Each period consists of two years, 
whereas the first is 1996-1997, the second 2000-2001 and the third 2003-2004. At 
the end or during these periods important moments of common agreement were 
taken publicly. This was for example a treaty revision resulting from an IGC. Public 
events are very central since they visibly reflect the dominant interpretations 
established at that particular moment of time. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 177) The 
periods, which led up to these events, are central for the analysis because dominant 
interpretations are a production of previous processes of social interaction. The 
events publicly re-establish the common sense and by agreeing on a revised treaty 
these interpretations became legally binding. This research project investigates the 
dominant interpretations established in a particular moment of time and analyses 
how they became dominant. Therefore, in each period I analyse the construction of 
EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity.  
Apart from these periods, I also argue for the need to separately examine the first 
half of 2003. During that time, EU member states discussed how to proceed with 
Iraq and more generally with subjects of European foreign policy and integration. 
The interim section is important to address criticisms of the literature which argued 
that the dispute over the war on Iraq showed that CFSP and especially ESDP were 
not successful but marginalised. I will contest this perspective by demonstrating the 
robustness of discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the 
EU level and within ESDP.  
The analysis is divided into these periods in order to identify more easily changes in 
the meaning of security and its constituting discourses on EU identity, the 
construction of threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. In each individual section 
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I will start by analysing the construction of EU identity, followed by the analysis of 
how threats are perceived and then how rules are constructed. I will especially focus 
on changes in the constructions compared with previous periods in order to highlight 
how the meaning of security evolved over time, as well as how this enabled actors to 
presume a security policy necessary on the EU level. In the following, I will argue 
the decision to select these three periods.  
To start with, the period 1996-7 is crucial to my analysis because it represents the 
latest time frame before a security policy was implemented at the EU level. It was 
the run up to the IGC of Amsterdam which changed the EU Treaty of Maastricht 
which not very specifically envisaged “the eventual framing of a defence policy” at 
the EU level. (TEU Maastricht, Article J.4.1) The run up to the IGC of Amsterdam 
was a very important time for the later inauguration of ESDP since for the first time 
the EU treaty encompassed a more concrete outlook to an EU security policy by 
including the Petersberg Tasks into the treaties.  
The Amsterdam Treaty was signed by the EU member states during the IGC in 
October 1997. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty 
enhanced the EU’s external dimension with a security component. Despite this 
inclusion, security and defence still was organised outside of the EU framework. At 
the end of the IGC of Amsterdam, all 15 EU member states declared to aim for the 
development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) to be established 
within NATO. (see European Council 1997c) It was intended to strengthen the 
“institutional and practical cooperation” (European Council 1997c: No: B, 9) of the 
WEU and NATO. In regard to the EU, WEU was declared as being an “integral part 
of the development of the Union” (TEU Amsterdam J.4.2) in the way that the 
 
Barnutz Chapter I – Constructing Security 86 
 
“Union requests the WEU […] to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of 
the Union which have defence implications”. (TEU Amsterdam J.4.2)  
Therefore, the period 1996-7 is most suitable for the analysis because, on the one 
hand, EU member states were used to procedures and mechanisms implemented by 
the Maastricht Treaty which had been in force for three years. The Maastricht Treaty 
inaugurated CFSP which enabled the institutionalisation of discourses on foreign and 
security policy on the EU level. These discourses are central to the analysis. On the 
other hand, the period represented the last moment before EU member states agreed 
on a new treaty which included further references to security and defence policy, 
although these references did not integrate security and defence into the EU 
framework. In 1996-7 and still so with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU did not 
have a security and defence policy at its disposal. By declaring ESDI as an objective, 
the EU went for the option to accumulate security and defence within the framework 
of NATO while using the existing structures of WEU.  
The second empirical chapter will focus on the period of 2000 to 2001. During this 
period, the IGC of Nice introduced ESDP into the Treaty on the EU. Prior to this 
event, the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies were actively 
engaged in revising the treaties. This included processes of reasoning on European 
security as was discussed in 1998 and 1999 during the St. Malo meeting between 
France and Britain, as well as during the European Council meetings taking place 
under Austrian and German presidency. Although the years 1998 and 1999 are most 
frequently regarded as the years of change in the EU’s approach in setting up its own 
security policy, (see Howorth 2000a: 34; Howorth 2000a, 2000b; Gnesotto 2004) 
this project focuses on 2000 and 2001 for good reasons: first, the year 2000 included 
the very run up to the IGC of Nice and the discourses of that time represented the 
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knowledge and dominant interpretations which were established throughout the 
previous two years. Second, the year 1999 is left out of the analysis in favour of the 
year 2001 since the Treaty of Nice was declared being of lower-value almost 
immediately after the IGC because it did not address the challenges ahead, e.g. 
enlargement and how the EU was able to carry out its role on the international level 
after enlargement. It was this understanding of a system crisis which led to an 
identity crisis which initiated the post-Nice process paving the way to the Laeken 
declaration, the Convent on the Future of Europe and the process of reforming the 
EU, its treaties and institutions by utilising a deliberative approach different to the 
IGC model. In other words, the year 2001 marked the beginning of a process of 
recasting EU identity and one in which EU actors realised the potential of the EU’s 
security policy. (see Solana 2004) Therefore, the analysis focuses on the period of 
2000 and 2001. It favours 2001 over 1999 because the post-Nice process was very 
central for EU identity constructions; also, relevant discourses of the run up to the 
IGC taking place in 1999 were reflected and visible in discourses of the year 2000.  
The above developed period ends with the 11th September 2001. The events of that 
day and the processes of reasoning followed by these events will not be taken into 
account. They constituted a discursive crisis by which earlier meanings did not 
match new phenomena. (see Diez 2001: 14; Croft 2006: 8) This crisis affected ways 
of reasoning on EU identity and global challenges as well as rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity. Therefore, they will not be considered as part of 
the period 2000 and 2001. 
Following this chapter, I will focus on the first half of 2003. Discourses on the 
meaning of security were challenged by a disagreement of EU member states on how 
to proceed with Iraq. I will show that the discursive crisis taking place in the first 
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half of 2003 triggered the EU member states’ disregard of established rules of 
interaction and cooperation on the EU level. Despite arguments of the literature, the 
intensity of the crisis could neither be explained by subject disputes nor did it change 
the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
The discourse on the way forward with Iraq took place outside of institutionalised 
discourses on the meaning of security. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to address 
discussions in the literature which have identified a paradox of crisis and success 
when, despite the crisis over Iraq, EU member states agreed on successful steps in 
regard to ESDP. Second, the chapter will endorse the robustness of institutionalised 
discourses on the meaning of security by deconstructing the discursive battle on the 
question of Iraq and ESDP’s next steps of institutionalisation and implementation. 
This chapter will strongly support the final chapter by showing that the meaning of 
security was much less contested compared with earlier moments in discourse. 
The final chapter analyses the time frame 2003 to 2004 as the final period in which 
the EU fully established ESDP by inaugurating its first ever strategic security 
strategy, e.g. ESS. It also conducted its first police missions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (EUPM) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 
called PROXIMA, and its first military operations in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (Artemis) and in FYROM (CONCORDIA). (see Missiroli 2003a: 500) This 
all took place in 2003. The following year was marked by the full implementation of 
the ESS in all aspects of EU’s external relation, i.e. economic, development, foreign 
and security policy. Also, ESDP operations were enhanced and revisited by lessons 
learned initiatives. This period publicly and visibly established the EU’s ability to act 
as a security actor at the international level. Furthermore, the ESS was not only 
important as the first ever commonly taken and legally relevant security strategy of 
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the EU and its member states. Also, it included the EU’s perception of international 
terrorism as the most challenging security problem. Therefore, the ESS re-
established the EU’s dominant interpretations of the phenomenon of international 
terrorism which were constitutive for the meaning of security in 2003 and 2004. 
Finally, the analysis focuses on these two years in order to show that despite the very 
controversial discussions on the way forward in Iraq, the meaning of security 
established at the EU level remained very robust. As a result, the chapter will 
demonstrate that the EU strongly settled into its self-perception as international 
actorness, for example by defining detailed rules of appropriate behaviour on how to 
use civilian and military capabilities. Also, the chapter will show that sense making 
processes on international terrorism integrated a meaning of dynamism as a 
structural security problem into the discourses of security, which made more robust 
reactions necessary.  
3.4 Research Techniques 
In the following I will discuss the methods of how to analyse processes of sense 
making. It is important to conceptualise how discursively upheld meanings and 
discursive practices constitute agency and structure. Three aspects are important in 
this regard. First, the analysis needs to identify subjects and objects available within 
the discursive practices. Second, the relationship between them needs to be analysed. 
Third, both agents and structures need to be qualitatively evaluated. In the following 
I will provide suitable methods of discourse analysis to excavate the meanings of the 
discursive practices and the aspects it constitutes. These three aspects will be 
rigorously applied to analyse a great number of texts which represent the 
institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. They enable the analysis to 
carry out ground work on the meaning of security. Finally, I lay out the research 
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strategy of how I conduct the analysis as a grounded theory based on discourse 
analysis. The strategy includes a full reading of each individual text, definition of 
meanings as codes and identifications of respective quotes, a quantitative evaluation 
of how significant codes were, and finally a qualitative analysis of how codes related 
to others logically. 
Techniques of Discourse Analysis 
The research methods developed here need to bring about a conceptualisation of how 
the internal dynamics, the politics of discourses, can be studied by analysing written 
words. The key is to understand discourse as creating “subjects, objects, and 
relationships among them”. (see Shapiro 1981: 141; Foucault 1972; Milliken 1999b) 
Therefore, as a first step, the analysis needs to identify subjects and objects which 
are constituted through discursive practices. The second step needs to analyse the 
relationships between i) subjects and ii) subjects and objects.  
After identifying subjects, objects and their relations, the research needs to go a step 
further by focusing on the quality or character of each. In the literature a variety of 
methods can be found to analyse these qualities. In my analysis I will use three 
different methods. They are predicate analysis, (see Milliken 1999b: 231) 
juxtapositional method, (see Milliken 1999b: 243; Campbell 1992) and method of 
subjugated knowledge. (see Milliken 1999b: 243; Doty 1996: 6) These methods will 
be briefly introduced in the next paragraphs. Overall, the analysis will be conducted 
in terms of a ‘grounded theory’ approach. The approach needs to combine empirical 
study and the attempt to abstract from its findings in order to create theoretical 
categories which again are able to explain the empirical material. (see Milliken 
1999b: 234; Glaser and Strauss 1967) This approach also provides proof of whether 
the analysis needs to include more data or not. In the case that new texts do not add 
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new aspects to the theoretical categories, or when theoretical categories are not 
falsified by new findings, the categories are defined appropriately to explain the 
empirical data.  
Predicate analysis “focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, 
adverbs, and adjectives that attach to nouns”. (Milliken 1999b: 232) Predicates 
mount particular qualities and characters to subjects, objects, and relationships. An 
example should clarify this. 
“Our experience in the European Union is clear: we have been more successful 
when we have worked with other partners. Take the example of Congo, among 
many. We sent a military force at the request of the United Nations. Our soldiers 
worked with theirs. And we all together managed to crown with free and fair 
elections a very complex democratic transition.” (Solana 2004: 2) 
This section is particular interesting in regard to the construction of EU identity. 
What is referred to as ‘we’ most times, albeit not all, refers to the European Union as 
a community. The subject European Union as a ‘we’-group is given quality by 
different predicates: 
1. successful 
2. working with others (cooperation) 
3. sending military force (strength) 
4. at the request of the UN (multilateralism) 
5. managed to crown with free and fair elections a very complex democratic 
transition (successful problem solving, and democracy) 
These qualities together represent the EU as a successful international actor which is 
able to deal with very complex problems by (multilateral) cooperation and strength. 
At this stage, this predicate analysis is only a singular shot without providing any 
indications of whether findings can be generalised. However, the analysis conducted 
in the following chapters will follow the rules of grounded theory in order to create 
theoretical categories. 
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The juxtapositional method and subjugated knowledge can be seen as similar 
approaches to analyse the discursive practice. Juxtapositional methods assume that 
discourses, by constituting meanings, always establish their diametrical others. The 
focus of this method not only rests on the subject, object, or relationship itself but on 
the discursive practice establishing the other. It thereby enables the analysis to 
recognise qualities and characters of subjects, objects and relations while their 
diametrical others are constructed. The purpose of this method is to render 
“predominant interpretations […] and to demonstrate the inherently political nature 
of official discourses”. (Milliken 1999b: 243; see Campbell 1992, 1993)  
Whereas the juxtapositional method only points out alternative concepts, the method 
which focuses on subjugated knowledge intends to analyse these alternatives in more 
detail. The approach assumes that alternative concepts become possible in discourses 
which do not significantly overlap with dominant discourses. (see Milliken 1999b: 
243) This method is very important in making sense of political contestedness. 
Different meanings are possible only if processes of sense making are not dominated 
by one meaning. In order to analyse different meanings in more detail, different 
processes of sense making need to be identified and analysed. The concept of 
subjugated knowledge enables the researcher to recognise different processes more 
easily. 
Research strategy 
This section makes explicit how the discourse analysis is actually conducted and 
how I deal with the texts selected for the analysis. The research strategy includes 
seven steps which are carried out individually for each period of time. This is 
necessary because it is expected that the ways of reasoning changed over time and 
the analysis must track these changes accordingly.  
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After selecting the documents, the first task is to read all documents and highlight 
text passages which engage in one of the three constructions: i) EU identity 
constructions; ii) construction of threats and security problems; and iii) construction 
of rules of appropriate action in the case of insecurity. The second step is to identify 
codes for specific aspects of identity constructions, threat constructions, and rule 
constructions respectively. The codes represent particular meanings dominant in the 
discourse on security. Codes are identified for each period of time and each element 
of construction, e.g. identity, threats, and rules. Based on the codes, the third step is 
to mark and highlight quotes as shorter passages of texts which represent a particular 
code. In other words, the quotes actively construct a meaning as part of the discourse 
on security. In the fourth step, the analysis identifies subjects, objects and the 
relations among them by using the research techniques developed above. This step is 
essential to discover the inherent logics of the meanings per quote. The following 
fifth step is carried out as a grounded theory checking whether or not identified 
quotes support the related quote and hence the meaning constructed by the text 
passage. The grounded theory is constantly searching for texts which falsify earlier 
findings. This process only ends when the findings could not be falsified by texts 
previously not considered. (see Glaser and Strauss 1967) By this approach, identified 
quotes are qualitatively checked for whether they support or falsify the codes they 
are related to. The first case supports the code, the second leads to the identification 
of another code for which further text passages are searched. In the sixth step, the 
codes are quantitatively evaluated. The number of quotes supporting a specific code 
is calculated and codes are ranked in regard to their significance as the measure of 
frequency of use. This is again carried out in regard to each element of construction, 
e.g. identity, threats, and rules. In the final step, both levels of analysis, qualitative 
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and quantitative, are brought together in a mind map which logically relates codes to 
each other while reflecting the significance of the codes.  
This research strategy leads to three mind maps per research period – one on EU 
identity, one on threat, and one on rules. They reflect the internal relation of 
meanings, as well as their dominance in the discourse on security. The following 
empirical chapters are written based on this research strategy and the mind maps. 
The findings are presented by referring to supportive quotes and references to 
secondary literature. I have selected quotes in order to make the meaning discussed 
as clear as possible. This sometimes leads to catchy or blunt quotes. But the 
meanings they represent are double checked by the grounded theory approach and 
the research strategy developed here. 
Summary 
In this chapter I have argued for a constructivist approach to analyse the meaning of 
security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The approach 
enables the research to focus on endogenous processes of social action and 
interaction which mutually constitute agency and structure. This mutual constitution 
is subjectively shared among a group of people which together share a common 
identity. In regard to this thesis, this group of people encompasses the political elite, 
diplomats, politicians and staff of the EU. Together they share a common EU 
identity. From this intersubjective perspective, I have argued that relevant EU bodies 
such as the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies frame the 
institutionalised discourses of EU identity and security policy by which actors 
approach the world and perceive certain external actors and phenomena as security 
problems or threats. The relation between both, identity and threat perceptions, 
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affects the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. 
Based on the theoretical discussions above – building up on international relations 
theory and more broadly social sciences literature – rules are not only understood to 
constitute agency but also in structuring actors’ behaviour. This leads to the 
theoretical claim that rules which apply in the case of insecurity translate into 
formally and informally institutionalised rules and procedures within ESDP. 
Therefore, the thesis hypothesises that identity constructions affect institution 
building and the use of available policy tools. The thesis will focus on this 
hypothesis by answering the research question of how ESDP became possible at the 
turn of the 21st century.  
Socialisation processes of involved actors are considered to be important in regard to 
European integration, of which ESDP is a part. (see Checkel 1999; Øhrgaard 1997, 
2004; Smith 2004b) Traditional approaches such as neo-realism or neo-liberalism are 
not able to take into consideration endogenous factors of social interaction. 
Therefore, I have argued for a constructivist account. In the vein of the literature on 
social constructivism, authors have differently conceptualised how human action and 
interaction takes place and how this affects the social construction of reality. The 
approach developed in this chapter is fundamentally based on Onuf’s work. Onuf 
most plausibly conceptualises the role of language as responsible for the social 
construction of reality. He argues that agents are discourse dependent. 
Intersubjective meanings affect the way agents make sense of the world. Through 
this process, agents find and produce order which constitutes the social reality which 
they take for granted.  
Equipped with this theoretical approach, I have conceptualised the social 
construction of security as a relational complex. Security always relates a referent 
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object to threats and thereby establishes rules of appropriate behaviour applicable in 
a situation of insecurity. In this regard, I have argued for two different ways of 
identity formations. The first leads to an inclusive, the second to an exclusive 
identity. Both are heuristic concepts which can only be identified by analysing the 
political contestedness of identity constructions. On the one hand, the construction of 
threats becomes possible depending on the type of identity. On the other hand, threat 
construction depends on the perception of the behaviour of the ‘other’. Together, 
identity construction and the perception of the other can either lead to association or 
dissociation.  
Following this logic, the thesis analyses how social reality is constructed in the 
domain of security within relevant European institutions. Actors of the European 
Council, the Council and its supplement bodies have produced order by giving 
meaning to security which enabled the institutionalised of ESDP. In other words, the 
thesis considers ESDP and its policies to be possible based on particular sense 
making processes defining the rationale of security. These processes are accessible 
while studying discourse. My approach, which starts with Onuf’s perspective, 
enables the research to directly link the ontological observation of texts to the 
epistemological approach of constructivism.  
As I have argued, meanings can be analysed by the discursive methodology 
discussed above. In order to answer the research question, I have argued for a 
discourse analysis focusing on discursive practices establishing subjects, objects, and 
their (inter)relationships. In regard to the research techniques, I have argued for 
predicate analysis, juxtapositional method and the method focusing on subjugated 
knowledge. Furthermore, I have identified relevant discursive fields in which 
discourses on the meaning of security can be located. I have argued that identity 
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formation takes place in the discursive field of European integration, whereas the 
perception of the ‘other’ hugely depends on discourses of global challenges. Finally, 
rules of appropriate behaviour applying in the case of insecurity had to correspond to 
discourses within the discursive field on international order. The meaning of security 
enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP can be found in the space 
where these three discursive fields overlap. While using this research design, the 
analysis will rigorously conduct a discourse analysis producing a detailed and 
diversified picture of how security has been constructed, how this construction has 
changed and how these processes have made ESDP possible and the implementation 
of corresponding policy tools.  
In the following empirical chapters, I will answer the research question while 
focusing on the meaning of security and its development within each period of time. 
The structure of every empirical chapter always follows the same logic: I will start 
by analysing identity formations taking place in the discursive field on European 
integration. I will then focus on the construction of threats which largely depends on 
discourses on global challenges. Finally, I will analyse how rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity have been constructed. I will analyse all aspects 
of security discourses, starting with the chapter on the period 1996-7. In the 
successive empirical chapters on the period 2000-1 and 2003-4, I will only focus on 
those aspects or meanings which were constructed differently. By this approach, I 
will be able to precisely point out the changes and developments in the meaning of 
security which accounted for a shift in the intersubjective understanding of relevant 
actors that finally perceived the EU as responsible for security policy. This enabled 
the institutionalisation of security on the EU level, as well as the deployment of 
security action further afield. 
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The structure of the empirical chapters is interrupted only by Chapter IV, which 
focuses on the first half of 2003 and the discursive crises which took place in the 
lead up to the war on Iraq. Here, I will deconstruct individual speech acts which 
strongly affected European discourses on Iraq, European security and EU identity. 
The purpose of this approach is to show that the dispute on how to proceed with Iraq 
did not relate to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level 
and within ESDP. In other words, disarmament by military force was never 
understood as an appropriate tool for ESDP. I will also show that the intensity of the 
discursive crises can best be explained by actors’ disregard of established European 
rules of interaction and cooperation. Finally, this explains how success in regard to 
ESDP matters was possible, despite the crisis. The chapter will also endorse the 
robustness of discourses on the meaning of security. This will support the findings of 
the other empirical chapters arguing for change in the intersubjective perception of 
the EU as an international actor responsible for security policy on the international 
level. 
In the following, I will start with the chapter focusing on the period 1996-7, followed 
by the chapter on 2000-1. The interruptive chapter on the discursive crises in early 
2003 will be followed by the final empirical chapter focusing on the period 2003-4. 
In the summary I will bring together the theoretical discussions and empirical 
findings of this thesis. 
Chapter II 
 
Avoiding Duplication in EU’s External Action 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the processes of constructing EU identity, 
perceiving threats from the EU’s intersubjective perspective, and constructing rules 
of appropriate behaviour for a situation of insecurity. I have argued above that 
discourses on European security at the EU level were institutionalised within the 
European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Documents produced 
within, or in relation to, this institutionalised discourse need to be analysed in order 
to gain knowledge of the meaning of security. In the following, I will first give an 
overview of the findings which I then will present in more detail. At the end of this 
chapter I will summarise my findings and relate these findings to my general 
argument in order to prepare the conclusion of my thesis. Also, the summary will 
lead to the next chapter analysing the period 2000-1. 
The period of 1996-7 was dominated by a variety of central meanings. Two 
meanings dominated in the discursive field of European integration. First, in regard 
to external action, the EU acted within the limits of the EC and did not consider it its 
responsibility to act in the field of security policy. Based on its economic success 
and potentials, the EU perceived its own history as one of success. This perspective 
affected the internal as well as external dimensions of EU identity. Internally, the EU 
tried to ensure the prosperous development of all its citizens. Externally, the EU at 
times carried the “bulk” of the financial aid. (Council 1996j) This perspective not 
only led the EU to external action using its economic power almost exclusively. It 
also constructed a limited meaning of responsibility by which the EU did not 
perceive itself as an actor in security but as a source of financial aid at the 
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international level. Second, EU identity was constructed referring to the cooperative 
and integrative nature of the integration process. European integration made war 
unthinkable between EU member states. If cooperation could make war history 
within the European continent, this could be nothing but true for other regions of the 
world. As a result, the EU understood cooperation as the most powerful tool to 
overcome differences between actors and to improve economic, social, and political 
circumstances. I will later show in more detail how this self perception not only 
influenced the construction of EU identity but also how it affected its external 
approach. Derived from its historic perspective, the baseline of the EU’s foreign 
policy and external relations was built on a particular understanding of cooperation 
and duplication. It was this meaning of duplication which did not allow the EU to 
expand its action into spheres which already were covered by other actors or 
institutions, e.g. security policy. 
The discursive field of global challenges was dominated by a meaning that 
development, crisis and conflict were the most striking global challenges. This was 
reflected within the institutionalised discourses at the EU level. Crisis and conflict, 
as well as development, ranked high on the agenda in Europe. However, these 
situations were not perceived as security relevant. First, this was disabled by the 
EU’s self-perception of not being responsible to act in the field of security. Second, 
the meaning of duplication disabled the conclusion that the EU should enhance its 
abilities in fields already dealt with by other institutions or actors. Overall, threat 
constructions only took place in regard to weapons and their procurement, as well as 
in regard to landmines. 
Finally, the discursive field of international order was dominated by the end of the 
Cold War. In this post-Cold War period, international organisations were given 
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particular relevance in stabilising world peace and security. This applied primarily to 
the UN. Furthermore, the stabilising of international relations was assigned to 
regional organisations, such as the OSCE and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU). This was also understood in the European Council and Council of the EU 
and affected all three aspects under review here: EU identity, perception of threats, 
and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The EU understood itself 
as a regional organisation almost exclusively responsible for the well being of the 
people in its own territory. In regard to other regions, the EU understood itself as 
being able to step in and provide (financial) aid – still avoiding duplication – but 
only after stable conditions were established either by conflicting parties themselves 
or by responsible regional organisations. (see Council 1996k) 
1. EU Identity 
In the following I will analyse the construction of EU identity. The findings will be 
clustered in five subsections. The chronology represents the internal logic of the 
identity construction. It starts first with the historical dimension or memory of EU 
identity, through which European integration was constituted as a successful attempt 
to overcome the war-shaken past of the continent initiated by European states 
themselves. This enabled the construction of responsibility as a central meaning of 
EU identity. Also, the historical dimension provided normative arguments for the 
support of international cooperation as the way to overcome differences. The second 
subsection deals with EU core principles as the very foundation of EU identity. They 
contained democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Third, I will 
show that EU identity construction strongly built up on the meaning of ‘civil society’ 
and the rational that responsibility did not only apply to EU member states but to the 
citizens, as well. In reference to EU core principles, civil society had to be enabled to 
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be actively involved in policy processes and thereby stabilise state structures and the 
EU governance system. Fourth, another central meaning of EU identity was that of 
‘EU self-awareness’. It constituted the EU to possess actor-like characters, which 
was related to the historical dimension of EU identity. Fifth, the final meaning dealt 
with ‘cooperation and integration’. It referred to the rules of organised cooperation 
within Europe and at the international level. Finally, I will summarise the findings 
and argue that EU identity was constructed as an inclusive identity.  
1.1 Memory 
EU identity constructions very dominantly included references to Europe’s war-
shaken past. The EU memory implemented the logic that EU member states were to 
bring an end to that evil past by cooperation and integration. EU member states 
themselves initiated this process. This perspective was central for EU identity 
constructions and enabled the meaning of responsibility as a central requirement by 
which actors – not only European actors – were able to overcome their own 
problems. The Council basically stated that the “success of the EU has made major 
war in Western Europe unthinkable.” (Council 1996l: EU-India/Political Issues) This 
perspective juxtaposed today’s Europe with its own past. In this sense, past was the 
time before the end of the Second World War and before the beginning of European 
integration. The time of concern was different in regard to enlargement. Here, the 
evil past meant the Cold War and the period proceeding European reunification in 
the 1990s. However, the initial step was the signing of the treaty establishing the 
European Community of Coal and Steel in 1951. This crossroad was understood to 
divert the evil past of Europe from its cooperative and successful presence.  
The Foundation of successes has been “the principle of the equality of all the 
Member States, respect for the cultural identities and national and institutional 
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specificities of each and every one, respect for fundamental human rights, 
political, economic and social solidarity between peoples, regions and States and 
the principle of sufficiency of means.” (Portuguese delegation 1996: 9) 
The past was constructed as being dominated by brutal conflict and insurmountable 
differences between European states. The European states themselves banished evil 
times into history by establishing cooperation through economic integration. (see 
Mitzen 2006: 271) The EU invited Middle and Eastern European countries to share 
“the Union's commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties 
of the past”. (European Council 1997a: paragh. 5, introduction) This perspective was 
important for the internal dynamic of European integration. The juxtapositioning was 
important for the dynamic of European integration, since it offered the logic that the 
evil past could only be defeated through integration. This perspective was supported 
by the understanding that the process of cooperation and integration was made 
possible by European states acting responsibly. They acted responsibly by taking 
control of their own history. The meaning of responsibility was very central to the 
construction of EU identity – which I will discuss in further detail in the section of 
rules of cooperation. Following the logic of responsibility, European integration in 
this view did not depend on any other force than the willingness of member states to 
overcome the conflicting periods of history. The EU was able to “build trust, boost 
confidence, break down the barriers and bring prosperity to” Europe. (Council 1996l: 
EU-India/Political Issues) The importance of the historical dimension of EU identity 
again became apparent in a declaration made by the EU and addressed to “the people 
of the FRY”, which affected the EU’s approach to the outside world: 
“Many of the countries in the Union have faced economic problems similar to 
those that now beset you. […] The lesson of the last forty years is that it is by 
working together with other Europeans that economic well-being is most speedily 
restored.” (Council 1997f) 
 
Barnutz Chapter II – Avoiding Duplication 104 
 
In general, this perspective was important to the European Council, the Council and 
its supplement bodies in showing that European integration was a success story. 
Also, the quote above showed that the historical dimension affected the EU’s 
approach towards the outside. The logic was that taking up responsibility to initiate 
change did not exclusively apply to Europe. By taking on their responsibility, actors 
were able to overcome any difficulty facing them. It enabled every actor to overcome 
differences with its neighbours. They only had to choose cooperation and economic 
integration.  
“Drawing from its own experience, it is the Union’s view that the future 
prosperity and stability of its partners rest on increased cooperation between 
themselves in the economic, social and political spheres. The elimination of 
barriers will foster economies of scale and greater market opportunities thus 
encouraging investment, facilitating the exchange of ideas and increasing mutual 
understanding.” (Council 1996g: EU Mediterranean Policy) 
The beginning of the quote most prominently referred to the juxtaposition of 
European history and the success of today. EU member states experienced how 
cooperation could help to overcome poverty and conflict. In this regard, the quote 
referred to ‘prosperity’ and ‘stability’. In the logic of juxtaposition, the evil past of 
the European continent was dominated by the opposite, e.g. poverty and instability 
or conflict. The basic message of this quote was that these evil times could be 
overcome when states cooperated with each other. Most centrally, cooperation had to 
take place in the economic sphere. Cooperation in the social and political sphere 
seemed to depend on that of the economic sphere. The second sentence established 
the understanding that closer cooperation in the economic sphere will lead to ‘mutual 
understanding’ and therefore to much more than just cooperation, i.e. trust and 
friendship. Therefore, the quote established a functionalist logic of spill over 
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following the logic that after economic cooperation was implemented, the social and 
political spheres would almost inevitably benefit from that cooperation.  
1.2 Core Principles 
Apart from the historical dimension, the most central aspect of EU identity was 
constituted by EU core principles. (see European Council 1997b: Annex III) These 
core principles were: democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. (see Atricle J.1 no. 2 of Maastricht Treaty) They remained 
central and unchanged throughout the whole period of analysis conducted in this 
thesis. EU core principles provided the very foundation on which cooperation and 
integration were possible. This was right for EU internal cooperation. In this regard, 
the EU perceived itself as a community of shared values which were constituted by 
the EU core principles. This is well illustrated by the debates on treaty 
reformulations by the IGC: 
“As Member States are committed to respect human rights, democratic values 
[…] and as the Union is a community of shared values, the IGC should consider 
whether and how far it will be possible to strengthen these fundamental rights and 
improve the safeguarding of them.” (European Council 1996a) 
This quote exemplified the rational which was implemented by the meaning of EU 
core principles. Since EU member states respected human rights and democratic 
values, they shared common values which again bonded together in a common spirit. 
(see Youngs 2004: 416) In this sense, EU core principles were constructed as the 
very preconditions enabling peaceful coexistence. In the following I will briefly 
explore the meaning of each EU core principle.  
The EU understood itself as an experienced actor of democratisation who was able to 
overcome un-democratic times. The meaning of democracy was very much 
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interlinked with the meaning of responsibility. Apart from other democratic rules, 
responsibility established the meaning that actors had to get involved in changing for 
the better circumstances in which they were involved. (see Council 1996o: Ex-
Yugoslavia) Furthermore, democratic processes had to include  
“the setting of precise dates for the electoral process and the advancement of the 
date for the constitutional referendum, the elaboration of a new constitution after 
consultation of a broadly representative national forum, and the announcement of 
the imminent reactivation of political parties”. Council 1996p: Nigeria)  
Overall, a genuine process facing up to these standards and including actors who 
accepted their responsibility was understood as a blue print democracy. (see Council 
1997g: Belarus)  
The rule of law was another component of such a genuine process. “The judiciary in 
all EU Member States is independent of Governments and Parliaments.” (Council 
1996q) It established “[…] a proper balance between the functions and duties of the 
members of the legislative, executive and judicial powers”. (Council 1997h) The rule 
of law and the separation of powers was part of the blue print of democracy.  
In regard to human rights, the EU reaffirmed its pledge “[…] to respect and defend 
the rights of all human beings” (European Council 1997a: Annex 3) in accordance 
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights and fundamental 
freedoms went hand in hand. They universally applied, “regardless of race, gender, 
language or religion”. (European Council 1997a: Annex 3) “[R]espect for human 
rights” was “an integral part of the general principles of Community law and 
constitute[d] a condition for the legality of Community acts”. (European Parliament 
1996b: Answer) Therefore, EU core principles and especially human rights were 
constituted as fundamental parts of EU identity. Their construction referred 
prominently to the international law as providing the basic outset of individual EU 
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core principles. (see Council 1996k: MEDA, EU-Turkey) Both can not be used 
interchangeably but EU core principles inherently built up on norms established 
within international law.  
However, the central aspect of EU core principles was that they did not exclusively 
apply to the internal sphere of the EU. They dominantly affected the construction of 
EU identity and thereby affected the way in which the EU made sense of its external 
sphere. In a way, EU core principles were the starting point of the EU’s external 
action. Reference to the EU core principles could be found in nearly all documents 
addressing the external policies of 1996 and 1997, whether in regard to  Cuba, Niger, 
Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes Region, the Middle East or Afghanistan. (see Council 
1996c; Council 1996h: 2; European Council 1996c: Russia, Belarus) This can be 
exemplarily shown in regard to ex-Yugoslavia, when the Council stated that 
resolutions were “based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which [were] an essential aspect”. 
(Council 1996e: Ex-Yugoslavia) The quote established EU core principles as the 
very core of EU’s identity, not only applying to the internal sphere of the EU but 
also to the external. It perceived the establishment of EU core principles as 
fundamental in resolving conflict. For example, in regard to Belarus, the Council 
constituted the existence of a “blueprint of a genuine process of democratization”. 
(Council 1997g) The blueprint referred to the successes of European integration 
through which European states, while applying to EU core principle, were able to 
overcome conflict. 
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1.3 Civil Society 
Another important meaning of the construction of EU identity was that of ‘civil 
society’. The meaning was important for the construction of EU identity because it 
expanded the process of European integration to include not only nation-states but 
their citizens, as well. (see Warleigh 2001: 620-1) The purpose of European 
integration was to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. 
(European Council 1996a) This perspective required an understanding of how a 
union among peoples could be established. In the first place, European integration 
had to be reasoned as a process encompassing not only states but their peoples. In 
order to become a union among peoples, the meaning of civil society had to cross 
national boundaries to establish a union of the peoples. In the following I will 
develop the meaning of civil society and explain how it related to other central 
meanings of EU identity. 
To start with, the meaning of civil society referred to EU core principles and 
especially to the meaning of democracy as the pre-condition for a civil society to 
develop. (see European Council 1997a: Annex 3 pt. 6) In addition, a civil society 
was constituted by a group of subjects bound together on a national level. This logic 
could be read out of documents dealing with external relations and foreign policy 
when, for example, the Council stated that the citizenship had to be defined in 
“accordance with international law”. (Council 1997n: Great Lakes Region) This 
quote again supports the argument that EU core principles and other central 
meanings of EU identity referred to the international law as the source of definition. 
However, from the EU’s perspective, the purpose of a civil society was to establish 
“mutual understanding” (Council 1996s) within the society as well as “dialogue and 
[…] mutual confidence between parties” constituting this society. (European Council 
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1997a: Palestinian track) Following this argument, the EU established a much more 
ambiguous perspective. A well established civil society was perceived to play an 
“important role” in “preventing and resolving violent conflicts” (Council 1997e: III 
A) by working “with the international community for the stabilization, 
democratization and economic recovery of their country”. (Council 1997l: Albania)  
This was a far reaching understanding of civil society which not only applied to 
EU’s internal sphere but to the external, as well. Its high ‘standards’ could be 
explained by EU internal identity constructions. The way of reasoning was informed 
by the active role played by the civil society within European nation-states and the 
EU more general. They were involved in processes of policy making on almost all 
levels. (see Youngs 2004: 418) The meaning of a union among people implied that 
not only states were responsible for the existence and performance of the EU but the 
civil society, as well. Both were mutually constitutive and dependent on each other.  
In order to play such an important role, a civil society had to be well developed and 
effectively organised. Also, interfaces had to be implemented for civil society to take 
part in policy processes such as agenda setting, for example.  
The Council supported “the participation of civil society in policy making and 
development activity; the aim is to promote participation and social dialogue on a 
broad basis, not just at the project level; a systematic assessment of the social and 
societal impact of policies, programmes and projects is required.” (Council 1996i: 
human empowerment) 
Such a high quality of civil society required a very high degree of well educated and 
economically independent individuals. Equal opportunity was therefore another 
principle which contributed to EU identity. Equality was a general aspect of EU 
identity which not only applied to citizens but informed the reasoning on external 
action. It was “a policy based on a fair approach to, and equal opportunities for, all 
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the countries of the region.” (Council 1997f: Annex I) Hence, equality and fairness 
was constructed to be a general principle which applied to any community or society 
independent of the level on which the community was established. In regard to 
domestic societies, equal chances first and foremost were defined by economic 
chances in the way that “an open and modern economy […] brings benefits to all”. 
(Council 1997f: Annex I)  
Another important aspect of a well-established civil society was freedom of speech. 
In the documents on the EU’s external relations and foreign policies, freedom of 
speech was mostly required by establishing a free media. The Council underlined 
“the importance it attaches to […] the role of free […] media in the pre-election 
information effort”. (Council 1997h: Albania) It was also argued that the media must 
respect international norms or standards of freedom of information. The media “must 
refrain from any propaganda inimical to the peace process as well as any incitement 
of violence”. (Council 1997m: Ex-Yugoslavia) These quotes make clear that the 
media was perceived as having two different characteristics. On the one hand, the 
media was understood as crucial for a strong civil society to develop. On the other 
hand, the media was understood to have the potential of destabilising civil societies 
or even causing or abetting violence. The second problem only arose when structural 
aspects of the media did not apply to international norms. (see Council 1997h: 
Belarus) These norms required a media free and independent of the state. As soon as 
the state in any way gained control of the media, it had the potential to destabilise the 
civil society. Therefore, the meaning of freedom of speech was important for the 
EU’s understanding of how civil societies could be implemented and function well. 
It was a main principle of civil society and hence of EU identity. 
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The principles discussed above added to the construction of EU identity and its 
perspective onto the world surrounding it. In this regard, priority was given to a well 
functioning civil society as a cornerstone of overcoming crisis and conflict and 
establishing democracy, the rule of law and human rights. This meaning was 
combined with the understanding that European states and their citizens were acting 
responsibly by overcoming their evil past. Generally, state actors and actors in civil 
society were responsible for tackling their own problems. (see European Parliament 
1997b: Answer) The central role given to the civil society was constructed based on 
the EU’s understanding of democracy and the meaning of responsibility. As I will 
show in the section on the perception of threats, these principles were very important 
for the EU’s understanding of what constituted a security problem. Also, they 
affected the definition of appropriate behaviour. I will discuss these aspects later in 
this thesis. In the following, I will analyse aspects of EU identity which began to 
constitute a meaning of actorness. As this process was barely obvious, I will not use 
the header actorness but self-awareness. 
1.4 EU Self-awareness 
In the sections above, I have discussed principles of EU identity of a rather general 
kind. They were concerned with EU core principles and further central meanings of 
EU identity. What I now cluster under the header of ‘EU self-awareness’ can be 
understood as a contested attempt to equip the EU with actor-like characters. This 
argument will be developed in the following.  
First and foremost, EU identity was constructed as a “European family of modern 
states” located geographically within Europe. (see Council 1997f: Annex I) This 
perspective strongly referred to previously discussed principles of democracy and 
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civil society. But it was more than just the understanding of a community sharing 
democratic values. The development of a European family was a result of 
socialisation processes. Only a limited number of states and people were involved in 
these processes. They shared more than just democratic values; they shared a 
particular understanding of how this family worked, how family members lived 
together and what kinds of aspects were uniquely important to this particular family. 
Those principles are presented in the following section addressing the question of 
what constitutes the European family of modern states. 
The very beginning was dedicated to the initiative of a few states and their civil 
societies to take up their responsibility to overcome conflict and mistrust. 
“Ultimately the successful socioeconomic development […] will depend on their 
own efforts.” (Council 1996g) In this sense, the European family was born in the 
1950’s, when European states accepted their responsibility. The integration of this 
family, as well as its growth, was constructed as a natural or inescapable process – 
also because the past could otherwise not have been left behind. It was an “ever 
closer Union”. (European Council 1996a)  
Rules organising the political and social life as the means of European integration 
fundamentally constituted this European family. Effectiveness and coherence took 
on a very prominent role. (see European Council 1996c) Effectiveness could be 
attained, for example, by following the rules of transparency and simplicity. “[F]or 
transparency and simplicity, the interruption of certain economic relations […] 
should be governed by only one legal instrument”. (Council 1997c) Another aspect 
of effectiveness was to ensure compliance through monitoring systems. (see 
European Council 1996a: Ex-Yugoslavia) Overall, effectiveness was an important 
character of the European family of modern states. The approach to effectiveness 
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was dominated by the understanding that it could be established by institutionalised 
procedures. (see European Council 1996a: pt. 3)  
The picture was a bit more complicated in regard to coherence. On the one hand, 
especially in the debate within the IGC about how to develop further EU’s foreign 
and security policy, coherence was prominently referred to as important. The “Union 
external policy is to have greater consistency, continuity and visibility.” (Presidency 
of the EU 1996: 4) These three aspects added to the meaning of coherence as a 
matter of how external relations by the EU, EC and EU member states should be 
organised. Similar to effectiveness, coherence was a matter of institutionalised 
procedures which enabled consistency, continuity and visibility of these processes. 
On the other hand, coherence was contrasted by the understanding that solutions had 
to take into account member states’ individual point of view. Only by taking them 
seriously, could the European family develop. “The agreement must be consistent, 
while taking account of the special nature of each country’s individual situation.” 
(Council 1996j: Ex-Yugoslavia; see Article J.4 no. 4 Maastricht Treaty) This 
perspective was enabled by the meaning of equality by which each actor, member 
states as well as EU institutions, had to be equally involved in the decision-making 
processes. This aspect was discussed in regard to stabilising the constitutional 
balance of EU institutions. (see Presidency of the EU 1996: 4) Following this 
meaning, EU’s external action would only be based on the lowest common 
denominator.  
Such a meaning of coherence did not go well with the meaning of effectiveness. 
Coherence required the recognition of all individual situations. This may have led to 
a coherent external action but which did not apply to the understanding of 
effectiveness. Effectiveness could be ensured by decision-making structures which 
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enabled faster decisions. It required “procedures and structures designed to allow 
decisions to be taken in a more effective and timely manner, in a spirit of loyalty and 
mutual solidarity”. (Presidency of the EU 1996: pt. 3) This quote very clearly shows 
why both meanings contested each other. Whereas coherence required the 
recognition of every individual situation, effectiveness not only required faster 
decisions but also a common spirit. The wording ‘spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity’ called for unity among member states and EU institutions by overcoming 
differences of individual interests. This contestedness showed that the meaning of 
effectiveness and coherence – although already introduced into the discourses on EU 
integration and security – was not able to dominate processes of sense making.  
The next aspect of ‘EU self-awareness’ did not deal with the means of cooperation 
but with its ends. References to EU’s objectives or interests could be found in the 
discourse on EU identity. Therefore, the EU established an actor-like character by 
following interests in its external action. For example, the declaration on the Middle 
East Peace Process produced by the European Council of Florence in 1996 referred 
to the EU’s “fundamental interests” in the peace process. (European Council 1996b) 
A Joint Action on the Great Lakes Region stated that the special envoy “may make 
recommendations […] on measures which the Union might undertake to fulfil its 
objectives in the region”. (Council 1996u: Article 3) In regard to mine clearance, 
operations “having priority for the Union” should be financed by the EU. (Council 
1997q) These actor-like characters of following objectives, interests or priorities 
were rarely further specified. Their meaning could only be deduced from the context 
in which they were stated without providing access to their internal logics. They did 
not seem to be defined properly. Rather, it seemed that the EU used the language 
already known from a national context as the grand design acquiring changes. 
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Nation-states were understood to act on interests, objectives, and priorities. But 
whenever the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies referred to 
interest, objectives and priorities, their meaning was not constructed in detail. Only 
their policy field could be reconstructed. However, even when these constructions 
lacked precise meanings, their role within the discourses on EU identity was 
remarkable because they inscribed actor-like characters to EU identity.  
In sum, EU self-awareness rested on three principles. First, the EU perceived itself as 
an European family sharing a common spirit and democratic values. Second, the 
common spirit referred to effectiveness and coherence as the envisaged logic of 
interaction. Both principles organised in a how members of the family had to 
cooperate with each other in a particular way. Finally, the socialisation process of 
forming an European family led to the perspective that the EU was acting on 
common interests, objectives and priorities, even when they were not further defined 
in most cases. Thus, the EU implemented actor-like characters.  
1.5 Cooperation and Integration 
In this section I focus on how EU identity constituted its relation to, and situation 
within, the external sphere, i.e. the international system. This endeavour should not 
be confused with the question of how the EU defined appropriate behaviour in the 
case of insecurity. Rather, this section focuses on how sense making processes on 
EU identity corresponded with the external sphere. The most relevant meanings in 
this regard were economic cooperation, regional cooperation and cooperation with 
organisations. In general, constructions of EU identity included aspects which 
located and defined the EU as an entity within the international system and 
especially within the multilateral system of international treaties, regimes, and 
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organisations. In this regard, the most fundamental principle was that of cooperation. 
Cooperation basically meant that interaction with other organisations or actors 
should be institutionalised. (see European Council 1996c: Russia; Council 1997b)  
Economic cooperation constituted the starting point of European integration and 
thereby added fundamentally to the construction of EU identity. As a result, it 
affected processes of sense making on the EU’s approach towards cooperation with 
external actors. (see European Council 1997b: South Africa; Hanson 1998: 67, 78) 
From this perspective, it was a matter of logic that EU identity and its positioning 
within the international system dominantly referred to economic cooperation as its 
central sphere. For example, the biggest part of the EU Mediterranean policy fell into 
the field of economic cooperation.(see Edis 1998: 97) Although the Barcelona 
declaration contained a security policy and a social basket, the central aim of the EU 
Mediterranean policy was to establish economic cooperation based on association 
agreements with third countries. (see Zaim 1999: 39) Another aim was to establish 
economic cooperation and free trade between the third countries themselves. (see 
Council 1996g)  
Similar logics could be applied to the meaning of regional cooperation. The meaning 
of regional cooperation referred to cooperation within Europe and perceived stability 
as a result of cooperation. “Regional cooperation [played] a major role in stability 
and prosperity in Europe.” (European Council 1997a) Regional cooperation was 
understood to be established by individual nation-states implementing 
institutionalised processes of interaction. In regard to Europe, European integration 
was understood as a special from of regional cooperation and in a later period it 
served as the grand design for the Balkans. 
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However, the interesting turn in the meaning of regional cooperation was that it also 
included cooperation among regional institutions and organisations. The EU 
constituted itself as an institution which was able to cooperate with other institutions. 
Therefore, another actor-like character was added to EU identity. The EU attached 
importance to cooperation with the WEU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the 
OAU, and the UN. (see Council 1996j; Council 1997m) Cooperation took place in 
almost all policy fields, depending on the individual outset of the organisation in 
question. In regard to the field of security policy, this included conflict resolution, as 
well. Where ever regional aspects of conflict resolution were concerned, regional 
organisations were held responsible for solving these problems – sidelined by the 
UN. This applied to the OSCE as well as the OAU, for example. The EU itself did 
not consider it its responsibility to act but to support – almost always financially – 
regional organisations. 
Although the EU understood regional cooperation as important, the EU’s 
responsibility to engage was limited by the meaning of duplication. Duplication was 
understood to be a matter of institutional development and policy action of the EU in 
general. The EU perceived duplication of structures, capabilities and fields of action 
as inappropriate. Duplication addressed the moment when an EU policy began to 
touch on policy fields of other institutions or actors, including almost every 
international organisation of interest to the EU and its member states, such as OSCE, 
Council of Europe, UN, OAU, and WTO.  
The following examples will clarify this meaning. First, in order to eliminate 
technical barriers of trade, the relationship between WTO and international 
standardised institutions should be close in order to “eliminate unnecessary 
duplication”. (Council 1997i: Trade, A) This included the EC and the EU 
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Commission (COM) as a source of defining standards. Second, cooperation with 
Russia in the field of justice and home affairs should avoid “any duplication of 
Council of Europe initiatives”. (Council 1996r: Cooperation with Russia, III) Third, 
the Council required that enlargement negotiations of the COM with Middle and 
Eastern European countries should recognise the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment so “that duplication of work in other negotiation fora is avoided”. 
(Council 1997j: MAI) Fourth, another example was the EU’s Special Envoy to the 
Great Lakes Region, which had to “coordinate closely with the representatives of the 
UN and the OAU in the region avoiding duplication of the initiatives of these 
organizations”. (Council 1996n: Great Lakes Region) In all these cases, the EU did 
not act when another institutions or actors were already in place to act on the 
concerned subject.  
Probably the most central case in which the EU showed that it did not consider it its 
responsibility to act in the field of security was that of the crisis in Albania. In 1992, 
Sali Berisha was elected as head of government in Albania gaining support from the 
US and Europe. The later offered $800 million of financial aid making Albania the 
recipient of the highest aid per capita of that time. (see Perlez 1997) After his re-
election in 1996 which already was criticised by the OSCE, the country suffered 
from a collapse of financial pyramid schemes leading to political protests. This led to 
the breakdown of public order and to the brutal attempts by the government to re-
establish public order. In this situation, rebels were able to control the most 
important cities in southern Albania which again led to a massive refugee movement 
especially into Greece and Italy. (see Permutter 1998: 206) Although France, Greece 
and Italy were ready to engage in an EU/WEU security operation to establish order 
in Albania, the project was rejected mainly by opposition of Germany, Great Britain 
 
Barnutz Chapter II – Avoiding Duplication 119 
 
and Sweden. (see Greco 1998: 205) Finally, on 24 March 1997, the EU Council 
decided to send an advisory mission to Albania as soon as order had been established 
by the Albanian government. (see Greco 1998: 205; Econmist 1997) Thereby, the 
EU member states followed the dominant meaning of responsibility. The Albanian 
government was expected to take up its responsibility in establishing order and turn 
back into the path of democracy. Also, the EU avoided duplication because at the 
same day, the UNSC approved Resolution 1101 calling for a Multinational 
Protection Force for Albania. 
The very interesting turn was that this meaning of duplication was also applied 
internally to EU member states. One example was the debate on the research and 
technological development (RTD), which was developed to “achieve the objectives 
of the European Union’s development policy”. (Council 1997e: I 1) RTD was 
understood to support developing countries. Coordination between the COM, the 
member states, other donors and the beneficiaries was perceived important by the 
Council in order to “avoid cases of duplication”. (Council 1997e: I 11) This framing 
did not only differentiate between EU’s action and those of other donors but between 
action of the COM and EU member states. Although coordination was required to 
make the actions of both more effective, the reference to duplication stabilised the 
understanding that the EU as a whole did not or only reluctantly engage when 
policies were already implemented by others, including member states.  
This meaning of duplication was very dominant in the discourses during the period 
1996-7. It disabled EU’s action whenever other institutions or actors were already 
involved and the Albanian case highlights that this especially applied to the field of 
security. This way of reasoning explains why the EU did not understand itself as 
responsible in the field of security. As soon as other institutions were already active, 
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the EU supported these institutions in their action but did not consider autonomous 
action.  
Such a meaning of duplication was only possible based on the absence of a concept 
of international actorness in the field of security at the EU level. As I have shown 
above, the EU was only slightly equipped with actor-like characters but did not 
understand itself as an international actor in the field of security. Such a meaning of 
actorness was contested by the inter-relation of i) the dominance of the meaning of 
duplication and ii) by the limitedness of the meaning of responsibility. In regard to 
the first, the meaning of duplication disabled the EU to enlarge its institutional and 
policy outlook in field of security. Therefore, the EU could not enhance its 
understanding of being an actor on the international or regional level in the field of 
security. In regard to the second, the meaning of responsibility was limited in the 
sense that the EU’s understanding of responsibility seemed to be connected to a 
regional understanding. On the regional level and when countries became closer to 
the EU’s self, as in regard to the Middle and Eastern European countries, the EU 
perceived itself as responsible to support and assist other European countries in the 
process of successful European integration. But, this responsibility took for granted 
that the respective countries took seriously their own responsibility in engaging in 
cooperation and keeping at least the basic requirements such as public order, the 
establishment of democracy and the respect for the rule of law and human rights. 
When states, such as Albania, did not take up their responsibility as a consequence 
the EU did not consider it its responsibility to support them. This was particularly the 
case at the international level. Here the EU did not perceive it its responsibility to 
act. Only, the EU financially supported regional organisations or the UN in their 
attempts to support others. This way of reasoning remained in utmost contrast to that 
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of 2003-4, when the EU perceived itself as responsible to act on the international 
level in the field of security. By then, the meaning of duplication had almost 
vanished from discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour.  
Summary 
EU identity was constructed around five aspects which were connected logically in 
such a way that they constructed an inclusive identity. These aspects were the 
memory of EU’s success in overcoming the evil past, EU core principles, civil 
society, self-awareness and cooperation. The meaning of the historical dimension 
juxtaposed the present as successful, in contrast to Europe’s evil past. It would be 
misleading to understand this meaning as constructing a kind of exclusiveness, 
applying exclusively to Europe. The meaning strongly helped to implement the 
meaning of responsibility, stating that actors were able to help themselves when they 
joined in cooperation. Therefore, the historical dimension was given universal logic. 
The European victory over its evil past was just one example in history looking for 
similar successes. By implementing responsibility, cooperation and equality between 
cooperating actors, the success of European integration was perceived to be 
reproducible. Hence, the historical dimension of EU identity helped to construct EU 
identity as inclusive. 
Furthermore, EU identity was based on a variety of central meanings which could be 
separated into four categories. EU core principles served as the very basis of EU 
identity. They defined the basic values by which interaction was organised. The 
second and third categories built up on these EU core principles. In the section on 
civil society I have shown that principles, while referring to EU core principles, 
highlighted the importance of civil society in the project of European integration. 
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The third category of EU self-awareness addressed principles which could be 
understood as a result of a European socialisation process. European integration led 
to the understanding of a community which shared common rules of interaction and 
common interests. Finally, I have shown that a meaning of cooperation was central 
for EU identity, even though it was contested by the meaning of duplication.  
Overall, EU identity was constructed as an inclusive identity to which other actors 
could become more ‘self’ by applying to established rules. The only meaning to 
which other actors could only limitedly ascribe to was that of being a European 
family of modern states. The meaning had a geographic dimension to it, which 
limited the possibility to become more ‘self’.  
This way of constructing EU identity was important for the construction of threats 
because it more or less disabled an understanding of other actors as being 
fundamentally different or ‘other’. In other words, the EU was not constructed as the 
referent object of security. Inclusive identities enable others to become more ‘self’ as 
soon as actors start to ascribe to basic rules constituting the identity in question. As I 
have argued in the theory chapter, inclusive identities only feel threatened when 
other actors are understood to be unwilling to become more ‘self’ which did not, or 
very rarely, take place as I will show in the next section.  
2. Construction of Threats 
The purpose of this section is to analyse how, based on EU identity, security 
problems were perceived by the European Council, the Council and its supplement 
bodies as the main actors within the institutionalised discourses of security policy at 
the EU level. Findings are again generated by a discursive analysis. I will focus on 
discourses on global challenges and analyse whether or not the EU was engaged in 
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threat constructions perceived by its intersubjective perspective. I will argue that 
threat constructions did not take place. The only exception was the EU’s perception 
of weapons and landmines. 
The most striking aspect was that during the period 1996-7, threat constructions were 
almost completely absent. Weapons and their proliferation among states was the only 
sphere in which something like threat constructions took place. This applied to 
weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 
their delivery systems, to conventional weapons and landmines. Other sources of 
threats did not exist, apart from those which did fall into the domain of domestic 
security policy, such as organised crime and terrorism. Both problems were 
addressed by the EU’s justice and home affairs policy.  
However, the meanings which dominated discourses on security were conflicts and 
crises on the state or sub-state level. In the following, I will start with identifying the 
meaning of crisis and conflict as the most frequently used meanings of discourses of 
global challenges. This will be followed by the argument that the EU, based on its 
identity, was disabled to understand conflict and crisis as posing a security problem 
on the EU as referent object. This section will be followed by focusing on the way in 
which weapons, organised crime and terrorism were constructed as a security 
problem. Especially the final two were important in regard to recognising changes in 
the construction of threats during the following periods. For example, in the period 
under review here, terrorism did not add to the meaning of security because it was 
perceived as a matter of domestic policies. This changed following the events of 11 
September 2001. In order to recognise these changes, I will discus the perception of 
organised crime and terrorism, although they did not fall into the domain of 
(external) security policy during the period 1996-7. 
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2.1 Conflict and Crisis 
Discourses related to global challenges frequently dealt with conflict or crisis 
situations. These situations were connected to four regions or countries. They 
included the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and especially sub-Sahara Africa, and 
Afghanistan. The perspective of each conflict was characterised by a general, 
underlying understanding of what constituted a conflict or crisis situation. Even 
when each individual conflict or crisis was perceived to be different in intensity or in 
the level of violence, the underlying perception of what constituted a conflict or 
crisis was almost always the same. The EU understood conflict as being based on a 
variety of “root causes”. (European Council 1996c: Great Lake) Root causes were 
for example ethnic, cultural and religious factors which were “often combined with 
weak social, economic and political structures, rapid socio-economic transition, 
inequality and environmental degradation.” (Council 1997k: Africa) Violence was 
only a result of a worsening situation. Root causes led to political and socioeconomic 
imbalance and disregard of human rights and ineffective “democratic governance, 
freedom of press and good governance”. (Council 1997k) Also, “the availability of 
arms, in quantities exceeding the needs for self-defence, may be a factor contributing 
to situations of instability.” (Council 1997e: development policy)  
These root causes led to situations in which EU core principles were disregarded. For 
example, abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as difficult 
humanitarian situations were understood to add to situations of conflict and crisis. 
“Violent conflicts in developing countries have in many instances caused great 
suffering.” (Council 1997e: Development, A) The meaning of human rights abuses 
was understood as “practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced 
labour, abuse of women, political arrests, forced displacement of the population and 
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restriction on the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, movement and 
assembly”. (Council 1996b) The inappropriate implementation of democratic rules 
was understood to contribute to a crisis or conflict situation. A situation of instability 
based on inappropriate compliance with democratic principles was given when 
elected governments were overthrown by other actors, when outcomes of elections 
were manipulated or not taken seriously, or when politicians or parties were hindered 
in their work. (see Council 1996p: Niger) Therefore, the Council attached “the 
utmost importance to respect for human rights and the restoration of democracy”. 
(Council 1997d: Nigeria)  
Conflict and crisis carried elements of juxtapositioning of EU core principles. 
Conflicts and crises were understood to be possible only in a situation of disregard of 
international law, EU core principles, and principles constituting a civil society. As a 
result, conflicts and crises negatively affected conditions of the political, economic 
and social sphere. Based on this understanding, it would have been possible to 
construct conflicts and crisis as threats. But this did not take place. The EU did not 
understand conflicts and crises as posing a security problem on the EU as referent 
object. Although it was stated that the “international community […] cannot remain 
indifferent to events” (Council 1997k) such as conflicts or crises, the EU did not 
perceive itself as responsible to act in these situations. The EU, based on its 
intersubjective perspective, was unable to understand regional conflict and crisis as a 
security threat – and as a result, an EU security policy was not necessary. This can be 
explained by the logic of the meaning of responsibility. As argued earlier, the 
meaning of responsibility required actors to take their fate into their own hands. This 
was to be done by fostering cooperation. For example, a “blueprint” of a genuine 
process of democratisation did not work without actors taking seriously their 
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responsibility in initiating change for their own benefits and those of other actors of 
the region. (see Council 1997g) That meant that conflicting parties “themselves must 
take the lead in, as well as the main responsibility for, the prevention and resolution 
of conflicts”. (Council 1997k: Africa) From this perspective, it followed that the EU 
was not responsible to solve conflicts and crises outside of Europe, if not outside of 
EU territory. This meaning of responsibility was so dominantly constructed that it 
led the Council to state: “The EU should abstain from acting in a manner likely to be 
perceived as an attempt to impose solutions” on others’ problems. (Council 1997k: 
Africa) This was by far the most remarkable reasoning on EU’s external action.  
The logic of this reasoning was fourfold. First, as I have argued in the section on 
EU’s self-awareness, the EU did not understand itself as an international actor in the 
field of security. Second, this perspective was further supported by the meaning of 
responsibility which argued for regional actors to act on their own behalf. Third, if 
the EU’s external action was disabled by these two ways of reasoning, it was further 
disabled by the meaning of duplication. As soon as the EU’s action touched an area 
in which another international organisation or another state was already engaged, the 
EU avoided further duplication. Based on the meaning of responsibility and the 
meaning of duplication, the EU could do nothing else but perceive other 
organisations as responsible and already capable of acting in the situation of conflict 
or crisis. This was true in regard to Africa, where the OAU and the UN would have 
been responsible. This was also true for the Balkans, where the OSCE, NATO or UN 
was responsible. And fourth, the meaning of cooperation disabled EU’s action in 
conflict and crisis situations. Equality between involved actors was perceived as the 
most fundamental aspect of cooperation to be successful. (see above) Development 
policy took note of this because it was implemented in cooperation with the actors 
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concerned. For example, development policy was understood as development 
cooperation through the promotion of “mutually beneficial investment by 
Community operators […] with local operators” (Council 1996n: Regulations 
concerning development cooperation) Cooperation was understood to be impossible 
in a “situation of continuing conflict and ongoing mistrust and tension between the 
parties who were to come together”. (Council 1996y: pt 12) Cooperation was 
possible again in a conflict situation only after involved actors returned to reason. 
This argument was based on the meaning of responsibility which added effectiveness 
by including the logic that “support of the international community and the European 
Union will not achieve its full potential unless the States directly concerned move 
towards true cooperation.” (Council 1996n: FRY, pt.4) But the situation would then 
no longer be one of conflict and crisis. Hence, external action as a security policy 
was no longer necessary. Together, these four meanings disabled the EU to perceive 
conflicts and crises as threats and the EU as the referent object. 
The EU understood conflicts or crises as a problem affecting itself only in one 
regard. Crises and conflicts “seriously undermine[d] the efforts of the European 
Union to foster sustainable development”. (Council 1997e) Through this framing, 
conflict and crisis were constructed as jeopardising achievements of development 
policy. EU’s development policy was designed “to address the causes, in particular 
the root causes, as well as precipitating factors of violent conflicts, previously 
identified on a country-by-country/region-by-region basis, in a targeted manner”. 
(Council 1997e: conflict prevention) As argued earlier, root causes of conflicts and 
crises were understood to be a matter of development. Root causes could be tackled 
by long-term initiatives of development policies. (see Stewart 2008: 236; Stokke 
1997) From this perspective, outbreak of conflicts or crises had to be a sign of failure 
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of the EU’s development policy. Despite this reasoning, it did not lead the EU to the 
conclusion that a security policy was necessary in order to bring to a halt conflict and 
crisis. This would have added to the meaning of security and enabled the 
implementation of civilian but also military capabilities at the EU level. But such a 
way of reasoning was not available, based on the EU’s understanding that it should 
not impose solutions on others’ problems. In contrast, during the period 2000-1 such 
reasoning existed in discourses on European security. At this time, the EU’s security 
policy was connected to development policy as providing a policy tool of the last 
resort – although it was not implemented on the ground.  
In sum, during the period under review here, conflict and crisis were not perceived as 
security threats. Conflict and crisis were understood to be results of particular 
political, economic and social root causes. From the EU’s perspective, they had to be 
tackled by the group of people suffering from these problems – the EU only 
perceived development policy appropriate to support these people in a long-term 
approach. But EU identity did not provide a basis for understanding conflicts and 
crises as posing a security problem on the EU.  
2.2 Weapons 
Apart from that, the only area in which threat constructions took place was regarding 
weapons. Weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation were perceived as a 
problem which was security relevant. “In connection with the Union's common 
foreign and security policy the Council attaches particular importance to the areas of 
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.” (European Parliament 1997a: 
answer) This applied to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. They were 
perceived to threaten international peace and security. Therefore, banning these 
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weapons would be “a landmark in the history of disarmament”. (Council 1997h: 
CWC) The EU’s strategy to prevent this threat was by cooperation on the 
international level. “The European Union is an active player in international efforts 
to prevent and counteract the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” 
(European Parliament 1997c: answer) International treaties and agreements on non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were understood to “contribute to the 
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the process of nuclear 
disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security”. 
(Council 1996p: CTBT)  
In contrast, conventional weapons were not only perceived to be security relevant in 
the sense of international peace and security but to produce immanent regional 
security problems. They were understood to build up tensions between conflicting 
parties on the regional or domestic level which could lead to crises and conflicts. For 
example, “the flow of arms and ammunition into Afghanistan from outside its 
borders must end without delay” because it was understood as an act of disregarding 
the sovereignty of Afghanistan, which built tensions within the country. (Council 
1996m: Situation in Afghanistan) Anti-personal landmines fell into the category of 
arms, which negatively affected not only anxieties between conflicting parties within 
a country. The continued “irresponsible supply and indiscriminate use of anti-
personnel landmines” also produced a threat to innocent civilians. (Council 1996t) 
The difference between conventional weapons and anti-personal landmines was that 
landmines were considered more problematic and  were labelled “inhumane 
weapons”. (European Parliament 1996e) The EU attached grave concern to the use 
and spread of anti-personal landmines which were “deemed to be excessively 
injurious”. (Council 1997q) Anti-personal landmines were understood to be a more 
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serious problem since they did not make a difference between members of 
conflicting parties and military personal on the one side and “innocent humans” on 
the other. (Council 1996m: Situation in Afghanistan) Therefore, the use of anti-
personal landmines caused violence against the civilian population. Landmines had 
the potential to further destabilise situations leading to crises or conflicts. In regard 
to the EU, these conflicts and crises were perceived as a problem for and within the 
region but did not affect the EU itself. 
2.3 Organised Crime and Terrorism 
Finally, processes of reasoning on organised crime and terrorism took place within 
the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Strictly speaking, both 
processes did not relate to the meaning of security researched here. Both problems 
were not understood as security problems but as a matter of combating crime. 
However, both problems are briefly introduced here because terrorism especially 
played a fundamental role in regard to the construction of threats and the EU’s 
perspective onto the world surrounding it in 2003-4. Therefore, processes of sense 
making on a phenomenon called ‘terrorism’ was very different during both periods. 
In 2003-4, terrorism was understood to be an extraordinary threat, whereas in 1996-7 
it was understood to be related to organised crime.  
To start with, organised crime and terrorism included two different dimensions. First, 
their origins or their appearances were perceived to be external. Second, they were 
addressed almost exclusively by the EU’s justice and home affairs. This could be 
explained by the EU’s reasoning on organised crime and terrorism as being a matter 
of crime. (see European Council 1996a: IGC, pt.1) This may well be no 
revolutionary finding in regard to organised crime but is in regard to terrorism, 
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which was understood as a sub-problem of organised crime. This opened up the 
possibility to understand terrorism as crime. For example, the Council was to 
develop a convention for the “fight against organised crime including terrorism”. 
(European Council 1996b: JHA; European Council 1996a: JHA) The perception that 
terrorism was a matter of crime could be read out of the processes of sense making 
on both phenomena. For example, organised crime and terrorism were understood to 
be part of the same core of problems, such as “visas, asylum, immigration, the 
crossing of external borders, the fight against drugs and international crime including 
terrorism, offences against children and trafficking in persons”. (European Council 
1996c: pt IV) The problems listed in this quote fall extensively into the status of 
injustices or crimes. The link between terrorism and crime became even more 
explicit in other circumstances. The most prominent example of reasoning on 
terrorist action taking place outside of the EU’s borders was the suicide attacks 
sidelining the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. (see Council 1997p) 
Terrorism took place in the form of “criminal and cowardly attacks”. (Council 1996j: 
bomb attacks in Jerusalem) This framing again referred terrorism to crime by saying 
that the attacks were ‘criminal’. This way of thinking was also visible vis-à-vis 
terrorism in Afghanistan – although not as strongly. (see Council 1996m: 
Afghanistan) However, the link was again made explicit when the Council stated 
that “the murderous attack against innocent […] tourists” led it to confirm that all 
EU member states were determined to “confront terrorism decisively”. (Council 
1996p: Greek victims) Terrorist attacks were again understood as a matter of crime – 
as ‘murderous’ attacks.  
This link between terrorism and (organised) crime helps to explain why terrorism, 
alongside organised crime, was meant to be tackled by the EU’s justice and home 
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affairs pillar exclusively. It was not a matter of foreign policy but of protecting the 
people from crime. Increasing cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs 
was required to “ensure better protection of the Union's citizens against international 
crime, in particular, terrorism and drug trafficking” (European Council 1996a: JHA) 
This could only be done domestically – through arrangements for extradition 
between EU member states and strengthened control at external borders of the EU. 
(see European Council 1996b: JHA)  
Summary 
In this section of the chapter, I have shown that threat constructions rarely took place 
in the discursive field of global challenges. Only weapons of mass destruction were 
understood to directly threaten international peace and security. In this sense, they 
also threatened the EU. Apart from these weapons, nothing was constructed as a 
threat against the EU or its identity. On the contrary, conflict and crisis situations 
were not perceived as a threat, although they could have been, since they were 
defined as situations in which EU core principles were disregarded and the 
achievements of EU’s development policy were seriously jeopardised. Based on the 
meanings of cooperation, responsibility and duplication, the EU thought action 
inappropriate in a situation of crisis or conflict. Here, active meant nothing more 
than advising. Based on this, threat constructions were impossible because of three 
reasons: first, the EU did not understand itself as responsible, second, it did not want 
to duplicate others’ capabilities. Third, based on the inclusiveness of EU identity, 
actors (previously) involved in conflict or crisis could easily be seen as trying to 
become more ‘self’ again – by taking up their responsibility. The result was that the 
meaning of conflict and crisis did not add to the meaning of security. After a 
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conflict, action was appropriate as soon as actors were open for cooperation. Crisis 
and conflict then turned into a matter of development policy again. 
In the next section of this chapter, I will show that this perspective on crisis, conflict 
and responsibility affected the EU’s external action. Based on the meaning of 
responsibility, actors were required to at least try to implement EU core principles 
and the rule of law. The EU started to engage in cooperation only when actors 
accepted their responsibility. 
3. Rules of Appropriate Behaviour 
In this section I will analyse how rules were constructed defining appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity. This section completes the three dimensional 
construction of security. As I have argued in the theory chapter, security can only be 
understood as relating an identity to issues which are understood to be threatening to 
the identity. This relation mutually establishes rules which apply in situations of 
insecurity. These rules are interlinked, on the one hand, with the identity 
construction in question because identity constructions limit what can be understood 
to be appropriate. On the other hand, rules of appropriate behaviour in a case of 
insecurity only make sense facing a particular, previously defined security threat 
against which the identity needs to be defended. 
The problem of this chapter is that within the discursive field of global challenges, 
none or only minor threat constructions took place. Following the logic of the three 
dimensional understanding of security, rules of appropriate behaviour could not exist 
applying in the case of insecurity. In the section above, I have shown that threat 
constructions only took place in relation to weapons of mass destruction. The threat 
coming from these weapons was understood to be global rather than directed against 
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the EU itself. I will show later in this section that rules which define appropriate 
behaviour in the field of weapons of mass destruction requested multilateral 
arrangements, treaties and monitoring systems and hence cooperation. (Council 
1996m: Dual use goods) These rules were the only ones to add to the meaning of 
security.  
However, conflict and crisis situations ranked highest on the agenda discussed within 
discourses of global challenges. They were not constructed as threatening EU 
identity but as situations lacking in the implementation of cooperation and that what 
I have called EU core principles. Therefore, conflict and crisis situations were less 
‘self’. It could be argued that from the EU’s perspective, they represented those 
times in which European integration had succeeded. This refers to the historical 
dimension of EU identity and the success of integration in overcoming the brutal 
past. As I have argued above, success was ensured by the responsibility taken over 
by European states in changing circumstances for the better. The same was expected 
from external actors, especially those sought out in conflict and crisis. Based on this 
perspective, it was inappropriate to engage in a conflict and crisis situation until local 
actors accepted their responsibility. Whether or not actors acted responsibly could be 
measured by how many EU core principles were implemented in the region of 
conflict or crisis. The rule which applied to these situations said that help and 
support of the EU was only available when certain conditions were met. (see Hill 
2001: 328) The Council considered “the gradual improvement of relations with the 
FRY and to adopt appropriate measures depending on the latter’s attitude”. 
(European Parliament 1996c: answer) Gradual improvement referred to EU core 
principles and hence the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
implementation of democratic rules and the rule of law, as well as compliance with 
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the international law. If “human rights and democratic principles” (Council 1996n: 
MEDA) were violated, leading to a situation of conflict or crisis, the EU intended to 
suspend its aid. As soon as actors stood up to their responsibility – at least by trying 
to implement EU core principles – the EU reconsidered its action. “It is not 
European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures” (Council 
1996c) But, the “European Union considers that full cooperation […] will depend 
upon improvements in human rights and political freedom”. (Council 1996c)  
The rule behind this kind of policy said that actors themselves were responsible for 
establishing democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental 
freedom. The Council recognised that “the primary responsibility for preventing and 
resolving violent conflicts lies with the people concerned.” (Council 1997e: 
coherence of development policy with other policies/pt B; see Council 1997k: 
conflict resolution in Africa) Here, a meaning of ownership was implemented saying 
that people themselves had to change things for the better, rather than any external 
actor. (see Manners 2006: 186) The EU provided aid and initiated cooperation only 
when local or regional actors took on their responsibility and the situation on the 
ground started to improve. For example, the Council stated that the EU “will find it 
easier to increase its support if it can be certain that procedures will actually be in 
place for rebuilding good neighbourly relations between the States concerned”. 
(Council 1996n: FRY, pt.4) However, this help and cooperation was not constructed 
as a security policy. It fell into the sphere of development policy. Development 
policy was understood to support actors and states in such a way that they were 
enabled to help themselves. (see Council 1997o) Again, this was based on the EU’s 
perspective that a well functioning and good governed state was understood to be 
important for peaceful and cooperative development, not only on its domestic level 
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but towards other states in the region. (see Council 1997m: Albania) A well 
developed civil society could help to stabilise the state and improve its functioning 
by providing services to its citizens. (see Council 1997e: III A) This understanding 
was based on EU identity which was constituted by EU core principles, the 
construction of civil society and rules of cooperation. Based on this understanding, 
the EU’s approach to crisis and conflict situations could be summarized as being 
conducted by development policy in order to establish a stable state. “[P]eace, 
stability and sustainable development, as well as respect for human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance, in Africa are of interest and 
relevance to the Union for reasons of preserving peace and strengthening 
international security” (Council 1997k: Prevention and Resolution of Conflict in 
Africa, pt.3; see Council 1996f, 1996g)  
However, the approach of the EU towards crisis and conflict situations was not one 
of security policy but took place in the domain of development policy and almost 
exclusively by financial aid. (see Council 1996e) The EU “reminded its interlocutors 
that the EU was, and is, the main donor of humanitarian assistance in the region and 
that a transition to a more structured cooperation with the EU would depend on 
concrete steps towards peace and reconciliation”. (European Parliament 1996a: 
answer) The EU supported recovery in economic and social terms “when political 
and security conditions make it possible to begin […] rehabilitation” of the country 
in question. (Council 1996k: Burundi) Apart from some exceptions, for example in 
Mostar, the EU’s main channel to provide financial aid was through international 
organisations, such as the UN and its sub-bodies, the OAU, the OSCE and other 
regional organisations. (see Council 1996t: 0002) In this regard, the Council stated 
that the “Union shall pursue its policies and actions within the appropriate political 
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and legal framework (United Nations, OAU, sub regional organisations), where 
necessary, and in close cooperation with the relevant bodies.” (Council 1997a) If the 
UN itself was not going to be active, the decision which organisation should be 
supported was again a matter of responsibility on a regional basis. After this decision 
was made, the EU intended “to identify ways of contributing financially” to the 
initiatives taken by the international or regional organisation. (Council 1997h: 
Albania) 
Apart from financial support, the EU’s external action was affected by its 
understanding of integration and cooperation, leading the EU to opt for regional 
dialogue to open doors for further cooperation. Regional dialogue was understood to 
lead to “a fair, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution”. (Council 
1996a) From the EU’s perspective, dialogue could create a peaceful and cooperative 
atmosphere which opened the way to achieve common agreements. Responsible 
actors were required to “enter into meaningful dialogue with pro-democracy groups 
with a view to bringing about national reconciliation”. (Council 1996b) In this sense, 
dialogue could not start too early because “the complex problems at issue can only 
be resolved through early and substantive dialogue”. (Council 1996m: Eastern Zaire) 
Dialogue was a precondition for the improvement of conditions in a crisis or conflict 
situation and opened the way for cooperation. (see Council 1997l: Albania, pt.8; 
European Parliament 1996d: answer) The position of an EU special envoy was 
established to help improve relations going from dialogue to cooperation. Special 
envoys were engaged in stimulating dialogue in regions where conflicts deeply 
irritated structures of negotiations by supporting “the efforts aimed at creating the 
conditions for solving the crisis” (Council 1996v) The goal was to integrate 
international and regional organisations, as well as conflicting parties. From the 
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EU’s perspective, dialogue was the indispensable starting point to solve conflict 
situations and find common agreements. This perspective was informed by the EU’s 
memory of successfully overcoming its brutal past through ways of dialogue, 
cooperation and finally integration.  
Overall, the EU’s approach to crisis and conflict situations was characterised by 
development policies and financial aid. Rules applying in this regard did everything 
but add to a meaning of security. As I have shown above, discourses of global 
challenges at no time constructed threats in a meaningful sense. Rather, conflict and 
crisis situations were understood to be best addressed through development policy.  
Apart from the dominance of development policy in regard to conflict and crisis, 
discourses under review here eventually referred to “defence implications” of EU’s 
foreign policy. (Council 1996w) It was said that as soon as EU’s external action had 
defence implications “use should be made of the Western European Union”. 
(Council 1996x) The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in late 1997, also included for the 
first time a reference to WEU as being an integral part of CFSP. (EU-Treaty 
Amsterdam, Article J.7) This was the result of discourses of effectiveness and 
coherence. They took place within the IGC, leading to the revision of the Treaty on 
European Union. Effectiveness and coherence were the main concepts around which 
treaty revisions were discussed. Both implemented the logic that internal structures 
of decision-making and cooperation between the different bodies of the EU had to be 
organised more rationally and thereby more effectively and coherently. (see 
Presidency of the EU 1996: 7-8) However, as I have argued above, the discourses of 
effectiveness and coherence were contested by the meaning of duplication, which 
stated that the EU’s action and institutional structure should abstain from duplicating 
those of other institutions and actors already established. Therefore, the discourse of 
 
Barnutz Chapter II – Avoiding Duplication 139 
 
defence implications led the EU to go for a European Security and Defence Identity 
(ESDI) integrated into NATO by utilising WEU as the organisation which more or 
less was already structuring the European dimension of defence. (see European 
Council 1997c) Therefore, even the discourse on defence implications did not add to 
the meaning of security affecting the EU’s external action in the domain of security. 
(see Treacher 2004: 51) 
Finally, one area in which threats to international peace and security were perceived 
was that of weapons of mass destruction. Problems relating to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction or any material which could lead to proliferation of 
related technology were dealt with in a multilateral approach. (see Council 1996d) In 
the same manner, the EU addressed problems related to anti-personal landmines and 
its clearances. (see Council 1996t) Also, the EU acted in support whenever an UNSC 
resolution required embargos on arms, goods and services, or diplomatic sanctions. 
(see Council 1996b) These methods of cooperation fell into the EU’s perception of 
what constituted appropriate behaviour. The meanings of cooperation and integration 
added strongly to the construction of EU identity. Hence, the EU intended to address 
or solve problems of the international community by following a cooperative 
approach. 
Summary 
The most central meanings of EU identity were EU core principles, cooperation and 
integration, and the juxtaposition of EU’s past and presence. EU core principles 
incorporated democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
They referred to the international law as the international source of these values. EU 
core principles will remain central in each period analysed in this thesis. The same 
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holds true for cooperation and integration. Integration was understood as a special 
form of cooperation reaching higher levels of formalisation. However, cooperation 
itself meant formalised interaction. Both were central in overcoming the EU’s past 
by initiating economic growth and thereby establishing ‘mutual understanding’. All 
three meanings were related to the meaning of responsibility, which required actors 
to take hold of their problems themselves. All these meanings were central to EU 
identity, not only during the period 1996-7 but in all other periods analysed here. 
However, differences between the constructions of EU identity in 1996-7 and those 
of a later stage relied on the contestedness of EU identity based on the meanings of 
effectiveness, coherence and duplication. Effectiveness and coherence contested 
each other. The first required a common spirit to implement more effective and faster 
decision-making. The second implemented the logic that EU’s external action could 
only be a single and forceful one when situations of individual member states were 
taken into account. The meanings contradicted each other in the period 1996-7 and 
thereby weakened the construction of EU’s actorness also in the field of security. 
The meaning of duplication had the same effect. Duplication defined EU’s action as 
inappropriate when it fell into the field of another organisation or actor. Finally, in 
reference to the meaning of responsibility, the Council stated that the “EU should 
abstain from acting in a manner likely to be perceived as an attempt to impose 
solutions”. (Council 1997k: Africa) Therefore, the EU was not constructed as an 
actor in the field of security and this claim furthermore disabled the construction of 
threats almost entirely.  
Although conflict and crisis were frequently discussed in institutionalised discourses 
on EU’s external action, they were not perceived as security relevant. First of all, the 
responsibility to solve crisis and conflict rested with the people concerned. Second, 
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in compliance with its understanding of duplication, the EU did not act when other 
organisations or actors were already in place. This was the case in regard to the 
Balkans, to Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Actors which already had established 
relevant competences and capabilities were the OSCE, the Council of Europe, 
NATO, WEU and the UN. The EU committed itself in the area of development 
policy through financial aid, as soon as conflicting actors returned to reason by 
starting dialogue and cooperation.  
The result of these processes of reasoning was that a security policy including 
civilian and military capabilities was not necessary. The fight against weapons, their 
procurement and proliferation were the only policy field which added to the meaning 
of security. But the fight against these problems required cooperative approaches on 
the international level by implementing formalised structures of disarmament, 
monitoring, control and procurement regulations.  
This very limited meaning of security will expand over time. In the following 
chapter covering the period 2000-1, I will show that EU identity was more robustly 
defined, including a stronger self-perception of actorness in the field of security. 
Together with the reduced contestedness of EU identity, this perspective enabled the 
EU to perceive conflict and crisis as affecting itself by putting its achievements of 
development policy at risk. As a result, conflict resolution was perceived as an 
appropriate tool of last resort in order to secure its development policy achievements. 
The EU was perceived to be directly affected by conflicts and crises in its effective 
implementation of development policy making the EU the reference object of 
security accordingly.  
However, I will show that the rule to implement conflict resolution did not dominate 
discourses on the meaning of security because it was still contested by the debate on 
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autonomy versus duplication. Also, it did not contain clear cut rules of how and 
when to use civilian or military capabilities. Apart from that, the institutional 
development of the security policy was very much driven by discourses on 
effectiveness and coherence and thereby followed internal logics instead of being 
informed by the EU’s perception of the world surrounding it. Yet, the way of 
reasoning on the institutionalisation of security policy at the EU level paved the way 
for the re-constitution of EU’s self-perception as an international and security actor. 
Both constructions became visible in the final period reviewed within this project. 
Chapter III 
 
Realising its Actorness 
In this chapter I will analyse the process of EU identity constructions, the perception 
of threats, and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of 
insecurity during the period 2000-1. Compared with the previous chapter, I will 
highlight differences in the (re-)constitution of meanings relevant in these three 
contexts. In this regard, it is not necessary to once again go through the corner stones 
of EU identity constructions when they have remained unchanged, compared with 
the period of 1996-7. By focusing on differences, I will be able to show how 
processes of reasoning changed over time and thus how the meaning of security 
developed.  
The most significant changes took place in the construction of EU identity. This is 
not to say EU identity changed fundamentally. For example, EU core principles did 
not change. The same was true for the meaning of cooperation and integration. 
However, in regard to EU identity, almost every corner of EU policy went through a 
‘review process’ which checked its effectiveness and coherence. Discourses of these 
two meanings were dominant in the period 2000-1. Change could also be recognised 
in the way in which the EU understood itself. It constructed itself as an actor on the 
international stage. I will show that the EU explicitly attached a meaning of 
actorness to its security policy, showing its ability to act internationally and, hence, 
enforcing its status as an international actor. This change can be explained by the 
development to apply to the grand design of becoming a recognised international 
actor. Also, an identity crisis which enfolded after the IGC of Nice led to a re-
constitution of EU identity. 
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Another important change took place in regard to the conception of the people as the 
principle addressees of policies – referring to the debate within the UN on the 
responsibility to protect. This was obvious during the period of 1996-7 but did not 
dominate the EU’s security policy because the EU did not consider itself as being 
responsible in the domain of security policy outside of its own territory. This 
changed in 2000-1. In regard to external action, the meaning of the people was 
fundamentally important for the EU’s conceptualisation of development policy. The 
dominance of the meaning of people enabled the EU to perceive itself responsible to 
protect individuals from development, poverty, crisis and conflict. Here, the EU 
adopted dominant interpretations established in discourses at the UN level. 
This way of reasoning not only affected the EU’s development policy by more 
strongly focusing on poverty prevention in order to prevent individuals from being 
harmed. It also affected the meaning of security and helped to establish a security 
policy as a tool of last resort when crisis and conflict threatened the people and the 
achievements of the EU’s development policy. In this regard, the meaning of the 
responsibility to protect the people was much more important to EU’s identity in 
2000-1 than in the previous period. This way of reasoning enabled the construction 
of a development-conflict cycle, by which the EU perceived situations of 
development as including a high probability to expand into conflict. This 
understanding added meaning to security established within ESDP as a tool of last 
resort to engage in conflict resolution.  
Finally, in the section on rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity, I 
will show that these newly defined meanings only slowly translated into rules. I will 
argue that, although a meaning of security began to develop, this had limited effects 
on rules of appropriate behaviour. Compared to the period of 1996-7, discourses of 
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rules and international order were richer in the sense that they contained more 
differentiated meanings. Two rules were newly defined in regard to external 
relations, conflict prevention and crisis management. Especially the second rule 
added meaning to security policy. However, both rules remained contested for a 
variety of reasons. One reason was the indifference in preferring long- or short-term 
approaches in regard to crisis management. As a result, the rules added to the 
meaning of security but limited its intersubjectivity by being contested.  
Finally, I will summarise the findings of this chapter and lead to the next, focusing 
on the crisis of discourse taking place in the first half of 2003 when EU member 
states were divided on how to proceed with Iraq. This ‘interim’ chapter will help me 
to argue for the robustness of institutionalised discourses on the EU level. This will 
directly lead my project to the final analysis of the period 2003-4. 
1. EU Identity 
The most important changes within the construction of EU identity took place in 
regard to the EU’s self-perception of being an actor on the international level. 
Discourses of actorness were enabled by a mutual constitution of the EU’s external 
action and the construction of EU identity. If in earlier periods, EU identity 
constructions were informed by processes of reasoning on internal cooperation and 
integration and the EU member states’ ability to overcome their brutal past, in 2000-
1 the EU’s external action was understood to stabilise EU identity by implementing 
the same principles externally that were required internally. Through these processes, 
the EU implemented such meanings of actorness as international, regional or military 
actor. These changes derived from developments of earlier marginalised discourses 
which gained support over time leading to a stable discourse on the EU’s actorness 
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in the field of security. This process was further supported by an identity crisis 
affecting discourses after the IGC in Nice. 
Furthermore, discourses of EU identity constituted a meaning of the responsibility to 
protect the people and the people as being the principle addressees of the EU’s 
policy. The interesting turn is that the meaning not only applied to the internal but 
also to the external sphere, dominating discourses of foreign and development 
policy. This meaning was already apparent in 1996 and 1997. However, it did not 
dominate the conception of foreign or development policy because the EU did not 
understand itself as responsible for the well being of the people outside of its 
territory. The EU only engaged in dialogue and cooperation when a minimum of 
standards were established in accordance with EU core principles. In 2000-1, the 
meaning of people in relation to the meaning of actorness enabled the EU to 
recognise its responsibility to protect the people outside of its own territory. While 
constituting itself as an international actor, the EU had to take up this responsibility 
on the international stage. This change occurred based on a dominant discourse at the 
international level constructing a new grand design of what accounts for a 
responsible international actor. This grand design influenced the shared 
understanding of EU actors. 
Finally, another important area of change was that of discourses of effectiveness and 
coherence. Both meanings dominated almost all issues of the EU’s policies in the 
period under review. They also affected the self-understanding of the EU and its 
view of the international system. The meanings of effectiveness and coherence were 
less contested in 2000-1 because coherence did not explicitly require taking into 
account member states’ individual situation. Rather, it organised a well functioning 
workflow among the different levels of EU governance. As a result, both meanings 
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slightly re-constituted the meaning of cooperation. The meaning of cooperation was 
more dominantly affected by the meanings of effectiveness and coherence which 
implemented a rational or objective way to organise cooperation. The meaning of 
effectiveness and coherence was already established in discourses on policies of the 
supranational level. Arguments were applied to the EU’s security field as an attempt 
to ensure continuity of the EU’s identity and its external policies in other fields.  
In the following, I will analyse these three aspects and conclude that the EU was on 
its way to realise its actorness on the international stage. Situations of development 
and poverty were perceived to contradict the EU’s minimum standards. Accordingly, 
the newly established meaning of actorness required action by the EU to help to 
solve this miss match.  
1.1 Actorness 
During the period under review here, the meaning of EU actorness was in the 
process of being developed. It began with actor-like characters analysed in the 
previous chapter. These actor-like characters established the reasoning that the EU 
was able to act on the international level, based upon its own experience of 
overcoming its brutal past and hence conflict. At this point, the EU’s self-perception 
of actorness was related to discourses of conflict prevention. These relations 
established the EU as a capable actor in supporting cooperation and peace on the 
international level. In other words, the identity construction experienced a process of 
development in which discourses on the EU’s actorness in the field of security 
gained more support because the grand design of being an international actor was 
still not established. However, processes of sense making on EU actorness were 
contested in 2000-1. There were some reassuring moments, in which the EU tried to 
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convince itself of its actorness. The meaning of actorness also vacillated between 
being an international, regional or military actor which contested each other to a 
certain extent. (see Rosecrance 1998; Stavridis 2001a, 2001b; Treacher 2004) All 
these aspects of the construction of EU actorness will be analysed step by step in the 
following pages. 
Discourses of EU actorness were connected to already existing self-perceptions of 
actor-like characters. These characters had remained constant since 1996-7. For 
example, the capacity to learn was one dominant meaning in this regard. “The 
knowledge and experience of the EU can be of particular importance.” (Council 
2001c: Conflict Prevention) Through this sentence, the EU constituted itself as an 
actor capable of learning and having the ability to recall knowledge and experiences. 
In contrast to the period of 1996-7, this perspective was directly linked to the EU’s 
external action and here conflict prevention. The Council was “in favour of an 
extensive, consistent, coordinated EU role in the region”. (Council 2001e: Africa) 
Similarly, the European Council was “of the view that the European Union […] 
should play a leading role” in conflict prevention. (European Council 2001b: Annex 
I)  
The relation of EU actorness to conflict prevention and the role this link played in 
this construction needs to be further analysed. First of all, in 2000 and 2001, the 
EU’s perspective on conflict prevention dominated processes of sense making of the 
EU’s role on the international level. (see below) Therefore, discourses of conflict 
prevention contributed to the meaning of actorness. (see Manners 2006: 185; 
McLean and Lilly 2000: 8) The rational which made this link possible was reflected 
by the Council, who declared European integration as a successful way of conflict 
prevention. “Many ministers stressed that European integration was an excellent 
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example of conflict prevention.” (Council 2001f: open debate) The understanding of 
the European integration process as a form of conflict prevention opened up the 
possibility for the EU to perceive itself as a capable actor in this field. “Preserving 
peace, promoting stability and strengthening international security worldwide” was a 
“fundamental objective of the Union, and preventing violent conflict” constituted 
“one of the most important external policy challenges”. (Solana 2000: pt. I.1) 
Therefore, the EU constituted itself as an experienced actor who was well-equipped 
in the field of conflict prevention. To be explicit, until now this link served the 
argument of why the EU should act on the international level and why it was 
legitimate to do so. In the section on rules I will show that the implementation of a 
policy of conflict prevention remained contested. 
This link was new during the period under review here. The European integration 
process was previously not explicitly called conflict prevention, although the 
juxtapositioning constituting EU’s memory stated exactly this. But even when this 
link had been implemented during the earlier period, the meanings of responsibility 
and duplication would have prevented the EU from considering a role in conflict 
prevention externally. Therefore, the meaning of responsibility and duplication must 
have been different for the period 2000-1, in order to enable the link of EU actorness 
and conflict prevention.  
First, in the period 1996-7, responsibility was limited to the EU’s own territory. This 
way of reasoning did not fit the perspective of being an international actor. The 
meaning of responsibility had to be expanded to include objects of responsibility 
further afield as a matter of ensuring continuity of the newly introduced international 
actorness and the attempt to be an international in the field of security. In this regard, 
I will later show that changes in the meaning of responsibility were enabled through 
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the meaning of the responsibility to protect and the people as principle addressees of 
policies. It led the EU to protect civilian populations internally as well as externally. 
For example, the EU acted responsibly in implementing a policy to eradicate 
poverty. Such a re-constitution of the meaning of responsibility was central to the 
construction of EU actorness. It did not follow the meaning of duplication as 
implemented in the period 1996-7, since in order to be meaningful EU actorness 
could not stop at the borders of duplication but required a redefined meaning of 
responsibility. 
Second, the meaning of duplication was contested more and more by the meaning of 
coherence and autonomy and thereby marginalised. Whereas in 1996-7, coherence 
required the explicit inclusion of member state’s individual situations, in 2000-1 
coherence meant “deploying the right combination and sequence of instruments in a 
timely and integrated manner”. (Solana 2000: pt. II, 7) Therefore, coherence required 
well functioning policies and instruments working together across all levels of EU 
governance. In order to achieve this, new structures were necessary. Following the 
logic of coherence, it was not important whether or not a particular policy or 
structure was already provided by another actor or institution, but whether or not it 
was necessary for the EU’s coherent action. This way of reasoning strongly 
contested the meaning of duplication. 
Also, the meaning of duplication was affected by the meaning of autonomy, arguing 
for structures which enabled the EU to act autonomous from NATO. “Development 
of consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO mast take place in full 
respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making.” (European Council 2000a: 
Appendix 2 pt. 1) This meaning of autonomy was to contest the meaning of 
duplication and thereby enabled the EU to develop capacities and procedures in 
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policy fields previously perceived as producing duplication. This change affected the 
meaning of security because the EU intended to establish military capabilities as a 
tool of last resort in the case of conflict. Change in this regard can be explained as a 
matter of reaching for the grand design of an international actor in the field of 
security but also by a rising identity crisis of the EU because EU actors realised at 
least following the IGC in Nice that the EU hardly applied to the standards defined 
by its identity of being an international actor in the field of security.(see European 
Council. 2001e: Laeken Declaration) This aspect will be discussed later on. 
However, in the period 2000-1 EU actorness was still in the making, the meaning 
was not fixed within discourses of EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour. 
The EU engaged in constructing actorness in a reassuring manner. Or in other words, 
the meaning of actorness seemed to be established on a lower level of 
intersubjectivity. The process of constructing EU actorness used the logic of mutual 
constitution of EU’s external action and its actorness. For example, the Council 
argued that it was “appropriate […] at the same time to ensure greater visibility for 
the Union’s action.” (Council 2001b) ‘At the same time’ referred to the actual policy 
implemented by the Council decision. Therefore, the EU’s external action was 
mutually linked to the visibility and hence EU actorness. In the quote, the Council 
made explicit that it was appropriate to establish EU’s visibility. The reference to 
‘appropriateness’ could be understood as a sign that the meaning of actorness was 
still in the making and approved the legitimacy of the claim to be an international 
actor. In a similar way, the European Council reaffirmed “its commitment to 
building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing 
the Union’s external action”. (European Council 2000a: I C)  
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Furthermore, the EU’s self-perception of being an actor on the international stage 
was reassured by the way in which external actors responded to the EU’s external 
policies. For example, the Council welcomed “the warm reception received from the 
three countries by the Troika visit, perceived as a sign of the EU’s continued 
commitment to the region.” (Council 2001g: Southern Caucasus) On the one hand, 
the sentence re-established the relevance of the EU in the external sphere. On the 
other hand, the “warm welcome” was recognised as a sign that external actors 
perceived the EU as an international actor, as well. States, here Armenia, Georgia 
and Azerbaijan, already recognised the EU as an actor. This recognition positively 
affected processes of reasoning on EU actorness. The Council argued in a similar 
way by saying that all states of the Southern Caucasus supported “a stronger EU 
role”. (Council 2001g: Southern Caucasus) All these examples showed that in 2000-
1, the meaning of EU actorness l was still in the making and far from being widely 
intersubjectively shared, let alone dominant. 
Finally, this weakness was also visible in the EU’s indifference in types of actorness 
and their capabilities. The EU claimed to be an international, regional or military 
actor at various points. The types of international and regional actorness were at least 
contested. On the one hand, the Council stated that the EU should “pull its full 
weight in international affairs” (Council 2000f: 7). On the other hand, it argued for 
the “importance to the EU of stabilisation and development in the region”. (Council 
2000i: Western Balkans) Especially the meaning of regional actor contradicted the 
meaning of international actorness. Whereas an international actor could also act in 
the nearby region, a regional actor would not act further afield. (see Larsen 2000b; 
Missiroli 2003a)  
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Also, not all types were well equipped with rules of appropriate behaviour by which 
they would have gained more meaning. This was especially the case in regard to 
EU’s military actorness. During its development, the concept of military actorness 
exclusively related to conflict prevention and crisis management policies. The EU 
“highlighted its determination to develop an autonomous capability to decide on and 
[…] to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international 
crisis.” (Council 2000k: 5; see Larsen 2002; Smith 2000; Stavridis 2001b) But this 
type of actorness lacked well established rules to guide this type of actor in its 
appropriate behaviour. This deficiency could be explained by two factors. First, in 
the section on effectiveness and coherence, I will show that they established the logic 
that an effective and coherent ESDP was needed to support the EU’s external action. 
The most effective and coherent way to institutionalise security could be identified 
by objective, rational reasoning. Therefore, the EU was relatively blind on actual 
needs derived from its experience of implemented security policies. “[T]he Council 
called for closer co-ordination among Member States and the Commission in the 
delivery of assistance to meet the challenges set out above so as to promote a more 
coherent, effective and visible role of the Union as a whole.” (Council 2001j: 
Indonesia) These discourses established a logic that the EU had to have a security 
policy and military capabilities at its disposal in order to be able to act effectively 
and coherently. This debate, however, was not connected to actual security 
challenges which had to be faced by these capabilities. Therefore, rules on how to 
behave were only weakly established or not at all. Second, in the section on the 
construction of rules I will show that the EU’s approach to crisis management as the 
primordial sphere of military actorness was very much contested. As a result, the 
meaning of the EU’s military actorness was weakly implemented. 
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1.2 Protection of the People 
The meaning of the responsibility to protect led to the shared understanding that the 
EU’s policy had to support the people not only at home but also externally and 
thereby the EU was constructed as the reference objects of security – or at least as 
being responsible for the referent object of security. This meaning dominated 
discourses on EU identity in 2000-1. I will analyse this dominance while focusing 
explicitly on the effects of this reasoning on the EU’s perception of the world. Here, 
the meaning of the responsibility to protect was imported from a dominant discourse 
on the international level taking place especially at the UN level. The meaning was 
logically connected to a meaning of (under-)development and led to the EU’s 
perception that it was responsible to protect the people in these circumstances. This 
again referred to EU core principles as the source which defined minimum standards 
for peoples’ well being. As a result, people were constructed as referent objects of 
security. This included not only European citizens but also citizens of third world 
countries. The EU was expected to support people in third world countries in the 
case EU core principles were not adequately implemented. This way of reasoning 
finally enabled the EU to further engage in conflict prevention which – following 
this logic – was still a matter of development policy. However, conflict prevention 
also related to security policy and the implementation of a rule allowing for the use 
of military capabilities as a last resort to protect people suffering from conflict and 
crisis. In order to develop this argument I will first clarify the meaning of 
development as informed by EU core principles. I will then develop the meaning of 
the responsibility to protect. Overall, the goal of this section is to help analyse threat 
constructions to recognise people as the referent objects of global challenges and 
security threats.  
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The meaning of development referred to EU core principles as the founding 
principles of European integration. In discourses in 2000 and 2001, these EU core 
principles were labelled as European standards. EU identity was constructed around 
“European standards” (Council 2000l: Annex), to which the EU and its member 
states as well as other states had to apply if they wanted to draw “closer to the 
European structures”. (Council 2000g) As I have shown in the previous chapter, 
these core principles were “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the 
rule of law […] and to respect international law and standards”. (Council 2000m: 
Zimbabwe)  
In the period under review here, these core principles were equipped with an external 
dimension by having global legitimacy. (see Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 545) This 
affected the EU’s approach towards its external sphere. EU core principles were 
reflected in almost all external policies, whether in regard to the Great Lakes Region, 
Indonesia, the Western Balkans, Ex-Yugoslavia, or Cuba.  
“[T]he objective of the European Union […] remains the encouragement of a 
process of peaceful transition to pluralist democracy, the respect of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustainable economic recovery and 
improvement in the living standards of the […] people.” (Council 2000g: Cuba – 
conclusion) 
The quote above exemplifies EU core principles and their applicability to EU’s 
external action. The absence of EU core principles was understood as a situation of 
development. This was reflected in the statement of the Council on development 
policy which was “grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and 
participatory human and social development. Promotion of human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law and good governance [were] an integral part of it.” 
(Council 2000e: no. 6) As a result, the protection of the civilian population was the 
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object of the EU’s policy. They had to be protected from violence, suppression and 
undemocratic rules. The meaning of development built up on the understanding that 
EU core principles were not only good for the people but protected them from the 
threat of violence, conflict and suppression. For example, the Council concluded that 
action was necessary in “countries characterised by the absence of organised 
government and the rule of law”. (Council 2001c: LLRD pt. 2.2) The perspective 
again was based on the EU’s experience of its own successful integration. 
“[E]uropean integration had proved to be a model for regional cooperation and hence 
conflict prevention elsewhere in the world”. (Council 2001f: open debate) As I have 
argued in the previous chapter, European integration centrally included EU core 
principles as the very basis of peaceful and equal coexistence. From this perspective, 
development was perceived as a situation in which EU core principles were not 
implemented.  
In this regard, processes of reasoning on EU core principle and civil society almost 
inevitable made necessary a meaning of ‘people’ as the principle addressees of EU’s 
policy, as they were the constituting units of EU core principles. They included 
democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The meaning of ‘people’ was 
constitutive for all these principles. In the earlier period, the EU actively engaged in 
implementing EU core principles domestically or in close cooperation with Middle 
and Eastern European countries reaching for membership. The dominant discourse 
on the responsibility to protect taking place at the UN level affected the EU’s 
reasoning on its international responsibility. Since the late 1980s, the UN more often 
had to face situations of domestic violence, intra-state conflict, human crises and so 
forth. These situations, such as in Somalia in 1992, were interpreted as threats to 
international peace and security. (see UNSC 1992) By the beginning of the 21st 
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Century the UN prepared itself to be capable of solving civil wars, insurgencies, 
state repression and state collapse and thereby argued for a responsibility to protect 
“ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to 
protect them.” (ICISS 2001: 11) This framing required a security policy capable of 
civilian and military operations in support of the suffering people – which was 
nothing less then the EU’s shared understanding of the purpose of security policies 
in cooperation with development policies. 
The remarkable development was that this meaning was applied not only to internal 
but also to external policies and was related to security policies. Internally, in regard 
to the discourses of the future of Europe, reforms were called for to bring the 
political structure of the EU closer to its citizens. (see European Council 2001a: pt.6) 
But, the centrality of the concept of human rights and the responsibility to protect for 
the EU’s policies was also apparent in the EU’s external action. (see Manners 2006: 
192) Together, the Council demanded for Angola “to implement transparent 
management of public resources for the benefit of all her peoples”. (Council 2000b: 
2) In other words, the quote required the implementation of EU core principles by 
state structures in order to protect the citizens.  
This role of state structures could be read out of further documents. For example, the 
Council expressed its expectation of “concrete steps towards national reconciliation, 
democracy and respect for the human rights of all the people”. (Council 2001k: 
Burma) The way in which the argument was brought forward again highlighted the 
importance of policies to serve ‘all the people’. National reconciliation by respecting 
rules of democracy and human rights was one step in establishing good living 
conditions for each individual. In this sense, state building was not an end in itself 
but a means to protect the people. “The free expression of the political will of the 
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people by a secret and equal vote, through a universal, fair, transparent and 
participatory election process” represented “a cornerstone of an inclusive and 
sustainable democracy.” (Council 2001c: Election assistance) Here, political 
structures were again presented as to serve the people. They were not, in the first 
place, implemented to lead to a strong government which could control its territory 
and be an actor within the international system. But their implementation would 
enable the people to express their political will and be protected from harm, 
injustices and poverty.  
However, as soon as EU core principles were implemented, the people had to accept 
their responsibility in acting in accordance with these core principles. “The people of 
Croatia have shown” that they intend to follow the right path forward “by voting for 
peace, freedom and justice. There is a movement towards true ‘Ownership’ by the 
people and by civil society, with democratic freedom and economic transparency 
finally taking root.” (Council 2000j: EU Declaration on PIC) Therefore, the meaning 
of the civil society as being responsible for establishing and stabilising a well 
functioning state similarly applied to the people. 
1.3 Effectiveness and Coherence 
In the years 2000 and 2001, discourses of effectiveness and coherence influenced all 
EU policy areas. Both concepts became constitutional for EU identity. They affected 
the way in which the EU understood itself and its role in regard to security policies. 
The purpose was “ensuring coherent action, building more effective partnerships, 
[and] improving long term and short term measures”. (Council 2001f: Conflict 
Prevention) A huge variety of discourses of effectiveness and coherence took place 
during 2000 and 2001. The most relevant were those relating to development policy. 
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The Council considered “that improving the quality and efficiency of EC 
development assistance” was “its core priority for future action”. (Council 2001c: the 
follow-up of EC development policy) “[E]ffective coordination at all levels” was 
“essential to ensure maximum impact in the country concerned”. (Council 2001c: 
LRRD) The discourse became dominance in order to ensure continuity in a time of a 
strengthened identity construction and the implementation of new policies such as in 
the field of security. 
The interesting aspect of discourses of effectiveness and coherence was that they 
established an objective logic of why the EU had to implement a security policy and 
how this policy and its structures should look like. Both implemented a meaning of 
rationality and objectivity by which structures were reviewed independently from 
actual experience on the ground. This logic could be contrasted with a lessons 
learned approach by which the institutional structures and procedures were double 
checked by its performances in the field. Such an approach was stated very clearly 
by CIVCOM: 
“The UN has a unique role in and experience of civilian crisis management, 
including police operations, but also strengthening of the rule of law, civilian 
administration and civil protection. Experiences and lessons learned from these 
and other areas, including those set out in the report by the Brahimi panel, should 
be fully taken into account by the EU in developing its civilian crisis management 
capacity.” (CIVCOM 2001a: pt.4) 
However, discourses of effectiveness and coherence implemented a different logic 
by which the EU’s security policy was not developed because its necessity was 
double checked with the EU’s experience. Effectiveness almost exclusively strove 
for the best, objective way to equip itself with decision-making procedures and 
coordination. For example, the Council discussed that “effective conflict prevention 
also means the coordination of Community instruments in a coherent manner with 
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those of Member States, of the CFSP – and in that context the ESDP – and other 
international partners.” (Council 2001f: open debate) Also, decision-making 
procedures of ESDP were under review to be more effective. Further institutions were 
established which followed the logic of making ESDP more effective. “[T]he 
Satellite Centre […] will support the decision-making of the Union in the context 
[…] of ESDP”. (Council 2001e: ESDP). “The Council also reviewed and discussed 
instruments of early warning and conflict prevention available to the EU, and how 
they could be used to strengthen the Union’ short and long term conflict prevention.” 
(Council 2001e: Conflict Prevention) These quotes support the argument that 
effective and coherent structures were perceived exogenously and given identity by 
rational reviewing and discussions. This was also visible in regard to the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism (RRM), implementing the meaning that effectiveness and 
coherence was a management problem which could be solved by appropriate 
structures. The RRM was “designed to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, 
efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence 
of crisis”. (Council 2001g: RRM) The weakness of RRM “should also be seen as a 
consequence of insufficient co-ordination of available resources and instruments”. 
(Council 2001c: LRRD, pt. 2.1)  
These logics implemented effectiveness and coherence as ways to objectively 
address management problems. Effectiveness could be ensured by particular 
decision-making structures. This was also true for coherence. Therefore, the meaning 
of coherence was re-constituted, compared with the earlier period, when it asked for 
equal involvement of member state’s individual position. The re-defined meaning of 
serving as measurement on how to organise workflows between the different levels 
of EU governance could be read out of a document produced by CIVCOM, stating 
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that it was “of paramount importance to ensure co-ordination and coherence of 
action between the EU civilian administration components and other elements of an 
EU crisis management operation”. (CIVCOM 2001b: 4) Here, it became clear that 
coherence no longer focused on the recognition of individual situations. It focused 
on management problems and the organisation of workflows between bodies and 
actors on different EU levels. This included EU member states, although coherence 
no longer focused on all individual situations of member states. Coherence ensured 
“effective coordination of the assistance efforts made by the Community and each 
Member State and to reinforce their coherence and complementarity.” (Council 
2000f: Effectiveness of EU’s External Relations, pt. 1.2; see Keane 2004: 492) This 
meaning of coherence fundamentally differed to that of 1996-7, it required that 
different policy levels had to be managed effectively. 
Both meanings, effectiveness and coherence, opened up the way for the 
institutionalisation of security policy but highlighted that this new policy applied to 
already established measurements which again ensure continuity. The EU 
acknowledged that it had different policies at its disposal which already contributed 
to a security policy. They only had to be managed in an appropriate, meaning 
effective and coherent way. “In principle we have adequate mechanisms for conflict 
prevention, including early warning, analysis and reaction. Now the key is putting 
these to effective use.” (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention) This reasoning had a 
huge impact on discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at 
the EU level and within ESDP. Discourses were to focus on management problems 
of how to make the EU’s capabilities more effective and coherent. One example of 
this way of reasoning was the Council’s pledge for greater civilian capabilities. “The 
Council gave strong support to the ‘Call for Contributions’ process […]. This and the 
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work underway on development of an EU professional capacity to plan and conduct 
police operations represent important steps towards realising the targets on police 
agreed in Feira.” (Council 2001i: ESDP) In Feira, this process was already a matter 
of effectiveness. “Improving European […] capabilities remains central to the 
credibility and effectiveness of” ESDP. (European Council 2000a: I C pt.8)  
Finally, discourses of effectiveness and coherence were relevant in regard to the 
EU’s cooperation with external actors. The meaning of cooperation as an important 
way to overcome differences was stabilised by the meanings of effectiveness and 
coherence. The EU’s efforts in cooperation were evaluated along the lines of 
effectiveness and coherence. For example, the Council stressed “that co-ordination 
of measures taken at international level, e.g. in the framework of the UN, OSCE and 
NATO, should be enhanced in order to rationalise the use of the resources involved”. 
(Council 2001g: International cooperation) Therefore, the meanings of effectiveness 
and coherence did not add new aspects to the meaning of cooperation. But the 
approaches to cooperation were strengthened while their effectiveness and coherence 
were measured. This could be read out of the Council’s conclusion on the 
International Day for Support of Victims of Torture. The Council underscored “the 
need for more intensive and concerted action, at national, regional and international 
level towards the goal of eradication of torture. […] Co-operation by States with 
international mechanisms […] is essential to make our international system of 
protection and promotion of human rights effective.” (Council 2001h: External 
Relations) Both quotes above further stabilised the meaning of cooperation by 
attaching measurements of effectiveness and coherence. 
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Summary 
Overall, discourses on EU identity during the period 2000-1 differed from those of 
the period 1996-7 in three ways. First, they established not only actor-like characters 
but a meaning of EU actorness. The construction of EU actorness was still in the 
making because utterances actively constituted the meaning of actorness as a matter 
of mutual constitution of EU’s external action. Also, the recognition of the EU as an 
international actor by external actors seemed to be noteworthy. Both processes 
underscored the fact that the meaning of actorness was in the process of becoming 
intersubjectively shared but did not dominate the construction of EU identity. 
Second, the meaning of EU actorness was enabled by another change in the 
construction of EU identity. This was the meaning of people as the principle 
addressees of policies. The EU perceived people as the principle addressees of 
policies because individuals were the constituting units or objects of EU core 
principles. In reference to this logic, the meaning of civil society was individualised 
by the meaning of people. The dominance of this meaning enabled changes in the 
meaning of responsibility. Responsibility more explicitly included the protection of 
the people. This not only affected the EU’s internal policy but its external policy, as 
well. Again, this meaning of responsibility enabled the construction of EU actorness 
by which the EU was perceived to be potentially responsible for the people outside 
of its own territory. 
Finally, the meanings of effectiveness and coherence dominated almost all 
discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour. They affected 
processes of reasoning on the institutionalisation of security policy as a matter of 
objectively measuring the best way of organising the EU’s external policy, including 
security. In this regard, the meaning of coherence contested its earlier versions. The 
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meaning of coherence was reconstituted, since it no longer required the equal 
recognition of EU member states’ individual situation but required the organisation 
all EU governance levels in a way to make processes and workflows most effective. 
These three changes together changed aspects of EU identity and the way in which 
the EU perceived itself positioned within the world.  
2. Construction of Threats 
In this section I will analyse processes of threat construction which took place in the 
years 2000 and 2001. The focus will again be on those constructions which were 
new in, or had been changed by, the years 2000 and 2001. Processes of threat 
construction circled around two central aspects. First, the concept of people as the 
primary objects of protection influenced processes of threat construction. I will show 
that threats to the people served as the argument why the EU perceived as necessary 
its involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management. Poverty was first 
understood to be a problem for the EU’s self-perception. Since it perceived itself as 
an actor on the international stage equipped with an identity which was built upon 
EU core principles, situations of poverty were ‘other’ to the EU’s ‘self’. This alone 
did not make poverty a security problem. The link between the people and conflict 
was constructed through the meaning of development. In cases in which EU core 
principles were absent, the population was understood to be at high risk, threatened 
by a variety of problems ranging from poverty to crisis and conflict. Situations of 
poverty were constituted as potential security problems. They were linked to conflict 
and thereby became security relevant. The link between development and poverty to 
conflict was implemented through the construction of a high probability that 
situations of development and poverty could dynamically lead to conflict.  
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The second central meaning for the construction of security was that of conflict. The 
meaning of conflict was related to violence and development. Conflict and 
development were understood to mutually invoke each other. The link between 
development and conflict was constituted by violence. Through violence, 
development could easily lead to a conflict situation. At the same time, conflict 
could further undermine the progress of development. These processes of reasoning 
established the meaning of a development-conflict cycle through which situations of 
development carried a high probability to lead to conflict and thereby worsen the 
people’s situation. Conflicts were understood as a security problem for the EU 
because of this logic. (see Stewart 2008: 236)  
I will show that conflict and the tendency of every development situation to worsen 
and lead to conflict was understood to be a security problem for the people rather 
than the state, or the regional and international order. Based on the EU’s identity 
including the meaning of peoples as the principle objects of protection, the EU 
equipped itself with the ability to rescue people in the case of conflict – also by 
military capabilities, as a last resort. In situations in which individuals not only 
suffered from a lack of development but also from the danger of conflict, the EU 
understood to develop crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms 
appropriately.  
In the following, I will show how these two aspects constituted the EU’s perspective 
of security problems and threats. Finally, this will directly lead to the last section on 
how rules of appropriate behaviour were constructed as a response to the perceived 
security problems. 
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2.1 Threats to the People 
The construction of threats referred to the concept of people as the principle objects 
of policies, including their protection in situations lacking the minimum of EU core 
principles. In general, the absence of EU core principles already qualified as a 
problem which had to be addressed by responsible actors. The lack of established EU 
core principles qualified as a relevant security problem as soon as it seriously 
affected the people, or in the event that the EU was able to identify subjects which 
were perceived responsible for the disregard of EU core principles or the worsening 
of a situation. These situations constituted a security problem because the EU 
perceived itself as responsible to protect the people from situations of development – 
which were constituted by the lack of EU core principles implementation. In the 
following, I will provide two examples in which situations of development were 
perceived as security relevant – if not a security problem. The first analyses how 
poverty was perceived as a divergence from the EU’s self-ascribed actorness of 
responsibility for people outside of its own territory suffering from inappropriate 
implementation of EU core principles, as well as how poverty was dynamically 
interlinked with conflict. The second analyses human rights abuses while focusing 
on how the construction of a responsible subject led the EU to perceive these abuses 
as a security problem. Both were perceived as situations of development lacking the 
implementation of EU core principles. 
Poverty 
Based on the EU’s perspective, poverty qualified as security relevant. In discourses, 
the EU’s policies of poverty reduction were presented as a fight against evil. The 
EU’s development policy was to “fight against poverty”. (Council 2000d: 9; see 
Nielson 2001; Stewart 2008: 237-8) The evil was twofold. First, poverty undermined 
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main principles of EU identity. Second, it was related to conflict and therefore added 
meaning to security. Both dimensions will be analysed in the following. 
In regard to the first dimension, poverty disadvantaged “people to have control over 
their development, enjoy equality of opportunities and live in a safer environment”. 
(Council 2000e: 5) In this sense, poverty was not only the lack of financial resources 
but expanded to include all aspects of human life. (see Flint 2008: 57) The result was 
understood to always be the same: Civilian populations which lived in poverty were 
excluded from certain standards of living either because they could not afford these 
standards or because structures which should provide access to these standards were 
not available.  
“Poverty is defined not simply as the lack of income and financial resources but 
also as encompassing the notion of vulnerability and such factors as no access to 
adequate food supplies, education and health, natural resources and drinking 
water, land, employment and credit facilities, information and political 
involvement, services and infrastructure.” (Council 2000e: no. 8) 
The list of ‘factors’ in the quote above was clearly related to EU core principles and 
therefore related poverty to an important aspect of EU identity. This included 
democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Environmental 
damages were also understood as a factor of poverty, as well as transmittable or 
communicable diseases. (see Flint 2008: 56-8) The Council argued “the need to set 
up action to combat the major transmittable diseases (AIDS, malaria, and 
tuberculosis) in the context of reducing poverty”. (Council 2000f: 12) The Council 
“recognised the complexity of poverty and, noting in particular the global dimension 
and impact on poverty of communicable disease”. (Council 2001j: Development)  
The first dimension of poverty was constructed as a problem affecting the people. 
Factors of poverty were measured in regard to whether or not access to appropriate 
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recourses and services were provided to the population. In the quote on poverty 
above, “access” clearly did not mean that state institutions had access to adequate 
resources. State institutions did not suffer from poverty. Instead, access referred to 
the civilian population which were constructed as the only objects suffering from 
poverty. They were characterised as “vulnerable”, (Council 2000a: no. 8) which 
could be translated into violable, unprotected or endangered. Overall, it meant that 
the population was unable to change these circumstances, even when they tried to act 
responsible. This understanding was the most central reason why poverty was 
understood as a problem for the EU. Poverty made people suffer from inadequate 
implementation of EU core principles. This made them less ‘self’ to the EU. (see 
Council 2000e: statement by the Council and the Commission, pt.8) Poverty was 
understood to undermine these main principles.  
In contrast, the subjects of poverty were not clearly identified. Poverty was measured 
in a list of factors which added to the situation of poverty. But they were not 
constructed as subjects. The factors represented a list of possible causes of poverty 
which needed to be reduced in order to relieve the civilian population from poverty. 
However, these causes did not include states as the subjects actively engaged in 
causing poverty. Instead, states were responsible for implementing EU core 
principles which enhanced the living conditions of the population. But states were 
not clearly addressed as subjects causing poverty; they only shared some 
responsibility in preventing poverty from increasing. This perspective may well be 
based on the meaning of globalisation as being a process which apart from others 
reduced the influence of state actors not only internationally but on the domestic 
level. (see Council 200e: 4) 
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The ‘fight against poverty’ fell first and foremost into the competences of the 
European Community and had to be dealt with on that level. “The development 
policy of the Community defines the fight against poverty as the overarching 
objective of Community development co-operation.” (Council 2000d: 11; see 
Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 112) In this regard, the EU, together with its individual 
member states, was active in development policy. The EU provided “approximately 
half of all public aid to the developing countries[…]. This effort reflects the essential 
solidarity which is an underlying feature of its international activity.” (Council 
2000e: no. 2) Overall, this first dimension of poverty diverged from the EU’s self-
perception of being an international actor responsible for protecting civilians 
suffering from poverty. Therefore, poverty was addressed by Community 
mechanism to take up the responsibility self-ascribed by the meaning of EU 
actorness.  
In regard to the second dimension, poverty was understood to include the potential to 
lead to crisis and conflict situations. “Poverty, and the exclusion which it creates, are 
the root causes of conflict and are endangering the stability and security of too many 
countries and regions.” (Council 2000e: Statement by the Council and the 
Commission, pt.1) The quote nicely shows the reasoning on international security. 
The EU perceived poverty and conflict as being interlinked or interdependent.  
The construction of the causal link between poverty and conflict enabled the EU to 
construct poverty as security relevant. In regard to the first dimension, poverty was 
difficult to construct as a threat because subjects responsible for poverty could not be 
clearly identified. Poverty was understood to be caused by complex factors for which 
states could not be held responsible. From this perspective, the construction of 
poverty as a security problem remained contested. This dramatically changed in 
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regard to the second dimension of poverty, which implemented a dynamic link from 
poverty to conflict. (see Hadfield 2007: 53; Chandler 2007) As I will show in the 
section on conflict, the dynamic qualified as a security problem because it led to 
serious suffering of civilians by violence and conflict. Since poverty and conflict 
were logically linked, poverty already qualified as security relevant because it 
carried the burden of leading to conflict which would make crisis management 
policies necessary. (see Council 2000e: EC’s development policy)  
However, before I focus on this dynamic, I will show that human rights violations 
followed a similar logic which made them security relevant. In this section I will 
exemplify how issues were constructed as adding to EU identity and their disregard 
was essentially perceived as a security problem.  
Human Rights Violations 
During the years 2000 and 2001, the EU criticised the violation of human rights and 
democratic principles. The EU was deeply “concerned about the continued reports of 
human rights and international humanitarian law” violations. (Council 2000h: 11) In 
regard to democratic principles, the EU blamed the “continuing mass arrests and 
detention of opposition representatives and student leaders, heavy punishment of 
independent media, repression of journalists and obstacles to public rallies of the 
democratic forces”. (Council 2000j: 7) And finally, refugees were understood to 
suffer from the same problems. “The Council expressed its concern over the 
humanitarian situation of refugees and displaced persons in the region”. (Council 
2000j: 11) As such, the disregard of human rights and democratic principles did not 
qualify as security problems. They were taken as problems with which the EU had 
do deal within the framework of its development policy and in cooperation with the 
international bodies. (see Council 2000e: 4)  
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In contrast, disregard of human rights and democratic principles qualified as a 
security problem when it qualified as human rights ‘violation’ conducted by 
identifiable subjects. “Specifically on human rights, the Council expressed its deep 
concern about the continuous violations that” were “perpetrated by both state and 
non-state parties”. (Council 2000j: 10) Here, the problem was defined as violation. 
The way in which ‘violation’ was introduced showed that it had a higher potential to 
cause problems than the disregard of human rights. In contrast to disregard, the 
meaning of violence had a more active character. Therefore, it constituted the 
existence of a subject. Following the quote above, the linguistic connection of 
‘violation’ and ‘perpetrate’ finally pushed the act of disregard over the edge of 
purpose. Thus, violation constituted a subject which was on purpose acting against 
central EU core principles and the international law. This perspective was further 
supported by the introduction of state and non-state actors as subjects of violence. 
They were responsible for the “increased occurrence of unacceptable acts of political 
violence and intimidation”. (Council 2001j: Zimbabwe) It was by this link that 
violation of human rights and democratic principles qualified as a security problem. 
The implemented link from human rights to security problems was similar to that of 
poverty and conflict.  
2.2 Conflict 
The meaning of conflict included a dynamic potential. The meaning of conflict built 
up on the meaning of violence in the way that a situation of violence constituted the 
precondition of conflict. First of all, situations in which EU core principles were not 
implemented but seriously breached qualified as a situation of violence. Such a 
situation was perceived as constituting conflict because it posed “a threat to law and 
order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into 
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armed conflict or to destabilise the country”. (Council 2001g: RRM) The difference 
between both meanings, i.e. violence and conflict, was that violence enabled the EU 
to identify subjects which were responsible for the breaching of EU core principles. 
The meaning of violence constructed an actor who ignored or acted against EU core 
principles or those which led up to them. Through violence, an ‘other’ was 
constructed as being responsible for the act of violence. For example, the Council 
“condemned the continuing ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo and urged the 
leaders of all communities to commit themselves fully, to the fight against such 
violence.” (Council 2000g: 8) Also, the Council strongly condemned “the violent 
and illegal actions by ethnic Albanian armed groups in Southern Serbia and 
particularly in the Ground Safety Zone”. (Council 2001f: Western Balkans) In 
contrast, conflict was understood to lead to further breaches of EU core principles as 
a result of a dynamic process by which different subjects ended up violating these 
rules. In a situation of conflict, the EU was unable to identify subjects which were 
responsible for the worsening of the situation. Rather, conflict per se led to the 
derogation of peoples’ situation.  
This meaning of conflict was important to understand how poverty included the 
potential to become a security problem. In this regard, it is important to recall the 
“multi-dimensional nature” of poverty including the following aspects: (Council 
2001c: Conflict prevention and development)  
“[O]ver 40% of the population are still living below the poverty line: throughout 
the world, 800 million people, 200 million of them children, are suffering from 
chronic malnutrition. […] The major communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis, are disproportionately rife among the poor peoples of 
the developing countries. Globalisation […] offers some opportunities but also 
entails the risk of marginalisation. The debt burden often leaves developing 
countries no room for manoeuvre.” (Council 2000e: 4) 
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The threshold by which poverty or development qualified as being worse ‘enough’ to 
count as a conflict situation depended on the level of disregard or violence of EU 
core principles and other rules of appropriate behaviour. The level of disregard or 
violence had to be high in order to qualify as a situation of conflict. However, this 
level was not quantified within discourses of poverty, development, conflict or 
security. In linking poverty to conflict and thereby making development a security 
problem, the EU determined its belief to be justified by data stating that the 
probability of conflict was much higher in situations of poverty or development. (see 
Chandler 2007: 365-6; Council 2000e: 4) As a result, the Council emphasised the 
“strategic role of development co-operation in conflict, as well as [...] post conflict 
situations”. (Council 2001j: Africa, pt.1) 
Through this perspective, the EU established the meaning of a development-conflict 
cycle. (see Hadfield 2007; Chandler 2007) The forces of this cycle not only 
dynamically led from development to conflict but also vice versa. As argued above, 
situations of development and poverty were perceived to contain a high probability 
to lead into conflict. The effect was also possible in the reverse, by which conflict 
worsened situations of development and poverty. This was perceived as a problem 
for the EU’s development policy because conflicts potentially ruined the 
achievements established by the EU’s development policy. This aspect was clearly 
stated by the Council, saying that “such situations are likely to jeopardise the 
beneficial effects of assistance and co-operation policies and programmes, their 
effectiveness and/or conditions for their proper implementation.” (Council 2001g: 
RRM) In this regard, conflict constituted a threat to the EU’s development and 
cooperation policies. 
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Summary 
Taken together, the EU established a development-conflict cycle which dominated 
the EU’s perspective on situations of development or poverty and their potential to 
lead to conflict. (see Hadfield 2007: 58; Chandler 2007; Council 2001c: Conflict 
prevention) Another mechanism which added to the meaning of conflict assumed a 
horizontal expansion. The Council “expressed concern about the risk of spill-over of 
the conflict to neighbouring countries”. (Council 2000h: 10) This way of reasoning 
on development and conflict as dynamically affecting each other was not only 
established by the EU but already by other international organisations and state 
actors dominating the discursive field of global challenges. (see Craig and Porter 
2003: 53; Abrahamsen 2005; Duffield 2003) However, the development-conflict 
cycle did not constitute a threat to the EU’s physical existence rather it was 
perceived as diverging from the standards of living required by EU identity. 
Poverty and development was perceived as contradicting the minimum standards of 
EU core principles and other core meanings of EU identity because people suffered 
from these situations. The EU felt responsible to act since it perceived itself as an 
actor on the international stage. Acting as an agenda setter, in the field of 
development or other ways was necessary to apply to its own standards of actorness. 
This perspective enabled the construction of poverty and development as security 
relevant and the dynamic of the development-conflict cycle as a security problem. 
3. Rules of Appropriate Behaviour 
In the above sections on EU identity and threat constructions, I have shown that 
meanings were redefined and became dominant in the discourses under review. The 
meaning of the people – as the principle addressees of EU policies – as well as 
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effectiveness and coherence dominated discourses on EU identity in 2000 and 2001. 
Furthermore, a meaning of actorness was strongly attached to EU identity. The EU 
promoted itself as an international actor capable of dealing with international 
problems. On this basis, the EU understood the dynamism of development and 
poverty potentially leading to conflict as a security problem. Development, poverty 
and conflict were perceived as situations which lacked the implementation of EU 
core principles and the international law. These situations were ‘other’ to the EU’s 
‘self’ and had to be addressed following the meaning of responsibility and EU 
actorness. 
The EU established rules of appropriate behaviour in accordance with these security 
problems. Rules included i) conflict prevention and ii) crisis management. (see 
Article 17, no. 3 of Nice Treaty on the EU) The meaning of conflict prevention could 
be understood as the umbrella including crisis management. The logic behind this 
was that conflict prevention accounted more or less for all situations in which EU 
core principles were not fully implemented. These situations were labelled as 
situations of development or poverty which again were perceived as including a high 
probability to lead to conflict and crisis. In order to prevent situations of 
development and poverty leading to conflict, the EU implemented a rule requiring 
long term approaches for conflict prevention especially carried out by development 
and other external policies in the field of trade or financial aid. In contrast, crisis 
management directly addressed situations of conflict. As I have argued above, 
conflict was understood to be a situation in which EU core principles were seriously 
breached or violated. Peoples were suffering from these situations and the violence 
carried out against them by state and non-state actors. The rule of crisis management 
required the use of civilian capabilities to enable conflicting parties – almost 
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exclusively state actors – to restore domestic order. Also, the rule required military 
capabilities and the possibility to use NATO’s military assets.  
Overall, both rules were relevant for the meaning of security enabling a security 
policy at the EU level and within ESDP, although crisis management was more 
central to it because it directly addressed situations of violence. These changes were 
enabled by a re-construction of EU’s identity and its perception of being an 
international actor in the field of security who had to take up the responsibility to 
protect also the people outside of its own territory. Therefore, these changes resulted 
in a change of the EU’s identity constructions. Also, it was a matter of continuity 
that the EU’s security policy had to support already established policies such as 
development policies. However, I will demonstrate that both rules were strongly 
contested, which weakened their intersubjectivity status and their effect on security 
policy. In the following I will analyse the construction of both rules.  
3.1 Conflict Prevention 
The meaning of conflict prevention was closely related to the meaning of 
development and development policy as well as to the meaning of the responsibility 
to protect. “The added value of development programmes in conflict prevention” 
was “their ability to analyse the structural causes of conflict and instability and long-
term development needs and priorities. The role of development cooperation” was 
“conflict prevention rather than crisis management.” (Council 2001c: Conflict 
Prevention and Development) By this quote, conflict prevention was perceived to be 
established through development policy and development cooperation. The meaning 
of development cooperation was central in this regard. It again referred to the 
European success of overcoming its brutal past through cooperation. (see Council 
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2001f: open debate) Informed by this perspective, development cooperation built up 
on a list of action including: “trade policy instruments, trade and cooperation 
agreements, development cooperation programmes, social and environmental 
instruments, political dialogue and cooperation with international partners and 
countries at risk”. (Council 2001f: open debate) Overall, the logic of conflict 
prevention was that “[o]nce peace is restored the EU is ready to consider long-term 
cooperation in support of national reconstruction”. (Council 2001a: 1)  
Based on the EU’s perception of the development-conflict cycle, conflict prevention 
was understood to be a security policy framed within a long term perspective of 
development policy. (see Stewart 2008: 233) It included policies and action in the 
political, social, economic, environmental, and health area. For example, in the 
political area the EU supported: 
“Democratic institutions which work are a condition of sustainable development. 
Good governance, which includes the fight against corruption, and the rule of law 
are decisive in strategies to reduce poverty. In that connection, the Community is 
especially well placed to support the strengthening of the partner countries' 
institutional capacities.” (Council 2000e: 6)  
In this regard, elections were taken as a sign of solid processes of democratisation. 
“The completion of these elections […] in full respect for OSCE standards will 
contribute to the further strengthening of the democratic institutions of the country 
and to its rapprochement to European structures”. (Council 2001h: Western Balkans)  
Objectives in the economic area included “in particular sustainable development in 
developing countries, their inclusion in the world economy and the fight against 
poverty.” (Council 2000d: 8) Starting from its perspective as an international actor, 
the Council claimed that the EU was a “leading player in the area of trade and 
development aid”. (Council 2000e: Link between development and trade) As a 
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result, the Community had to “ensure that development policies and trade and 
investment policies” were “complementary and mutually beneficial.” (Council 
2000e: Link between development and trade) 
The leading idea of conflict prevention was to initiate a process which would lead to 
regional integration following the idea of European integration and thereby making 
crisis and conflict impossible. As well as European integration, conflict prevention is 
a peace project and hence a security policy by other means. This perspective could 
be read out of the quote given above on the purpose of elections which contributed to 
countries “rapprochement to European structures” (Council 2001h: Western 
Balkans) In its close neighbourhood, motivations to engage in long-term 
reconstruction efforts should be created by “a credible prospect of potential 
membership once relevant conditions have been met.” (Council 2001d: Annex) 
Further afield, long-term reconstruction efforts carried out by the EU intended to 
initiate similar processes of integration in the respective region. Here, the EU again 
focused on cooperation and ‘constructive’ dialogues initiated by regional 
organisations. For example, the Council “expressed its readiness to increase its long-
term capacity-building support to ECOWAS, in particular in the fields of conflict 
prevention, crisis management and regional peacekeeping.” (Council 2001h: West 
Africa)  
Nation building was a central means to achieve the end of poverty eradication and 
development finally making crisis and conflict impossible. The EU’s long-term 
action of reconstruction focused first and foremost on nation building and 
democratisation. The Council argued for the importance “to build national capacity 
to prevent and resolve conflicts.” (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention and 
development) Accordingly, apart from being framed as development policy, the 
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discussion of how the EU’s civilian and military capabilities should look like already 
highlighted the point that ESDP should be active in nation building. In the following 
of the quote above, the Council listed possible contributions of the EU to nation-
building and democratisation. “Our contribution could include support to democratic 
institutions, judicial systems and the security sector. Support must also be granted for 
democratisation, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and civil society.” 
(Council 2001c: Conflict prevention and development) The list of contributions 
strongly referred to EU core principles. Also, the meaning of the civil society as a 
guarantor of state stability was re-constituted. This again was apparent in more detail 
in a statement on the situation in Indonesia: “In the Council’s view, legal reform, the 
rule of law, civilian control and democratic accountability of the police and armed 
forces, a vibrant civil society, decentralisation and the strengthening of local 
administration remain crucial for Indonesia’s stability and prosperity.” (Council 
2001j: Indonesia) 
The role of the UN was important in the field of conflict prevention, although the 
UN was perceived as one of many international organisations. This is not to say that 
discourses of conflict prevention did not explicitly refer to the UN. (see Council 
2001j: EU-UN relations) But the UN was almost exclusively referred to as one 
international organisation apart from others which were active in conflict prevention. 
For example, CIVCOM pointed out that the EU “should develop its crisis 
management capacity with a view to improve its ability to contribute to operations 
conducted by lead agencies, such as the UN or the OSCE,” but also that the EU 
should be able to “carry out EU-led autonomous missions”. (CIVCOM 2001a: 
Annex, p.1) The reason for that might have been that the EU perceived itself as a 
successful actor in conflict prevention. Discourses of conflict prevention frequently 
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referred to this meaning. (see above; Council 2001f: open debate) This quest for 
autonomy demonstrated two things: first, the EU seemed to be more settled in its 
role of international actorness in the field of security; second, the meaning of 
duplication, which dominated discourses in the period of 1996-7, was no longer 
relevant for the EU’s policies and institutional build up in 2000-1. Despite these 
processes of reasoning, the EU had an “inconsistent record of conflict prevention in 
EU development documents” which “undoubtedly reflects difficulties in defining the 
concept and tying it in with other pressing development objectives”. (Stewart 2008: 
238) This argument on the contestedness of the meaning of conflict prevention will 
be developed further in regard to crisis management. 
3.2 Crisis Management 
The meaning of crisis management addressed situations in which violence took place 
and it was related to the meaning of responsibility to protect. If violence was carried 
out, a situation previously understood as development turned out to be a security 
problem. The rule requiring crisis management applied in situations of development 
or poverty which were worsened by violence and, therefore, were labelled crisis or 
conflict. As I have described earlier, violence did not have to include the use of 
force. The threshold for a situation to become security relevant was the seriousness 
of disregard or violation of EU core principles. On the one hand, violence could be 
done against individuals or ethnic-groups. On the other hand, disregard included 
situations in which state structures were unable to provide serious policies in support 
of their citizens or to prevent circumstances from harming the civilian situation. The 
situation was then understood to be a security problem, including the potential to 
undermine the EU’s development policy.  
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This perspective led to the reasoning that civil crisis management approaches and 
capabilities were appropriate to push a situation of crisis back into the boundaries of 
development. In general, approaches in this regard were closely related to the efforts 
of the UN. The UN was held as primarily responsible for defining how to approach 
situations of conflict. For example, in regard to Afghanistan the Council agreed on a 
common position in “order to support the United Nations peace efforts”. (Council 
2000a: Article 2)  
In any case, crisis situations were addressed first by civilian operations. They 
addressed civilian administration, the rule of law, and civil protection. Civilian 
administration included “[g]eneral administrative functions: Civil registration, 
Registration of poverty, Elections/appointments to political bodies, Taxation, Local 
administration, Custom Service” as well as “social functions” and “infrastructural 
functions”. (European Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) Even though it was 
understood as crisis management, civil administration mechanisms were very closely 
interlinked with development cooperation and hence conflict prevention. In both 
policies, “rapid build-up of local capacity and subsequent hand-over to local 
ownership” was perceived to be “essential.” (European Council 2001b: Annex III to 
Annex) “The close link between civilian administration in crisis management and 
long-term structural assistance” made “continuity crucial.” (European Council 
2001b: Annex III to Annex) Although crisis was perceived as being security relevant 
and as requiring EU’s action, the EU still focused on long-term strategies following 
the logic of development policy and economic support. (see Stewart 2008: 237-8) 
This argument could be exemplified in regard to the implementation and 
strengthening of the rule of law. For example, the European Council stated:  
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“Experience shows that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition of peace 
and security. International efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, 
credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not 
complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system.” (European Council 
2001b: Annex III of Annex)  
In this regard, police missions also accounted for crisis management. They ranged 
“from advice, assistance or training assignments to substituting for local police”. 
(European Council 2000b: Annex II to Annex VI) But these missions focused on 
long-term achievements rather than on re-establishing order by the use of short-term 
initiatives such as conflict resolution, peace-keeping or peace-enforcement. 
In contrast to civilian crisis management operations, civil protection operations 
explicitly focused on short-term goals. They should assist humanitarian actors “in 
covering the immediate survival and protection needs of affected populations, in 
respect to e.g. search and rescue, construction of refugee camps and systems of 
communications and provisions of other types of logistical support.” (European 
Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) Based on this list, which referred to the 
Petersberg Tasks, the EU perceived as appropriate the development of military 
capabilities at the EU level. (see European Council 1999b: HHG; Keukeleier 2003: 
39; )  
The development of appropriate military capabilities under the leadership of the EU 
were not truly finalised but contested in the period of 2000-1, although the goal was 
to “make the EU quickly operational”. (European Council 2001b: 11; see Wivel 
2005: 401; Hill 2001) In order to face up to the problem of lacking in military 
capabilities, the European Council, for example, “called for an arrangements 
permitting EU access to NATO assets and capabilities.” (European Council 2001b: 
11; see Deighton 2002: 728; Stavridis 2001a) This request again showed that the 
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meaning of duplication no longer dominated processes of sense making on the EU’s 
external action. It was pushed away by meanings such as responsibility, actorness 
and coherence. (see above) Overall, in the period under review here, the EU 
perceived robust action necessary to face up to situations of crisis but it was not 
capable of applying to its own perspectives, since the EU did not have military 
capabilities at its disposal nor was the agreement with NATO in place before 2003. 
The perception that the EU had to be enabled for robust action in security policy 
derived from changes in the construction of EU’s international actorness following 
the grand design of being a full-fledged member of the international community for 
which it was perceived to be necessary to be capable of acting in security. 
Furthermore, the dominant discourse on the responsibility to protect affected the 
EU’s perception of its international role in the field of security. The attempt to 
cooperate with NATO can be explained on the one hand as the attempt to approve 
continuity but on the other hand, cooperation was necessary in order to prevent the 
EU from worsening the identity crisis because it already formulated that it wanted to 
engage in security policy internationally but was not capable of doing so without 
using NATO’s assets. (see European Council 1999: Annex IV; European Council 
2000: no. 8-9; Gordon 2000: 15-6) 
The interesting aspect was that the rule requiring active engagement in a situation of 
crisis did not exist in 1996-7. Back than, any direct involvement in advising other 
states was perceived as inappropriate. But in 2000-1, the implementation of a variety 
of mechanisms of crisis management was perceived appropriate. As I have argued in 
the sections on EU identity and threat constructions, this change can be explained, on 
the one hand, by developments in the construction of EU identity. The EU’s self-
perception of being an international actor in the field of security was especially 
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crucial here. The strengthened meaning of actorness required action by the EU on the 
international stage which, from the EU’s perspective, meant nothing else than taking 
up responsibility. On the other hand, the the responsibility to protect became 
dominant in discourses of EU identity. In reference to the meaning of actorness, the 
EU perceived itself as responsible for the peoples in other regions of the world. 
Situations in which civilians suffered from situations of development and poverty 
were perceived as a problem by being ‘other’ to the EU’s ‘self’. These situations 
qualified as a security problem when they escalated into conflict and crisis. The EU 
required conflict prevention and crisis management to address these situations as a 
matter of appropriateness. This went so far that the Council stated that a situation of 
conflict or crisis required “in the last resort, the readiness to use military force for 
conflict solution”. (Council 2001f: open debate)  
Overall, the rules of conflict prevention and crisis management were still contested 
in the period under review here. On first glance, they seemed clearly defined. 
Conflict prevention required action in the field of development policy and external 
action of trade cooperation and financial aid, whereas crisis management operations 
required robust capabilities of ESDP. But both rules were not strictly defined, which 
made the differentiation between both logics of action almost impossible. Although 
crisis was defined as a serious problem which required immediate reactions by the 
international community, the EU preferred long-term approaches instead of 
providing capabilities for robust conflict resolution. Accordingly, the distribution of 
competencies among EU institutions such as the COM and its Directorate-Generals, 
as well as CFSP and ESDP, remained contested and unresolved. (see Stewart 2008: 
238) Also, processes of sense making on EU’s capabilities to carry out robust crisis 
management and nation-building operations were contested. As a result, the EU did 
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not implement civilian and military capabilities in order to be able to conduct crisis 
management. Rather, it referred to its long-term development policies as appropriate 
tools. (see Hill 2001: 320) Therefore, the EU required other actors to carry out crisis 
management operations. For example, in regard to the Great Lakes Region the 
Council concluded that progress was “primarily the responsibility of the Government 
of Rwanda. In order to support and encourage its efforts, the European Union shall 
pursue a constructive and critical dialogue with the Government of Rwanda” (see 
Council 2000c: Article 2)  
In sum, although the meanings of conflict prevention and crisis management were 
very central for the process of reasoning on rules of appropriate behaviour in a 
situation of insecurity, both rules were still in the process of becoming 
intersubjectively shared. This can explain the EU’s inactiveness in conflict 
prevention and crisis management where security policies, including civilian and 
military actions, were concerned. (see Hill 2001: 330; Treacher 2004: 58) 
Summary 
In this chapter I have shown that in the period 2000-1, EU identity was still based on 
EU core principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. However, there were three important changes recognisable in 
the time period under review here. First, the EU more explicitly understood itself as 
an international actor in the field of security. The meaning of actorness was still in 
the making and discursive moments constituting the EU as an actor were very 
frequent. Thereby, change as development was visible based on the actors’ attempt 
to apply to the grand design of being a responsible and capable international actor 
also in the field of security. An occurring identity crisis by realising that the EU was 
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not able to apply to this grand design supported discourses which re-constituting the 
meaning of actorness in the field of security. Second, discourses were dominated by 
the meanings of effectiveness and coherence. They implemented an objective or 
rational perspective by which problems in EU’s policies were understood to be 
management problems. They could be dealt with by objective measurements of 
effectiveness and coherence. In regard to coherence, a remarkable change in the 
meaning was visible, compared to the construction established in 1996-7. Coherence 
no longer focused exclusively on EU member states’ individual situations which had 
to be recognised. Coherence required effective workflows between all levels of EU 
governance without particularly highlighting that of member states. Thereby, the 
new security policy was presented as continuity of other already established policies 
because it also applied to the EU’s attempt of being effective and coherent. Three, 
discourses of EU identity established a meaning of responsibility to protect and the 
people as the principle addressees of EU’s policies. This meaning was introduced 
into the EU’s discourse by the discourse at the UN level enfolding since the 
beginning of the 1990s. The EU discourse was able to relate to the UN discourse 
because it could build up on the EU’s core principles which all were design to 
support and empower the people.  
However, these changes together enabled the EU to perceive situations of 
development and poverty as security relevant. This perspective was enabled by the 
broader meaning of responsibility. Thereby, the EU’s responsibility to protect the 
people was shifted onto the international level. As a result, situations of development 
and poverty were perceived as a problem with which the EU had to deal. These 
situations were constituted by lacking the implementation of EU core principles and 
the international law. In order to apply to the requirement of its own construction of 
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actorness, the EU had to engage in these situations. This was especially the case 
when situations of development transformed into conflict and crisis. Generally, 
development and poverty were understood to systematically include a high 
probability to lead into conflict. Such a transition led to worsening conditions for 
civilians, who therefore had to be protected. 
As a result, the EU constituted rules on conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Both required a broad variety of policy tools ranging from development cooperation, 
financial aid to civilian crisis management operations and rather robust approaches 
of conflict resolution. As I have shown, the process of sense making on these rules of 
appropriate behaviour was contested in the period under review here. Especially 
rules of action including civilian and military crisis management remained contested. 
This contestedness was reflected by the lack of capabilities on the EU level.  
Overall, this chapter argued for the stability of EU identity, compared with the 
period of 1996-7, although it identified changes in some constitutive meanings. 
These changes were responsible for changes in the EU’s perception of the world 
surrounding it. It enabled the EU to perceive situations of development and poverty 
as security relevant. This perspective enabled the EU to construct rules requiring 
conflict prevention and crisis management accordingly. 
In the empirical chapter dealing with the period of 2003-4, I will show that EU 
identity was still consistent. This was also true for the constitution of EU actorness, 
consistently developed over time to include much more differentiated characters. 
They enabled the EU to define rules of appropriate behaviour more accurately than 
in the period of 2000-1. However, an important change took place in regard to the 
perception of threats. Processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international 
terrorism dominated threat perceptions. By these processes, security problems were 
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understood to systematically include a strong moment of dynamism. This affected 
not only the EU’s threat perception but also the way in which the EU perceived itself 
positioned within this world of dynamic threats, including international terrorism as 
a serious threat against the EU’s ‘self’. 
However, before I focus on the period 2003-4, I will need to address the first half of 
2003 explicitly. These six months were marked by a discursive crisis. As a result of 
processes of sense making on international terrorism, the approach towards Iraq as a 
host and in corporation with international terrorism was discussed on the 
international level. The EU had to position itself to this problem. The EU’s inability 
to do so was described in the literature as constituting a crisis of the EU. Especially 
its instruments of CFSP and ESDP somewhat mystically combined success in the 
development of ESDP. (see Allen and Smith 2004; Hill 2004; Menon 2004) In 
contrast, I will show that discourse on the meaning of security enabling a security 
policy at the EU level and within ESDP was robust and remained fairly unaffected 
by the discursive crisis. This robustness can be argued by showing that utterances 
dealing with Iraq took place almost always outside of the institutionalised discourses 
on the meaning of security. Also, if disputes took place within these institutionalised 
discourses, they evolved from the disregard of established rules of interaction rather 
than from the content of the utterances themselves. This ‘interim’ chapter will 
demonstrate the robustness of discourses of European security, even in a situation 
perceived as constituting an existential crisis. It will lead my thesis to the final period 
of analysis covering the years 2003 and 2004. 
  
Chapter IV 
 
The Paradox of Crisis and Success 
The achievements in the field of European security and defence policy became 
contested, if not irrelevant, in the year 2003. This, at least, has been argued by a 
strand of literature. (see Hill 2004: 152; Menon 2004: 640; Stahl et al. 2004: 417) 
During the year 2003, EU member states publicly battled over the war on Iraq, a 
second UN resolution, and the correct behaviour of EU member states and candidate 
countries alike. (see Aznar et al. 2003; Chriac 2003; Dimore 2003) In the literature, 
these events were reflected as a matter of crisis regarding the EU’s foreign policy 
somehow combined with successful strategies within ESDP. (see Menon 2004: 640; 
Brenner 2003: 200; Eilstrup Sangiovanni 2003: 194) These successes included the 
final agreement between NATO and the EU on Berlin Plus in March 2003, 
(Robertson 2003) the agreement between France, Germany and the UK on planning 
capabilities of ESDP, (Financial Times 2003), the launch of ESDP operations, such 
as Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in the DRC, and the inauguration of the 
ESS in December 2003. (ESS 2003) Despite these successes, the year 2003 was 
labelled as damaging for ESDP – and more generally CFSP – and taken as evidence 
for the irrelevance of both policies. (Stahl et al. 2004: 417)  
This chapter starts with the assumption that the coexistence of crisis and successes 
can be explained by the fact that the question of war over Iraq was by no means 
connected to the use of ESDP’s military capabilities. As evident by the findings of 
both previous chapters, as well as the following on the meaning of security, ESDP 
was not meant to tackle proliferation problems by force. But since this was the 
dominant logic for going to war with Iraq, no immediate or logical connection to 
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ESDP existed. Although change would have been possible, the discourses on the 
meaning of security remained robust in facing the crisis. Therefore, this chapter will 
address the question of why the discursive crisis did not affect the meaning of 
security but left room for institutional developments as a strong sine of unity among 
relevant actors following the established understanding of security.  
As argued in the theory chapter, crisis is a moment in which available meanings are 
unable to cope with new phenomena. European disunity on the war in Iraq was a 
sign of such a crisis. The phenomenon which had to be addressed by available 
meanings was the way in which developments within Iraq were perceived on the 
international level and especially by the US administration. As a result, the 
international community represented by both, the UNSC and the US administration 
together with its international partners, had to decide on whether or not to disarm 
Iraq by war. The EU and its member states had to position themselves to this 
question because a common position of the EU was necessary to apply to the EU’s 
self-perception of being an international actor. It was also necessary because member 
states were involved in the UNSC decision-making process and therefore had to 
contribute to the debate.  
EU member states were highly divided on the question of war. This dispute could 
have led to two results: it could have either changed the meaning of security enabling 
a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP to include military force as a tool 
of non-proliferation policies or kept the meaning of security robust enough to keep 
the discourse on the war in Iraq outside of institutionalised boundaries. It was this 
second option which secured the meaning of security enabling a security policy at 
the EU level and within ESDP from being changed or harmed by the discursive 
crisis. The discursive crisis took place outside of discourses on the meaning of 
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security. Since disputes over Iraq took place outside of this frame, agreements on 
institutional matters of ESDP were possible even though the crisis shattered relations 
among European partners. Indeed, shortly after the crisis, the development of ESDP 
was again initiated by a new impetuous. (see Menon 2004; Brenner 2003: 205)  
The central argument of this chapter is that the crisis unfolded by the disregard of 
established European rules on interaction and cooperation. I will demonstrate that the 
crisis did not unfold by disputes over subjects. Two examples may briefly underline 
this. First, the authors of the letter of eight did not consult European partners before 
taking a final position. (see Smith 2004b: 107) Therefore, they disregarded a well 
established European rule applicable in the context of CFSP/ESDP. (see Smith 
2004b: 107; Mitzen 2006: 275-6) This was even more so the case because the 
authors claimed to speak in the name of Europe. (see Aznar et al. 2003) In regard to 
the content, the letter of eight did not include claims to which other EU member 
states could not have agreed to. (see Menon 2004: 638; Howorth 2003: 248) Second, 
in regard to autonomous planning capabilities of ESDP, the conclusion of the so 
called Chocolate Summit was perceived by some EU member states as unthinkable. 
The Chocolate Summit brought the crisis to its peak because it not only proposed 
changes to the EU, but intended to implement parts of these changes on the national 
level without EU approval. Such behaviour did not fall into line with the established 
rules which allowed bi- or trilateral proposals on the EU’s future development but 
did not allow one-sided implementations without previous approval by European 
institutions. However, almost all aspects proposed by the Chocolate Summit were 
again proposed by the Berlin Mini Summit of France, Germany, and the UK at a 
later date. (see Dempsey 2003c; Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 2003) This 
exemplified that division was not a matter of subjects but of inappropriate behaviour. 
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During the crisis, actors of the EU did not apply to rules which had been established 
within discourses on European integration and EU identity. Utterances which were 
constitutive for the crisis took place in a less institutionalised environment. Actors 
did not even use EU institutions and their procedures to find common ground. (see 
Allen and Smith 2004: 95-6)  
In order to answer the question addressed in this chapter, the methodological 
approach needs to differ from the other empirical chapters. The approach follows a 
two fold strategy in order to deconstruct how individual speech acts were used to 
influence the overall structure of reasoning on the war in Iraq and the meaning of 
security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP more generally. 
First, I will analyse the discursive structure of the debate on the war in Iraq in a 
European context. Methodologically, this part of the analysis focuses on subjects and 
objects constituted within discourses. Therefore, I will identify the discursive 
structures in which speech acts were embedded.  
Second, the analysis will focus on individual speech acts and analyse how individual 
speakers were active in framing processes of sense making. (see Onuf 2001: 81-3) 
Here, speakers are understood as norm entrepreneurs. (see Finnemore and Sikkink 
1998: 897-901) Relevant speakers were those granted a high position in decision-
making processes on EU’s foreign policy. In particular, this applied to heads of 
states and governments of EU member states and candidate countries alike. The 
analysis will include candidate countries, since they were informally involved in the 
political structures of the EU and participated in various Council and European 
Council meetings at this time. Overall, this approach deconstructs not only the 
structure of the discourse on the war on Iraq but also the individual speech acts by 
which speakers – as norm entrepreneurs – tried to influence processes of reasoning 
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by arguing for their interpretations to become intersubjectively shared. Since 
utterances took place outside of established discourses on European integration and 
the meaning of security, actors could only weakly relate to the social reality – the 
mutual constitution of agency and structure – created through these discourses. Each 
speaker individually had to justify his or her position, enabling him or her to 
powerfully produce order and thereby create social reality. Speakers had to validate 
their utterances by constituting themselves as relevant speakers. Only when their 
utterances were perceived as being powerful were they able to influence discourses 
on the reasoning on the war in Iraq and the EU’s or member states’ involvement.  
Speakers could create these strong discursive positions in different ways. One option 
could have been to claim to be the rightful speaker of European common interests. I 
will argue that such claims were not successfully made; speakers did not draw on the 
established social reality of the meaning of security, which would have granted a 
rightful speaker a strong and established position. Examples were the reaction of 
Jacques Chirac and the outcome of the Chocolate Summit. In both cases, utterances 
were perceived as individual perspectives rather than acts to reach common interests. 
Furthermore, utterances of the crisis bluntly showed that in regard to the war in Iraq, 
common positions were non-existent which made the claim to speak up to European 
common interests unjustifiable. The only possible claim in regard to European 
common interests would have been to argue for compliance with established 
European rules which “orientated towards consensus-building, problem-solving and 
the creation of common understandings, interests or reference points“. (Smith 2004b: 
107) But at the peak of the crisis, no speaker took such a position – or at least 
nobody was able to speak up forcefully in this regard. Speakers had to, or did, 
establish their power as rightful speaker outside of established discourses. They 
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thereby tried to produce social order affecting the way of reasoning on the war in 
Iraq and tried to establish themselves as powerful speakers while disregarding 
institutionalised rules on the EU level. It is exactly this phenomenon which was 
responsible for the crisis. 
In order to analyse this phenomenon, I will focus on discursive events which were 
perceived in public discourses and in the literature as the most critical showing 
division among EU member states as well as candidate countries. In each situation, I 
will analyse the rules of the discourse enabling or justifying certain utterances and 
the subject matter accounting for disunity. The analysis will take into account i) 
primary sources of information such as official documents, press releases or press 
briefings, ii) newspaper articles on these events, and iii) literature on the Iraq crisis, 
ESDP and the transatlantic relations. Official documents of the EU and its 
institutions will be used rarely because utterances usually took place outside of this 
institutionalised framework. By following this approach, I will be able to argue two 
things: first, that the dispute over the war in Iraq took place outside of established 
discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and 
within ESDP; and second, that disunity unfolded by the disregard of rules of 
interaction established at the EU level. 
In order to develop this argument, I will deconstruct discursive moments of the 
crisis. The findings will be compared with basic lines of arguments prior to and 
following the crisis. This will enable the analysis to demonstrate more clearly that 
subjects discussed in regard to ESDP could not explain the outbreak of the crisis. 
Therefore, relevant discursive moments can be divided into three periods of time: the 
first was that of a peaking crisis marked by the disagreement on a follow-up mission 
in Macedonia in late 2002. The second period was the crisis peak which included the 
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letter of eight on 30 January 2003 and the declaration of the Vilnius Group as a 
follow up initiative, Jacques Chirac’s reaction to it following the extraordinary 
European Council meeting on 17 February 2003, and the so called Chocolate 
Summit of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in April 2003. In the 
analysis, I will focus on the letter of eight and not on the declaration of the Vilnius 
Group, as the latter almost repeated the former. (see Vilnius Group 2003) The third 
period started with the summer of 2003, when – little by little – discussions slowly 
returned to normal. The crisis slowly was resolved by the Weimar Triangle meeting 
between France, Germany, and Poland in May 2003, the so called Berlin Mini 
Summit between France, Germany, and the UK in September 2003 and finally, the 
extraordinary North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the demand of US NATO 
ambassador Nicholas Burns in October 2003. (see Dempsey 2003b) In the following, 
I will start by focusing on these periods chronologically while the main analytical 
focus rests on moments of crisis. In order to be able to contextualise the discursive 
moments of the crisis, I will discuss moments prior to and following the crisis. This 
will be brief, since the other empirical chapters support the argument that proposals 
made during the crisis on the development of ESDP were not fundamentally 
different to other moments in discourses.  
1. A Peaking Crisis? 
In late 2002, EU member states were willing to take over NATO’s mission Amber 
Fox in Macedonia but EU member states were divided over whether or not Berlin 
Plus was essential for this operation. The mandate of NATO’s mission was to end on 
15 December 2002 and the EU wanted to take over a follow up mission as its first 
operation using its rapid reaction force under the ESDP umbrella. (see Black 2002) 
In order to be able to do so, Berlin Plus had to be agreed upon to make NATO assets 
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available to ESDP operations. (see Missiroli 2003a: 494-5; Gourlay 2004: 410) An 
agreement could not be reached because Greece and Turkey vetoed. Greece was not 
eager to open up bodies of ESDP for participation of NATO members, i.e. Turkey. 
And Turkey feared that the EU would intend to use NATO assets in Cyprus. (see 
Schweiss 2003: 216-7) Both countries finally shifted positions in December 2002 to 
basically agree on Berlin Plus on 16 December 2002, but NATO and EU finally 
concluded the agreement only on 17 March 2003. (Mace 2004: 482) In any case, it 
was too late for the EU to take over NATO’s mission in Macedonia, which expired 
on 15 December 2002. 
The reason for this moment’s relevancy here was that during the period of unsettled 
agreement, France proposed to take over NATO’s mission even without previous 
agreement on Berlin Plus. (see Boulton and Dempsey 2002) The argument was that 
although the agreement would have helped to strengthen EU’s military presence in 
Macedonia, the EU did not need to use NATO assets for a limited mission. (see 
Mace 2004: 481) This followed a well known position of France which long was 
pushed for more autonomy of ESDP. France was keen to show that the EU was able 
to act without NATO. This long lasting policy goal did not become reality any 
earlier than ESDP’s 2003 operation Artemis in the DRC, the first without using 
NATO capabilities. (see Gegout 2005: 437-8) However, in late 2002, the France’s 
move was perceived as possibly leading to a precedent case of autonomy of ESDP. 
This perception was not only true for the US administration but for the governments 
of Germany and the UK, as well. (see Schweiss 2003: 216; Black 2002; La Guardia 
2002)  
In and of itself, the reluctance of Germany and the UK to agree on an autonomous 
mission in Macedonia without recognising  US worries was no hint that crisis was 
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peaking. France’s bid for autonomy did not come as a surprise. The disagreement of 
France on the one side and Germany and the UK on the other was predictable and far 
from constituting a crisis. However, this well known position of France was again 
publicly adopted by the Chocolate Summit in April 2003 of Belgium, France, 
Germany and Luxemburg. It then pushed the crisis of discourse to its final peak, (see 
Black 2003; Dempsey 2003a) although it was not impossible to bridge differences to 
earlier initiatives and those of the UK on ESDP’s planning structures. (see Lichfield 
2003)  
The disagreement in late 2002 on a Macedonian mission supports the argument that 
the discursive crisis did not unfold among disputes over subjects. In 2002, the 
dispute on autonomy did not lead to fierce reaction as those following the Chocolate 
Summit did – knowing that in essence the summit did not come up with any different 
ideas. Whereas the dispute over the Macedonian mission was dealt with within EU 
institutions and in accordance with European rules, the Chocolate Summit brought 
forward the idea of autonomy in an uncompromising manner disregarding 
established rules of interaction. 
2. The Peak of Crisis 
In the first quarter of the year 2003, the crisis on Iraq reached its most intensive 
moment. This peak was marked by three events: the publication of the letter of eight 
and the declaration of the Vilnius Group as one event, the reaction of Jacques Chirac 
following the extraordinary European Council meeting and the meeting of Belgium, 
France, Germany and Luxemburg, called the Chocolate Summit. Before analysing 
these three events it is essential to clarify the background of the dispute, namely the 
run up to the war on Iraq.  
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The goal of an Iraq intervention, pushed especially by the US administration, was to 
end Iraq’s breach of UN resolutions and disarm the Iraqi regime. (see Hastings Dunn 
2003: 288) In addition to that, the Bush administration intended a regime change 
which was considered to be the start of liberalising the Arab World as part of its 
broader Middle East initiative. (see Hastings Dunn 2003: 290) Publicly, the debate 
on going to war in Iraq was presented with the logic of non-proliferation of WMD 
and the disarmament of Iraq. This was especially true for the UN context and the 
UNSC. (see Perlez 2003; Tyler 2002; UNSC 2002) Only the US administration 
considered regime change as the primary goal from the very beginning, (see Sanger 
2002) although it was hesitant to openly discuss this as such. (see State Department 
2002; Weisman 2002) This may well be because of diverging perceptions of the 
problem in Europe.  
In Europe, the debate on Iraq was connected to the UNSC, in which Iraq’s non 
compliance to the weapons inspections were discussed. (see Sciolino 2003) The idea 
of regime change was not considered and certainly not as a means to further 
democratise the Middle East. Despite this fact, Britain turned to the idea of regime 
change in early 2003, following a humanitarian argument. (see Elliott 2003) The 
regime in Iraq was argued to seriously breach human rights and that this could only 
be ended by the establishment of a democratic government. Preferably, the 
intervention to cause regime change should have been legalised by the UNSC. If that 
were not possible, the UK decided to take part in a coalition to relieve the Iraqi 
people from the arbitrary regime without a second resolution. (see Beeston and 
Evans 2003) This argument was brought forward by Britain at a later stage of the 
debate. Previously, the debate almost exclusively unfolded on non-proliferation and 
Iraq’s non-compliance to the weapons inspections.  
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Following this logic, Germany and France opposed a military intervention in Iraq. 
(see Bremner 2002; Knowlton 2002; Riddell 2003) Very early and on various 
occasions, both governments publicly concluded that a war against Iraq should not 
be on the agenda. For example, in September 2002, the German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder secured his re-election by campaigning against the war in Iraq. (see 
Hoagland 2002) Also, during the UNSC meeting on 5 February 2003, in which 
Secretary of State Collin Powell made the case for war, the French foreign minister 
Dominique de Villepin stated that the time for war had not yet come and that weapon 
inspectors should be given more time and more capabilities. (see UNSC 2003) And, 
in reaction to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld arguing for war on Iraq, 
German foreign minister Joschka Fischer claimed in his widely noted speech during 
the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy that “I am not convinced” by the 
arguments brought forward by the US administration. (see Telegraph 2003)  
Apart from France and the UK as permanent members of the Security Council, 
Germany’s stance on the war on Iraq was considered to be important, since it chaired 
the UNSC. Overall, the debate on going to war against Iraq enfolded on arguments 
of non-proliferation and Iraq’s non-cooperation with the weapon inspectors. The UK 
government introduced the argument of regime change and its goal to relief the Iraqi 
people only later, in February 2003. But this argument did not become dominant in 
the European context.  
Overall, the context is important to demonstrate that the discourse on going to war 
with Iraq took place outside of established discourses on the meaning of security 
enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The outcome of the 
previous two empirical chapters as well as the following supports this argument. 
ESDP was institutionalised because of a changing self-perception of the EU and its 
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member states. This self-perception included more and more a concept of actorness 
by which the EU was constructed as an international actor. (see Chapter II and III; 
Manners 2002; Rosecrance 1998) The meaning of international actorness referred to 
central meanings of EU identity and EU core principles. These principles focused on 
the people as the principle objects of policies. ESDP was designed to take over crisis 
management in the event that achievements of development policy were jeopardised 
by conflicts. This was the central meaning of security enabling a security policy at 
the EU level and within ESDP. Civilian and military capabilities had to be developed 
in this regard. However, the problems of non-proliferation of WMDs and the breach 
of UN resolutions were not covered by that meaning. On the EU level, no rule was 
constructed allowing for the use of military capabilities as a tool of non-proliferation 
policies. Since this rule did not exist, the debate on going to war against Iraq did not 
connect in any meaningful sense to the meaning of security enabling a security 
policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Discourses on the meaning of security 
established a different logic for the use of force. Hence, the utterances on whether or 
not to go to war against Iraq could not build up on the social order established 
through discourses on the meaning of security.  
The fact that the discourse on going to war did take place outside of established 
discourses on the meaning of security does not mean that the crisis of discourse did 
not affect these discourses or the behaviour of actors within the institutionalised 
setting of ESDP. In the following, I will deconstruct how the crisis enfolded during 
the first half of 2003 and whether or not this affected actors in their processes of 
reasoning. 
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2.1 Letter of eight 
The letter of eight was singed by eight European governments, EU member states 
and candidates alike. It was published in the Wall Street Journal on 30 January 2003. 
(Aznar et al. 2003) The open letter argued for unity among transatlantic partners on 
the question of how to react to Iraq’s non-compliance to the weapon inspections 
agreement and its breach of UN resolutions. Therefore, the letter’s arguments 
centred around two meanings. The first was unity by which the transatlantic partners 
should remember their common values and remain united in the fight against 
international terrorism and Iraq, as being related to this problem by its WMDs. Also, 
it meant that the international community needed to remember its responsibility to 
secure world peace and stability by enforcing international rules. Both aspects 
referred to EU identity. The second meaning was threat to international security. 
This meaning of threat was constructed in a threefold way. It included i) 
international terrorism as seriously questioning or intending to destroy common 
values of the transatlantic partners, ii) Iraq as breaching basic rules of the 
international community, and iii) disunity of the international community itself 
endangering the foundation of world peace. By laying out these two meanings and 
their different aspects, the letter of eight did not include much to which other 
European heads of states or governments could not have agreed. (see Menon 2004: 
638; Howorth 2003: 248) It contained aspects only in regard to the meaning of threat 
which were not previously discussed in discourses on the meaning of security 
enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
In the following, I will first develop the argument that most of the content of the 
letter of eight should not have led to disunity. This will be done by deconstructing 
the narratives which were implemented in the letter of eight. This section will be 
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followed by a section focusing on the way by which the authors agreed on the letter. 
They did this without consulting other EU member states, including the strongest 
opponents of war, France and Germany, as well as the EU presidency. By doing so, 
the signing countries disregarded established rules of interaction and coordination 
established in the context of CFSP/ESDP. (see Smith 2004b: 107) To summarise the 
argument, this section will demonstrate that the content of the letter should not have 
been able to lead other member states to opposition but did so by the disregard of 
established European rules of interaction and cooperation. Therefore, the intensity of 
the crisis of discourse can best be explained by actors’ inappropriate behaviour.  
2.1.1 Unity 
The meaning of unity established within the letter of eight referred to dominant 
meanings of EU identity which were further enhanced by references to the common 
past of Europe and the United States. “The real bond between the United States and 
Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the 
Rule of Law. These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe 
to help create the USA.” (Aznar et al. 2003) This quote was an almost ideal example 
of constructing EU identity and its historic dimension in the traditions of democracy 
and human rights. Identical constructions were made by discourses on EU identity, 
such as in the Laeken declaration which read:  
“Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, 
the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, 
solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others’ languages, cultures 
and traditions. The European Union’s one boundary is democracy and human 
rights.” (European Council 2001e: 20)  
The EU presented itself as a valuable actor who had the right and the obligation 
based on its past to turn the world into a better, more equal, peaceful and prosperous 
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place. (see European Council 2001e: 20) This position referred to the meaning of 
responsibility as an important aspect of EU identity. This perception of European 
history was also established in the letter of eight.  
The link to the US as having the same values was established by constructing the 
meaning of a friendly ‘ping pong game’ of values. The first step established 
Europeans as the sailors of democracy crossing the Atlantic and serving as the 
foundation of the US. (see above) The next step was constructed by the following 
quote: “Thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity and far-sightedness, 
Europe was set free from the two forms of tyranny that devastated our continent in 
the 20th century: Nazism and Communism.” (Aznar et al. 2003) Here, the US played 
back the ball of values to the Europeans. Their values were re-established by the 
‘bravery’ of the US. This finally led to the “transatlantic bond” which was “a 
guarantee of our freedom” and “which has stood the test of time”. (Aznar et al. 2003)  
The historic dimension of the relationship between Europe and the US was used to 
argue for the case of unity even in times of difficult decisions, e.g. in the run up to 
the war on Iraq. “The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the 
current Iraqi regime’s president attempts to threaten world security.” (Aznar et al. 
2003) The historic dimension constituted a somewhat fateful bond of a community 
of values between Europe and the US. This meaning was enforced by the perception 
of international terrorism as a serious threat to these values. “The attacks of 11 
September showed just how far terrorists – the enemies of our common values – are 
prepared to go to destroy them.” (Aznar et al. 2003) In times of international 
terrorism, unity had primary importance to defend not only the values but the very 
existence of the transatlantic partners, since terrorism was perceived as attacking the 
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partnership as such: “[t]hose outrages were an attack on all of us”. (Aznar et al. 
2003)  
This logic perfectly fitted the discourses on EU identity following the events of the 
11 September 2001. For example, the conclusion of the extraordinary European 
Council in Brussels on 21 September 2001 already stated that the “European Council 
is totally supportive to the American people in the face of the deadly terrorist attacks. 
These attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, and multilateral society.” 
(European Council 2001c) One year after the events, the EU jointly stated that “[w]e 
will continue to stand side by side with the United States […] and seek to build a just 
international order that promotes peace and prosperity for all.” (EU 2002) Through 
this framing, the EU constituted itself as being responsible for keeping international 
peace and stability. This responsibility was shared with the US. 
In the letter of eight, the meaning of unity was finally applied to the international 
community. The meaning of unity unfolded among common rules to establish and 
maintain world peace. The “day-to-day battle” to ensure this peace demanded 
“unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all 
countries for whom freedom is precious.” (Aznar et al. 2003) These common rules 
were established by the United Nations Charter which “charges the Security Council 
with the task of preserving international peace and security.” (Aznar et al. 2003) The 
logic behind the construction of unity was that only in unity could common rules be 
forcefully implemented to ensure world peace. In turn, the logic goes as follows: if 
world peace could not be established, the entire world order could fall apart, 
jeopardising the stability of every single state. Hence, if world peace and established 
rules were challenged by any given state, “[t]he solidarity, cohesion and 
determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this [the 
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disarmament of Iraq; the author] peacefully.” (Aznar et al. 2003) To ensure stability, 
unity among the international community was essential. This was also argued in 
regard to the case of Iraq’s non-compliance to UN resolutions and non-proliferation. 
Since the decision was taken unanimously, “[a]ll of us are bound by Security 
Council Resolution 1441”. (Aznar et al. 2003) The meaning of unity called to the 
international community to take their responsibility seriously. 
In contrast, this meaning of unity among the international community differed from 
that which applied exclusively to the transatlantic relationship. The unity among 
Europe and the US was constructed among positive terms. It was established in a 
friendly environment by which each partner supported or enlightened the other with 
values of democracy, human rights, individual freedoms and the rule of law. Unity 
among the international community was constructed on negative connotations, 
arguing that only by unity could challenges of instability or conflict be kept at bay. 
In the letter of eight, unity of the international community was constructed as a threat 
by which disunity threatened international peace. This aspect will be further 
discussed in the section on threats below. 
Overall, the construction of unity among the transatlantic partners, as well as the 
unity among the international community, was not newly invented by the letter of 
eight but referred to already established meanings of unity and responsibility. The 
construction of unity thereby fell into the line of processes of reasoning on the 
meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. 
Therefore, the construction of unity should not have been disputable between EU 
member states or candidate countries.  
Also, the letter of eight was not uncompromisingly forceful on the war in Iraq. It 
stated that if the international community were united on the issue of implementing 
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the UN resolutions on Iraq, the problem could be dealt with peacefully. It therefore 
supported the position of France and Germany, who argued for strengthened weapon 
inspections and further time to evaluate Iraq’s weapons programme. (see UNSC 
2003) In sum, the construction of unity and its implications for further action could 
not serve as the reason for the crisis because it referred to already established 
meanings of EU identity and did not contrast positions of EU member states who did 
not sign the letter.  
2.1.2 Threat 
Three different threats were constructed in the letter of eight. The first meaning was 
terrorism, the second Iraq’s non-compliance and its supposed WMD programme, and 
third, the meaning of disunity within the international community. In the following, I 
will analyse each meaning in order to endorse that, first, terrorism was constructed 
almost equally on the EU level and, second, that the other two meanings were 
constructed differently compared with discourses on the meaning of security 
enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. In order to support these 
claims I will deconstruct the meanings of the letter of eight and compare them with 
those implemented in discourses on the meaning of security.  
Within the letter of eight, international terrorism was constructed as the ‘other’ 
seriously threatening the EU, its transatlantic partners and world peace in general. 
This construction was nothing new at the time of the letter of eight. Immediately 
after the events of 11 September 2001, the EU perceived international terrorism as 
fundamentally opposing European values. This was visible in the discourse of 
international terrorism, which added meaning to that of security institutionalised 
within ESDP. The events of 11 September 2001 were perceived as “terrorist 
attacks”. (Council 2001n: 6) They were “tragic events” (Council 2001l: challenge for 
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development), “terrible” (Council 2001m: 3) and “horrific attacks”. (European 
Council 2001d: 10) All four adjectives established the meaning of unimaginable or 
surreal events. They contain a hint of destiny. Such a meaning was strengthened 
within the Laeken Declaration by the understanding that the terrorist attacks 
constituted a “rude awakening”. (European Council 2001e: 20) This framing was 
related to the construction of EU identity which was shown a little earlier in the text: 
“it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world 
order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights”. (European Council 2001e: 
20) This glory past was brought to an end by the events of 11 September 2001. The 
attacks were perceived as “an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and 
multicultural society”. (European Council 2001c) The Laeken Declaration 
constituted terrorism as a serious threat questioning the very foundation of European 
values or principles. (see above and European Council 2001e)  
This way of perceiving terrorism was similar to how the letter of eight constructed 
the threat produced by terrorists as “the enemies of our common values”. (Aznar et 
al. 2003) Similarities went even further, including the perception of terrorists as 
seeking WMDs. This perception was implemented in the letter of eight, as well as in 
the ESS. (see ESS 2003; Solana 2003a; Solana 2003b) Another similarity of the 
construction of terrorism was the claim that terrorism affected everybody. Terrorism 
was perceived to be a phenomenon with a “global profile […] from which no 
country can consider itself free or safe”. (Council 2003a: 25) This was equal to the 
claim that the threat of terrorism was “one at which all of us should feel concerned” 
as stated by the letter of eight. (Aznar et al. 2003)  
This comparison showed that the meaning of terrorism constructed by the letter of 
eight referred to the meaning of international terrorism implemented through 
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discourses on the meaning of security. But to be clear, at no point in time did 
discourses on the meaning of security implement the logic that ESDP should be used 
to combat terrorism militarily. In contrast to the US’ approach of conducting counter 
terrorism militarily, the EU opted for another way by which regional cooperation, 
development policy and economic as well as social cooperation were intended to 
tackle the very foundation of terrorism. (see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006) In 
this regard, terrorism was perceived to arise “out of complex causes. These include 
the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation 
of young people living in foreign societies.” (ESS 2003: 3) Here, modernisation as 
well as cultural, social and political crises, were connected to situations of 
development or poverty. (see Council 2000e: no8) Crises in this sense related to the 
meaning of globalisation as a process establishing political, economic and social 
interdependence in a highly fragmented world. (see European Council 2003b: 1; 
Council 2003d: XII; Council 2003b: 9) Globalisation put people under pressure who 
were not able to respond to these processes. This understanding opened up a link to 
the development-conflict cycle. From this perspective, the most effective way to 
tackle the cause of terrorism was to solve the problems such as development, 
poverty, inappropriate implementation of human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. Overall, the perception of terrorism was similar in the discourses on the 
meaning of security and the letter of eight, but this did not mean that both opened up 
the possibility to argue for the use of ESDP’s military capabilities to fight terrorism, 
let alone to disarm Iraq as the potential provider of WMDs to terrorist groups.  
In contrast to terrorism, the letter of eight went further in constructing Iraq as a threat 
than simply discourses on the meaning of security. It implemented a clear language 
of how to interpret the situation. “The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass 
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destruction represent a clear threat to world security”. (Aznar et al. 2003) In contrast, 
the conclusion of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 27 January 
2003 did not clearly refer to world security. Rather, it focused on the final 
opportunity of Iraq’s government “to solve the crisis peacefully”. (Council 2003c) 
Combined with the conclusion of the Extraordinary European Council of Brussels on 
17 February 2003 saying that “war is not inevitable”, (European Council 2003a) the 
EU did not implement a forceful stance. The decisiveness of the EU’s position was 
further reduced by saying that the Resolution 1441 gave an “unambiguous message”. 
(Council 2003c) The adjective ‘unambiguous’ in relation to the UNSC resolution 
1441 meant that military action could not be directly deduced from the resolution in 
the case of Iraq’s non-compliance. This perfectly represented the position of France 
and Germany as opponents of the war on Iraq. The interpretation can be further 
validated by the following quote taken from the conclusion of the Extraordinary 
European Council of 17 February 2003: “The Union’s objective for Iraq remains 
fully and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, in 
particular resolution 1441. We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is 
what the people of Europe want.” (European Council 2003a) This clearly reflected 
the stance of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg, if not further EU member 
states.  
In contrast to the official EU documents, the letter of eight implemented a different 
perspective. Iraq was perceived as a threat to world peace and security. Following 
this argument, the authors of the letter of eight argued for the use of military means 
to disarm Iraq. Therefore, they could not refer to the meaning of security enabling a 
security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Although proliferation of WMDs 
was perceived as a threat by the EU as early as 1996-7, ESDP was never designed to 
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militarily solve the problem of proliferation. The problem of proliferation was 
always to be solved by multilateral institutions such as the UN and the IAEA. (see 
Council 2002: 267-8; Council 2003e: 109) Therefore, the idea of going to war in Iraq 
was incomparable to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU 
level and within ESDP. This made the discourse on the war on Iraq a separate 
discourse. 
Finally, the construction of the international community’s division as a threat against 
international peace and security did not directly reflect on discourses about the 
meaning of security. The letter of eight stated that if UN resolutions were not 
complied with, “the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will 
suffer as a result.” (Aznar et al. 2003) By this reference, it became clear the ‘unity’ 
had a negative connotation. The world did not break into chaos only when unity was 
ensured. This perception could not be found in discourses on the meaning of 
security. Here, the UN was perceived to play a fundamental part in maintaining 
international peace and security as well as in providing the framework to authorise 
interventions. (see EU and UN 2003: 217) But this was not to say that by the absence 
of unity, the international order would be seriously damaged. This could not even 
implicitly be read out of the discourse on the meaning of security, which frequently 
contained the phrase: “The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of 
the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international 
stability.” (see European Council 2000b: Annex VI) Here, responsibility for peace 
and stability rested with the UNSC, not with the international community. The 
discourses on the meaning of security implemented a much more institutional 
perspective, while discussing how to ensure the stability and peace of the 
international community. This was visible in the ESS. The EU wanted “international 
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organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to 
international peace and security”, and the EU “must therefore be ready to act” only if 
these rules were broken. (ESS 2003: 9) Here, disunity was not constructed as a threat 
to the international community. Keeping international peace and stability was a 
matter of implementing effective multilateralism as a structural approach.  
Summing up 
Although the EU’s perspective was not much different from the threat perception 
implemented in the letter of eight, various arguments can be brought forward 
demonstrating that the speech act was not successful. First, France and Germany did 
not change their positions following the letter of eight, even though they were the 
strongest opponents of the war on Iraq. Knowing that both countries were members 
of the UNSC, it can be considered that they were the primary addressees of the 
speech act. Second, the EU documents representing the discourses on the meaning of 
security published after the letter of eight did not include disunity as a threat. Within 
the discourses on the meaning of security, the UN was still understood as being 
primarily responsible for maintaining world peace and stability. In contrast, disunity 
was understood to be manageable by effective multilateralism. (see ESS 2003: 9)  
In sum, the letter of eight constituted a meaning of unity referring to already 
established meanings in the discourses of EU identity and the meaning of security. 
This was also true in regard to discourses of global challenges constructing terrorism 
as a serious threat. Whereas European actors could positively ascribe to these 
meanings, this was not possible in regard to the constructions of Iraq and disunity of 
the international community as a threat. Thereby, the authors of the letter of eight 
positioned themselves outside of established discourses on the meaning of security 
enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Although the authors 
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tried to influence the way of reasoning on the war in Iraq through the letter of eight, 
this was not or not completely successful, since the speech act was neither reflected 
within discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU 
level and within ESDP nor did France and Germany change their positions. 
2.1.3 Disregard of Common Rules 
The way in which the letter of eight was created remains a disputed story. What is 
clear is that the authors did not consult all EU member states and candidate countries 
but grouped around heads of states and governments which already had openly stated 
their support of a war on Iraq. What remains unclear was i) the role of the UK 
government as to whether or not it was spinning on the call of the Bush 
administration, and ii) whether or not the editors of the Wall Street Journal pushed 
certain European governments to agree on such a letter on behalf of the Bush 
administration. (see Gonzalez 2003)  
However, the question of whether or not the Bush administration pushed European 
states to publish such a letter was less important in regard to the outbreak of crisis 
than the fact that the authors did not consult other European heads of states and 
governments. Therefore, authors disregarded established rules of coordination 
relevant at the EU level. Since the EPC, cooperation in the field of foreign policy has 
initiated a so called ‘coordination reflex’ which has led EU member states to consult 
each other before taking final positions. (see Smith 2004b: 107-8; Tonra 2003: 740) 
This was obviously not done by the authors of the letter of eight. Therefore, they 
disregarded the European social order of coordinating foreign policy. This was 
perceived as a remarkable and inappropriate behaviour by other states. The reaction 
of Jacques Chirac to the letter of eight and the declaration of the Vilnius Group made 
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this pretty clear. In his reaction he again disregarded established rules. The way in 
which this added to the discursive crisis will be analysed in the following section. 
2.2 Chirac Strikes Back 
The letter of eight, followed by a similar statement of the so called Vilnius Group, 
(see Vilnius Group 2003) did not only make public the disunity among European 
states on the war on Iraq. It finally set off the discursive crisis. Before the letter of 
eight, differences between European states were almost exclusively carried out in the 
context of the UNSC as the international body which had to decide on the course on 
Iraq. The letter of eight brought a European dimension to the discussions because the 
authors explicitly positioned themselves as speaking with their European voices, 
saying that “we in Europe” support the policy of the US administration on Iraq. (see 
Aznar et al. 2003) This initiated ample reactions on the European side. The most 
prominent and highly recognised one was the reaction of French President Jacques 
Chirac following the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 17 February 
2003. In the following I will focus on the circumstances which enabled the 
extraordinary meeting to take place, as well as the reactions of Jacques Chirac in a 
press briefing which followed the meeting.  
Therefore, the section will focus on the second aspect of the analysis deconstructing 
individual speech acts carried out by relevant speakers. Jacques Chirac was a 
relevant speaker, since he was head of state of France and, therefore, integrated into 
the institutional structures on the EU level. He also represented the ‘counter camp’ of 
the letter of eight, arguing against the war on Iraq. He obtained a strong speaker 
position because of two reasons: first, France held a permanent seat in the UNSC, 
which made his opinion highly relevant in regard to the UNSC’s ability to come to a 
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conclusion on Iraq. Second, France was a founding member of the EC and EU and 
remained active in the integration process. This granted Jacques Chirac a highly 
recognised role as a speaker on behalf of European interests. By obtaining this 
position, Jacques Chirac tried to influence the way of reasoning on the war on Iraq, 
as well as on how interaction to reach European common interests should be carried 
out. He acted as a norm entrepreneur trying to implement his way of reasoning to be 
intersubjectively shared. This was similar to what the authors of the letter of eight 
intended. In the following, I will first contextualise the event of the Extraordinary 
European Council as a moment of unity and Chirac’s press conference in which he 
tried to position himself against the letter of eight at a moment of crisis. This will be 
followed by the deconstruction of how Chirac intended to argue for his position. 
Since his reactions almost exclusively addressed the disregard of established rules of 
interaction by the candidate countries, this section will support my argument that 
disputes enfolded exactly here: by the disregard of established rules of interaction 
and cooperation on the EU level.  
The Extraordinary European Council meeting was remarkable in itself. Usually, 
since candidate countries were invited to take part in the European Convention on 
the Future of Europe, they were invited as guests to every European Council – at 
least those countries ready for accession in 2004. On 17 February 2003, during the 
Extraordinary European Council, they were not permitted to remain in the room 
when EU member states discussed the reaction of the EU to the debate on the war in 
Iraq. This was based on a decision of the Greek presidency to limit the number of 
participants to a manageable amount, (see European Council 2003a: 348) which was 
welcomed by Jacques Chirac, if not pushed by him. (Independent 2003a) The 
European Council agreed on a conclusion balanced in its wording which did not 
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clearly position itself on the pro or contra side of the question of war. In public, the 
meeting was perceived as a success in overcoming disputes between EU member 
states. (see Dempsey and Parker 2003) Although candidate countries were not 
included in the discussions, the outcome was accepted by member states and 
candidate countries alike, potentially bringing the debate over Iraq back to reason 
and pushing the discussions back to the UNSC level. (see European Council 2003a)  
This moment of unity was destroyed again by Jacques Chirac by his reactions to the 
letter of eight and the statement of the Vilnius Group. In a press briefing on 17 
February 2003, Chirac was asked to comment on the statement of the Vilnius Group. 
Even if Chirac distinguished between candidate countries who signed the letter of 
eight and those who signed the statement of the Vilnius Group, his response was 
perceived as addressing all candidate countries likewise. (see Bartram 1996; 
Guardian 2003; Independent 2003b) During his response, he went on about what he 
perceived as misbehaviour of the candidate countries. First, he said that “C’est cette 
lettre qui était apparue comme créant une crise ou une mini-crise au sein de l’Union 
européenne, en tous les cas comme contraire à l’idée d’une politique étrangère 
européenne commune, à juste titre.”1 (Chirac 2003) He complained that the letter of 
eight did not support the idea of a common foreign policy. However, when it came to 
the statement of the Vilnius Group, he became more furious.  
“Car entrer dans l’Union européenne, cela suppose tout de même un minimum de 
considération pour les autres, un minimum de concertation. Si, sur le premier 
sujet difficile, on se met à donner son point de vue indépendamment de toute 
concertation avec l’ensemble dans lequel, par ailleurs, on veut entrer, alors, ce 
n’est pas un comportement bien responsable. En tous les cas, ce n’est pas très 
                                                  
1 “It is this letter which occurred as if to evoke a crisis or mini-crisis within the European 
Union, however, opposing the idea of a common foreign policy of Europe.” (translation by 
the author) 
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bien élevé. Donc, je crois qu’ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se taire.”2 
(Chirac 2003) 
By saying that candidate countries who signed the statement of the Vilnius Group 
showed that they were badly brought up and that they missed a good opportunity to 
keep quiet, (see Blitz and Parker 2003) he tried to establish a relationship between 
EU member states and candidate countries in which the candidates clearly were 
reduced to a junior partner. Thereby, Chirac tried to establish a social order in which 
the member states took on the role of privileged actors ordering candidate countries. 
This order was clearly stated by Chirac in another response: “Parce que les uns sont 
candidats et que les autres sont déjà dans la famille. Quand on est dans la famille, on 
a tout de même plus de droits que lorsque l’on demande à entrer, que l’on frappe à la 
porte.”3 (Chirac 2003) He could not clearer on the role of the candidate countries as 
junior partners.  
Overall, the statements of Jacques Chirac were not only undiplomatic but broke with 
established rules of interaction and cooperation. Although the candidate countries 
were not yet members, they never were considered be second in a hierarchy and 
certainly did not have to take orders from any EU member state. This view was 
shared, for example, by Chris Patten, Commissioner of External Relations, saying 
that candidate countries were going to join “a club of equals and everybody has to be 
listened to”. (Independent 2003b) Also, the question of accession never was 
constructed as a matter of sympathy and did not require that accession countries had 
                                                  
2 “To enter the European Union means to recognise each other, it requires a minimum of 
considerations. Indeed, to state at the first glance of difficulties onse own point of view 
without considering the ensemble, to which one wants to become apart of, can not be said to 
be very responsible. In any case, it is not very well brought up. Therefore, I believe they mist 
a good opportunity to keep quite.” (translation by the author) 
3 “Ones are candidates and the others are already members of the family. Being in the family 
means to have more rights than those which apply for membership, more than those who 
knock on the door.” (translation by the author) 
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to run the same tracks as member states. But this was what Chirac suggested. At 
least in regard to Romania and Bulgaria, Chirac said that they were in a delicate 
position in regard to their EU membership because of their signature on the Vilnius 
Group statement. “Si elles voulaient diminuer leurs chances d’entrer dans l’Europe, 
elles ne pouvaient pas trouver un meilleur moyen.”4 (Chirac 2003)  
By these statements, Chirac pushed himself out of the established social order of 
interaction and cooperation. He did not even try to paraphrase his opinion by 
diplomatic wording but bluntly stated his grief about the behaviour of the candidate 
countries. His words were commented upon by almost all heads of states or 
governments of the candidate countries, who were not amused by Chirac’s 
behaviour, saying that it was “totally unjustified, unwise and undemocratic”. 
(Guardian 2003) Or, like the Hungarian Prime Minister Medgyssey, who generously 
overlooked Chirac’s statement because “M. Chirac had spoken ‘at the end of a 
difficult evening’, adding: ‘I understand. These things happen from time to time.” 
(Independent 2003b) Also, Tony Blair stood by the candidate countries, who he 
thought should have been “there at our meeting” and that they were “perfectly 
entitled to express their views”. (Blair 2004) Furthermore, he admired their 
“leadership” which they showed in their attempt to unite the transatlantic partners. 
(Independent 2003b)  
Overall, the reaction of Jacques Chirac demonstrated that the discursive crisis 
unfolded on disregarded rules of interaction and cooperation. The responses of 
Jacques Chirac were widely considered as irresponsible and inappropriate, which 
showed that the dispute enfolded on the disregard of established rules rather than on 
                                                  
4 “If they wanted to reduce their chances of entering Europe they couldn’t have tracked 
better means.” (translated by the author) 
 
Barnutz Chapter IV – The Paradox of Crisis and Success 218 
 
 
subjects. This argument can be further supported by the analysis of the so called 
Chocolate Summit of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg. 
2.3 From Security Policy to Defence Union 
On 29 April 2003, Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg met in Brussels to 
discuss further steps in the development of ESDP at the invitation of Belgium. They 
proposed a variety of steps to make ESDP more effective. They suggested enhanced 
cooperation in the field of security policy, including the possibility for EU member 
states to introduce a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) within the EU 
framework. The final document established a very strong language in calling for the 
EU’s defence. “It is our common conviction that Europe must be able to speak with 
one voice and fully play its role on the international stage. […] The European Union 
must indeed have a credible security and defence policy.” (Belgium 2003: 76) Even 
if these points were not consensus among all EU member states – and especially not 
the idea to establish an ESDU – the meeting did not invent revolutionary ideas which 
could have been considered as being contrary to existing ones. This included the 
UK’s government and its opinion on most points proposed by the Chocolate Summit. 
(see Le Touquet 2003; Lichfield 2003) The following chapter will further support 
this argument by showing that the language on EU actorness and the establishment 
of civilian and military capabilities were similarly as strong as in the final 
declaration of the Chocolate Summit. Indeed, in September 2003, the UK together 
with France and Germany agreed on a paper including similar proposals. (see 
Dempsey 2003c; Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 2003) However, at the time of the 
Chocolate Summit in April 2003, its propositions were perceived by other European 
actors as inappropriate or at least puzzling because the declaration stated: 
“Diplomatic action is only credible – and thus efficient – if it can also be based on 
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real civilian and military capabilities”. (Belgium 2003: 76) Thereby, the sentence 
repeated the argument of those favouring a war on Iraq in order to enforce the UNSC 
resolutions. But this argument was perceived to argue not only for autonomy of the 
EU but to negate the transatlantic relationship, although this was not said in the 
declaration. “We believe time has come to take new steps in the construction of a 
Europe of Security and Defence […] which will also give a new vitality to the 
Atlantic Alliance and open the way to a renewed transatlantic relation”. (Belgium 
2003: 77) But even when the Chocolate Summit called for enhanced cooperation in 
the field of security, this proposal could not explain why the crisis was pushed to its 
final peak – especially since later in the year France, Germany, and the UK agreed 
on similar proposals. (see Peterson 2004b: 20; Biscop 2004a: 524-5) Therefore, the 
question remains puzzling as to why the Chocolate Summit further fuelled the crisis.  
Again, this example demonstrated that the Chocolate Summit did not fuel the crisis 
through its proposals. In contrast, it was perceived as being problematic because 
actors disregarded established rules of interaction and cooperation. The logic was 
different to that discussed above. Although meetings between limited numbers of 
member states were not unusual, the intensity of the crisis made it necessary to 
meticulously follow established rules. In the view of non-participants, this was not 
done during the Chocolate Summit. This argument remains at the centre of the 
following paragraphs, whereby the propositions of the Chocolate Summit will not be 
discussed at length, since most of them were again made by the so called Berlin Mini 
Summit. (see Peterson 2004b: 20) This will make very clear that differences between 
both propositions were minor and bridgeable and that dispute enfolded on the 
disregard of rules. 
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The difference in the declaration of the Chocolate Summit to similar initiatives, 
including the meeting in St Malo in 1998 between France and the UK, was that 
participants did not only propose how to develop ESDP but stated that suggestions 
were implemented un- or bilaterally immediately after the meeting. (see Belgium 
2003; France and the UK 1998) Normally, those types of meetings were used to 
influence the agenda setting. In contrast, participants of the Chocolate Summit not 
only intended to influence the agenda but intended to implement propositions 
without any European wide discussion or agreement. “With regard to the military 
field, we have decided, as far as we are concerned, to implement here and now […] a 
number of concrete initiatives that are meant to bring our national defence 
instruments further together.” (see Belgium 2003: 78) Therefore, the participants of 
the Chocolate Summit openly stated that they were going alone on security and 
defence without awaiting a debate, let alone a decision, on the EU level.  
This was perceived as inappropriate, especially during the crisis over the war on 
Iraq. For other member states, the anti-war stance of the participants of the 
Chocolate Summit, together with the initiative of France in late 2002 to take over the 
mission in Macedonia without Berlin Plus, was proof enough of the one sidedness of 
these actors. The dividing line between pro and cons of a war on Iraq was perceived 
to cut off those who were sticking to the transatlantic relationship from those who 
did not only favour EU’s autonomy but intended to implement it without European 
wide agreement. (see Evans 2003; Riddell and Hurst 2003) It remains a matter of 
speculation whether the participants of the Chocolate Summit were struck by 
surprise by this perception or strategically intended this. However, surprise showed 
in their reaction. This could at least be read out of their utterances following the 
meeting. For example, Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg, said 
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that this summit was “in no way anti-American nor is it an exclusive one”. 
(Dempsey and Dombey 2003) Also Gerhard Schröder, German chancellor, pointed 
out that in “NATO, we do not have too much America, we have too little Europe 
[…] and that is what we want to change.” (Black 2003) By these reactions, 
participants intended to disperse their anti-NATO image and the image that they 
initiated an exclusive European core group on defence. But this could not change the 
perception of the meeting as highly problematic and as widening the difference 
among European partners. (see Menon 2004: 647) 
Summary 
In the above section I have demonstrated that the crisis on the war in Iraq unfolded 
by the disregard of established European rules. At the beginning, the debate on Iraq 
took place in the context of the UNSC. Also, it did not have any logical connection 
to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within 
ESDP, since ESDP was never intended to be used for non-proliferation policies or 
the disarmament of a state that was in breach of UNSC resolutions. The debate on 
Iraq took on a European turn by the letter of eight and the statement of the Vilnius 
Group. Again, the letter did not include aspects to which other EU member states 
could not have agreed. Only the perception of Iraq as a threat to world peace and the 
threat of disunity of the international community were constructed more strongly by 
the letter of eight compared to discourses on the meaning of security enabling a 
security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. But the tipping point leading to the 
crisis outbreak was the very fact that the authors of the letter did not even inform, let 
alone consult, other member states of the EU prior to its publication. It was this 
disregard of established rules which ignited the crisis on the war in Iraq.  
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The crisis was then further fuelled by the reaction of Jacques Chirac following the 
Extraordinary European Council meeting in March 2003 and the meeting of 
Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in April 2003. Both events were marked 
by the disregard of European rules of interaction and cooperation. This was 
particularly true for the outrageous reactions of Chirac, by which he tried to establish 
member states and in particular France as the leader ruling over the candidate 
countries in their bid for membership. He thereby positioned himself outside of any 
European discourse on integration, enlargement and democracy. Compared to this 
remarkable and un-diplomatic behaviour, the Chocolate Summit was just a strategic 
mistake, since the core points of the declaration were later not only affirmed by the 
Berlin Mini Summit but were introduced into the new treaty agreed upon by the IGC 
in December 2003. (see Peterson 2004b: 20) The Chocolate Summit was a strategic 
mistake in the sense that it did transport the image that the anti-war camp intended to 
go alone on European security. Even if the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit did 
not include revolutionary ideas, it failed to re-unite member states because it not only 
proposed ideas for further European wide discussions but included aspects for 
immediate implementation without further consultations. Therefore, the Chocolate 
Summit disregarded central rules of interaction and coordination. This brought the 
crisis over Iraq to its final peak. 
3. Resolving the Crisis 
Shortly after the Chocolate Summit, member states and candidate countries tried to 
solve disputes and misunderstandings. The first initiative – which was already 
planned before the outbreak of the crisis – was the meeting of the Weimar Triangle 
on 9 May 2003, consisting of France, Germany and Poland. Whereas the Weimar 
Triangle meeting was limited in its success, the Berlin Mini Summit of France, 
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Germany, and the UK on European defence taking place on 20 September 2003 was 
the most important endeavour in overcoming the crisis. During the summit, Blair, 
Chirac, and Schröder agreed on a proposal for the development of military and 
civilian capabilities of ESDP and enhanced cooperation, including propositions 
similar to those of the Chocolate Summit. The situation in Europe was finally back 
to normal when the US NATO ambassador called an extraordinary NAC meeting in 
order to discuss fears of the US administration on EU’s autonomy in security 
matters.  
The purpose of the following section is to briefly show that discourses on security 
returned to ‘normal’ and participants resolved their disputes. This will support the 
argument of this chapter that the crisis on Iraq unfolded on the disregard of 
established European rules rather than unbridgeable or dividing ideas on European 
security. However, the next empirical chapter on the period 2003-4 will l analyse in 
detail discourses on the meaning of security and thereby demonstrate that they were 
highly stable – during and especially following the crisis. Therefore, the three 
situations of resolve which need to be considered as external to institutionalised 
discourses do not need to be analysed in detail. To support the argument of this 
chapter, it is enough to show that subjects discussed fell again into the line of the 
established meaning of security. Consequently, the section will briefly present the 
basic line of discussions and agreements of the three events. It will be based on 
newspaper articles and some official press releases. This is not at least due to the 
problem of accessing concluding documents of the three events.  
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3.1 Weimar Triangle 
The Weimar Triangle meeting which took place on 9 May 2003 was part of the 
regular meetings of France, Germany and Poland to initiate good and friendly 
relations, not only on the state but also on the sub-state level. Although the meeting 
was planned before the crisis over Iraq broke out, it was the first time that opponents 
of the war on Iraq officially met and attempted to find common ground to resolve the 
crisis.  
The heads of states and governments of France, Germany and Poland were not able 
to address and solve disputes over the war on Iraq or the breach of trust. The meeting 
produced nothing new on the subjects discussed. Subjects such as the proposals of 
the European Constitution or the policy towards enlargement had already been 
common. (see France 2003; Weimar Triangle 2003) However, the meeting was 
significant because members followed established rules of interaction and 
cooperation and thereby began to resolve the crisis. This was also done by the 
meeting of the foreign ministers of these three countries, which took place three 
weeks later on 26 May 2003 in Warsaw. The foreign ministers highlighted the 
importance to make ESDP more effective, which again was anything but a new idea. 
They called for a European foreign minister to be responsible for CFSP/ESDP, as 
well as for EU’s external relations. Furthermore, they discussed qualified majority 
voting, enhanced cooperation, and strengthening ESDP’s civilian and military 
capabilities. (see France 2003) 
Therefore, the outcome of both meetings, that of the heads of states and governments 
as well as that of the foreign ministers, concentrated on safe issues and left out 
aspects which would have touched the heart of the crisis. (see Simonian 2003) Still, 
both meetings counted as an attempt to solve the crisis because participants followed 
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established rules of interaction and cooperation. This was different compared to 
earlier moments. Also, during the meeting the members of the Weimar Triangle 
agreed to expand discussions from economic issues to those of broader political 
weight and potentially including foreign policy. (see Reed and Simonian 2003). 
Overall, the meeting was remarkable because participants followed established 
European rules and thereby opened up the opportunity to return to ‘normal’ social 
interaction of European actors. Participants signalled their will to follow European 
rules not only inside but also outside of EU institutions at a very early stage. In other 
words, they returned to the social order constituted through discourses of European 
integration and EU identity. The meeting can count as the initial step to overcome 
the crisis which unfolded on the disregard of European rules constituting this social 
order. 
3.2 Berlin Mini Summit 
The Berlin Mini Summit was even more important in solving the crisis because first, 
European rules of interaction and coordination were re-established by the meeting 
and second, during the meeting strong opponents of the crisis agreed on aspects 
which were disputable during the crisis.  
The summit was one in a series of earlier meetings between France, Germany and 
the UK, during which participants discussed issues of European integration and very 
frequently European security. Earlier meetings usually took place in bilateral 
settings, such as between France and the UK in St Malo in 1998 or the latest in Le 
Touque in early 2003, but also between France and Germany as in Nantes in 2001 or 
Schwerin in 2002. The Berlin Mini Summit, however, was an initiative to meet as 
three. In Berlin, the governments intended to find common ground on European 
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security by taking into considerations the draft constitution of the European 
Convention. The meeting applied to established European rules allowing bilateral or 
trilateral attempts to formulate common positions prior to European Council 
meetings. This was common practice in the EU, conducted by a variety of EU 
member states and candidate countries. (see Haine 2003; Missiroli 2003b; Rutten 
2002; Rutten 2001) But the meeting did not only help to overcome the crisis by re-
establishing European rules. It also helped to define common ground on European 
security among three big EU member states which, during the crisis, were not able to 
agree on similar subjects.  
During their meeting in Berlin, the three agreed on a variety of issues which had 
been unbridgeable during the crisis. This included the question of ESDP’s autonomy 
from NATO. The summit’s conclusion stated on autonomy that “we are together 
convinced that the EU must be able to plan and conduct operations without the 
backing of NATO assets and NATO capability”. (see Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 
2003) Although autonomy was not a new idea, the pledge for autonomy was 
perceived as highly disputable during the crisis. Another example of agreement was 
the call for ESDP headquarters to integrate into SHAPE. (Biscop 2004a: 524-5) 
Furthermore, the three regarded structured cooperation as a chance for a limited 
number of member states to cooperate closer in the field of security policy while 
keeping this cooperation open for all EU member states. (see Dempsey 2003c) In the 
conclusion it read that “structured co-operation in security and defence policy should 
be allowed for those countries ready to achieve faster and deeper co-operation”. (see 
Castle 2003a)  
Overall, the three agreed to enable ESDP to conduct operations without using NATO 
assets, including planning and command. (see Black and Wintour 2003) Exactly this 
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point was agitatedly discussed following the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit. 
The remarkable aspect of the Berlin Mini Summit was that almost all points of the 
Chocolate Summit – except the idea of an ESDU – were in one way or the other 
adopted in Berlin. (see Evans 2003) It became clear, when comparing the 
conclusions of the Chocolate Summit and the Berlin Mini Summit, that propositions 
or arguments should not have been able to cause the crisis to break out – at least not 
in its intensity. (see Biscop 2004a: 524-5; Peterson 2004b: 20) Rather, the Berlin 
Mini Summit again supported the argument that the crisis did not unfold on disputed 
subjects but on the disregard of European rules of interaction and cooperation. 
Actors did not apply to these rules during the crisis but again during the Weimar 
Triangle meeting and the Berlin Mini Summit. Hence, no other EU member state or 
candidate country perceived the summits as harassment. 
3.3 Extraordinary NATO Meeting 
The inauguration of an extraordinary NAC meeting in October 2003 was the final 
sign that matters on ESDP and European security had returned to ‘normal’. The 
meeting was called by US NATO ambassador Nicholas Burns to take place on 20 
October 2003. The US administration seemed to be concerned that NATO would be 
kept out of the debate on European security taking place in the run up to the IGC. 
(see Eaglesham et al. 2003) In newspapers, Burns was quoted as saying that the EU’s 
plans on ESDP headquarters were “the most serious threat to the future of NATO”. 
(see Castle 2003b) The US administration thought the IGC not transparent enough 
on the debate on security issues, including ESDP headquarters and the inclusion of 
territorial defence as a goal of ESDP. (see Eaglesham et al. 2003) This impression 
was further supported by the cooperation of the three member states France, 
Germany, and the UK, who agreed on a common position on European security 
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during their Berlin Mini Summit. This was puzzling for the US administration, since 
not much earlier the three had been seriously divided on how to proceed with Iraq. 
For example, during the war in Iraq a decision by the NAC was blocked by France, 
Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg, intended to make available NATO assets for 
the defence of Turkey in the event of war. (see Peterson 2004b: 16) The 
‘reunification’ of France, Germany, and the UK was commented upon by an US 
diplomat saying that “[w]e don’t know where we stand with Blair over EU defence[. 
…] We get one answer from the foreign office, a different one from the ministry of 
defence another from Downing Street”. (see Dempsey 2003b)  
However, by calling for an extraordinary NAC meeting, the US administration re-
constituted a transatlantic division on the question of whether EU’s capabilities 
should be integrated into NATO or organised independently. This was remarkable, 
since during the Iraq crisis Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld – if not the US 
administration – was busy highlighting the differences between i) ‘old Europe’ of 
France and Germany and ii) the candidate countries and thereby establishing a 
division between European partners. (see Rumsfeld 2003) The call for an 
extraordinary NAC meeting demonstrated that the line of division on European 
security did not cross the European continent but the Atlantic. The extraordinary 
meeting was a clear sign that debates were back to ‘normal’, since US 
administrations almost exclusively argued for Europe to take over more burden 
sharing but became anxious if it happened outside of NATO. (see Peterson 2004a: 
617; Peterson 2005) This division was resuscitated by the US ambassador’s call for 
an extraordinary NAC meeting. 
 
Barnutz Chapter IV – The Paradox of Crisis and Success 229 
 
 
Summary 
In the literature, it was perceived puzzling why, on the one side, EU member states 
were engaged in a damaging battle on the question of going to war on Iraq and why, 
on the other side, EU member states agreed on important steps in regard to the 
development and implementation of ESDP, including Berlin Plus and the missions 
of Artemis and Concordia. Within this chapter I have argued that this paradox can be 
explained because discourses on the meaning of security remained robust against the 
pressure of the discursive crisis and the dispute over Iraq. This argument is threefold. 
First, the question of whether or not to go to war against Iraq could not be connected 
to the use of ESDP assets. As I have argued in the previous empirical chapters – and 
as I will do in the following – ESDP was never designed to carry out non-
proliferation policies by force. Therefore, the discussion on the war on Iraq could not 
be meaningfully connected to the EU, let alone ESDP context. In the above, I have 
endorsed that the letter of eight tried to establish Iraq as a threat to which the EU had 
to respond. This speech act was not successful because at no time in the discourse on 
European security was Iraq considered as a threat against which the use of military 
force would have been appropriate. This will again become clear in the following 
chapter analysing the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level 
and within ESDP during the period 2003-4.  
Second, in the run up to the war on Iraq, European actors also discussed how to 
develop ESDP to include enhanced cooperation, military and civilian capabilities, 
and autonomous headquarters at the EU’s disposal. All these suggestions were 
received by fierce reactions from other European actors. The so called Chocolate 
Summit was a prominent example. Despite these reactions, all proposals were 
commonly accepted by opponents after the crisis. This argument was strengthened 
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while comparing the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit and the Berlin Mini 
Summit. In essence, both conclusions covered the same agreements, only differing 
on the proposal of an ESDU. However, when one reads the proposal of an ESDU as 
an example to enhance cooperation in the field of security, the basic idea was again 
reflected in the conclusion of the Berlin Mini Summit. In sum, suggestions did not 
vary fundamentally. Therefore, subjects discussed can not explain the outbreak of 
crisis – at least not its degree of intensity.  
Third, for each individual discursive moment I have argued that, on the one hand, 
subjects discussed or suggested could not count for the eruption of the crisis, since 
neither were they newly invented during the crisis nor did they cause similar 
reactions after the crisis. On the other hand, and that is the third point of the 
argument, I have verified that each individual speech act more or less massively 
disregarded rules of interaction and cooperation established on the EU level and in 
the context of CFSP and ESDP. This finding finally supported my argument that 
inappropriate behaviour – the disregard of established rules – served as an 
explanation for the outbreak of the crisis. 
All in all, the findings of this chapter, together with the other empirical chapters and 
especially the following one on the period 2003-4, demonstrate the robustness of the 
discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and 
within ESDP. Although the discursive crisis of the first half of 2003 had to be 
considered as a strong interruption in the unity of European actors, it did not affect 
let alone destroy the discourses on the meaning of security. In this chapter I have 
demonstrated that the high intensity of the crisis could be explained by the disregard 
of established rules and that the resolve of the crisis started immediately when actors 
again complied with these rules. The following chapter will directly pick up at this 
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argument by analysing the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats, and 
the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity which 
took place during the period 2003-4. Therefore, I will endorse that overall discourses 
on the meaning of security were highly consistent compared with earlier periods. 
And although the processes of reasoning on the new phenomenon of international 
terrorism led to an unprecedented construction of a structural problem of threats as 
being dynamic, this logic was already established by the development-conflict cycle 
during the period 2000-1. Therefore, the next and final chapter will recognise 
changes in the constructions of EU identity, threats, and rules, but these changes will 
be identified as a consistent development of already established meanings. 
Chapter V 
 
Settling in Actorness 
In this chapter, I will analyse discourses on the meaning of security during the period 
2003-4. Discourses within this period were dominated by two aspects. First, the self-
perception of the EU and its role in the world was dominated by a stable and un-
contested construction of EU actorness. This was visible in discourses of EU identity 
as well as of rules of appropriate behaviour. Discourses were affected by the EU’s 
self-perception as a rational international actor who had been able to overcome 
history by cooperation and whose obligation was to help the world to this end by 
supporting cooperation. The second aspect which dominated the discourses of 2003-
4 was the construction of dynamic threats in reference to sense making processes of 
international terrorism and its complex root causes. Overall, both aspects had an 
impact on the construction of EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. 
To start with, I will in the following present an overview of these impacts in regard 
to each discursive field.  
In regard to EU identity, the EU constituted itself as an international actor open to 
engaging in cooperation with, and support of, others when these others recognised 
the EU’s core principles and the international law, and when cooperation followed a 
structured, formalised and legalised approach analogous to the very early steps of 
integration. Discourses on EU identity were dominated by three logics: core 
principles, integration and (international) actorness. The difference in their earlier 
meanings was the preciseness by which they were applied to external actors, 
including clearly defined requirements to be fulfilled by these actors. Here, we can 
see change as development in which discourses were further stabilised and thereby 
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marginalised others by using arguments of continuity. Also, as I will argue later on, 
the discursive crisis following the events of 11 September 2001 enabled a 
reformulation of what was perceived as a threat and helped to strengthen the 
construction of EU identity by juxtapositioning self and other. 
In regard to core principles, EU identity still rested on the same EU core principles 
as in previous periods, e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. (see Manners 2002: 242-3) The new aspect of EU core 
principles was that it made possible the construction of what I call conditional 
identity. It included some EU core principles as obligatory. External actors had to 
observe these in order to be included in cooperation and support policies of the EU. 
When other actors – especially state actors –recognised these core principles, the EU 
understood cooperation to be worthwhile – depending not necessarily on the 
implementation of core principles but on the willingness of actors to take up their 
responsibility to change circumstances for the better. Thereby the EU strengthened 
its external approach as a matter of continuity by keeping in line with its own 
standards while conducting external action also in the field of security. 
Apart from core principles, the construction of EU identity was dominated by 
references to the project of integration as a successful example to overcome war and 
conflict. Integration was constructed to symbolise the only possible approach to 
overcome differences, disputes, development and conflict. Depending on the context, 
the meaning of integration was translated into cooperation varying from 
multilateralism to regional cooperation and the question of effectiveness and 
coherence. The new aspect visible during the period under review here, again, was 
the preciseness of the construction and the enhancement of the EU’s external action. 
This perspective is important to explain the meaning of security. It is hugely linked 
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to the overall external approach and in certain circumstances supports for example 
development policies by other means. 
Both aspects, the central role of core principles and the meaning of integration and 
cooperation, enabled a straight forward construction of EU actorness which included 
a huge variety of different interpretations, such as that of an international actor, 
security actor, economic actor, civilian actor, and pro-active or rational actor. 
However, the EU’s self-perception was dominated by the meaning of international 
actorness, constituting an actor who was acting on core principles and whose 
decisions were based on the experience of successfully overcoming war and conflict 
by cooperation and integration. (see Mitzen 2006: 271) This construction was further 
supported by processes of reasoning following the discursive crisis on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism. They not only affected the EU’s 
understanding of threats but enabled a process of ‘othering’ through which the self 
was more clearly and stringently defined. As a result, this affected rules of 
appropriate behaviour which also were defined more precisely where the use of 
military and civilian capabilities was concerned. This led to a more determined 
construction of the EU’s international actorness in the field of security. 
The construction of threats was dominated by processes of sense making on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism, which enabled the meaning of dynamic 
threats to become generally dominant in discourses of threat constructions. Although 
the reasoning on international terrorism started immediately after the events of 11 
September 2001, in 2003 and 2004 processes of sense making were much more 
settled. Dominant interpretations were the result which affected the construction of 
‘self’ and ‘other’, enabling threat constructions which for the first time included a 
threat to the very existence of the ‘self’. It would be too easy to ascribe every single 
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change in threat constructions to the sense making processes following the discursive 
crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism. In fact, threat constructions on 
terrorism fell onto a fruitful ground by picking up previous tendencies. Probably the 
most prominent example was that of dynamic threats. In the previous chapter 
analysing discourses of the period 2000-1, I have shown that the EU understood 
development and conflict as potentially interrelated, allowing a situation of 
development to easily transform into conflict. This was not called ‘dynamic threat’ 
but in its rationality it was nothing else. Likewise, the EU understood the 
phenomenon of terrorism as being intertwined with other phenomena. Terrorism was 
understood to have its root causes in extreme fundamentalism, for example, which 
again was understood to be interconnected with poverty. Poverty described a 
situation of inappropriate access to food, information, education and the lack of state 
structures to provide these services. From this perspective alone, terrorism was taken 
as a phenomenon relating poverty, weak states and fundamentalism to an extreme 
form of violence. Even when processes of both dynamics were similar, the dynamic 
logic of the development-conflict cycle did not generally affect processes of threat 
constructions. This effect was only ascribed to international terrorism but was then 
constructed as a general characteristic of security problems or threats. Thereby, 
processes of reasoning on international terrorism picked up on already established 
discourses on security problems and threats. As a result, dynamic threats included a 
huge variety of problems such as terrorism, under-development, WMDs and 
proliferation, violence, fragile states and organised crime.  
Furthermore, international terrorism was perceived to question the very foundation 
of the EU’s identity. The events of 11 September 2001 were perceived to show that 
terrorism negated norms and principles of a liberal, freedom oriented society which 
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previously never been a target. Hence, EU core principles were questioned by 
international terrorism. As a response of juxtapositioning, EU core principles became 
more explicitly defined and the risk of being negated was used to legitimise 
responses by EU’s external action in the field of security, including the use of ESDP 
capabilities. ESDP was declared helpful in strengthening or re-establishing state 
structures which again prevented the dynamism described above from taking effect, 
knowing the potential of poverty and other root causes to lead to international 
terrorism. By this process, the EU did not fundamentally change its identity, but it is 
recalibrated and re-constituted in the face of threat constructions. (see Kitchen 2009: 
100) 
Finally, rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity were re-constructed 
in more detail, compared with the period 2000-1. Basically, rules fell into two 
different categories: i) cooperation, and ii) the use of ESDP/EU capabilities. They 
corresponded nicely with the strengthened construction of EU identity. The meaning 
of integration was reflected in rules on cooperation asking for cooperation within 
multilateral structures, regional and bilateral cooperation, structured approaches 
based on different forms of formalised agreements, and finally state building for 
which ESDP was important. The second category of rules dealt with the questions of 
how to use and implement ESDP capabilities effectively and coherently. Whereas in 
2000-1, the institutionalisation of security exclusively corresponded with internal 
logics of effectiveness and coherence, in 2003-4, institutionalisation was equipped 
with an external dimension enabled by dominant constructions of EU actorness.  
In the following I will analyse these constructions, starting with EU identity, 
followed by the construction of threats to EU’s security and ending with the analysis 
of rules of appropriate behaviour. This will finally lead to the conclusion of this 
 
Barnutz Chapter V – Settling in Actorness 237 
 
chapter. As in the previous chapters, I will conduct a discourse analysis using 
relevant texts of the institutionalised discourse as argued in the theory chapter.  
1. EU Identity 
The construction of EU identity during the period 2003-4 was marked by changes in 
the meaning of i) core principles, ii) cooperation, and iii) actorness. These meanings 
were strongly interrelated, unlike in previous periods. Apart from this mutual 
reference, the construction of each meaning showed strong signs of continuity. All 
elements had been part of EU identity constructions in the period 2000-1; only 
during the period 1996-7 did the EU not consider itself as an actor on the 
international stage in the field of security. Thus, the meaning of integration did not 
include effectiveness and coherence as fundamental aspects. In combination, the 
three meanings established the EU as an international actor in the field of security 
deriving its legitimacy to act from its experience of successfully overcoming its war 
shaken past. Within these boundaries, EU actorness was forcefully constructed. 
Furthermore, the construction of EU core principles included principles which were 
understood as being indispensable. This brought a taste of exclusiveness to the 
construction of EU identity arguing, for example, that Balkan countries comply with 
EU core principles. Otherwise they would not be included in the EU’s enlargement 
policy. (see Council 2003c: 16; Council 2003b: 11, 13) Even if the construction of an 
exclusive identity did not dominate the discourses on EU identity, it was visible in 
the discourses and enabled by juxtapositioning in the face of the threat construction 
of international terrorism. 
During this period, integration combined the historic dimension of European 
integration with the meanings of effectiveness and coherence. Again, both aspects 
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had been part of EU identity constructions in earlier periods. But both aspects had 
not been strongly interrelated in previous periods. In 2003-4, the combination of both 
aspects enabled a much stronger construction of EU actorness in the field of security 
as the third important aspect of change in the sense of development by establishing 
continuity of identity constructions – especially after overcoming the identity crisis. 
The re-constituted meaning of integration argued for the right and obligation of the 
EU to act externally. In effect, integration and actorness were mutually constitutive.  
In the following, I will analyse in depth these three meanings. In doing so, I will 
support the argument of this section that during the period 2003-4, EU identity was 
more precisely and stably defined, based on the interrelation of the three meanings. 
1.1 Core Principles 
This section looks at changes in the construction of core principles. They included 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. (see previous 
chapters; Manners 2002: 242-3) They remained basically the same in the period 
2003-4. (see Council 2003h: 9; Council 2004e: 14; Council 2004n: V) However, two 
aspects were important while focusing on changes: first the list of European core 
principles had been further expanded and unfolded to include sub-principles of how 
core principles could be defined in more detail. It can be argued that these more 
detailed definitions were enabled the identity crisis from which the EU suffered 
following the treaty revisions of Nice which led to the Laeken process and the 
inauguration of the Convent on the Future of Europe. The EU realised that it did not 
apply to its own expectations of being an international actor in the field of security, 
for example. (see European Council 2001e: Laeken Declaration) And second, within 
the discourses, EU core principles and sub-principles were put together to define a 
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very essence to which external actors had to ascribe to in order to be considered 
(more) ‘self’. This is what I call conditional identity. Conditional in the sense that 
only when external actors displayed at least their willingness to establish core 
principles, did the EU understood these actors to be(come) more ‘self’. The actual 
content of conditional identities varied in time and space but core principles and their 
sub-principles were always the reference points. (see Petrov 2008) 
Before analysing the construction of conditional identities, the next section focuses 
on the construction of sub-principles. This is important to understand the 
construction of conditional identities. Sub-principles translated core principles into 
more detailed requirements of how to implement EU core principles. Their 
implementation could be evaluated more easily, which again helped to define 
conditional identities. 
1.1.1 Sub-principles 
The construction of sub-principles built up on EU core principles. On a less abstract 
level, sub-principles defined conditions which were supposed to lead to the 
implementation of core principles. In discourses of EU identity as well as rules of 
appropriate behaviour, these conditions required effectively established states. 
(Council 2003g: 11; Council 2004u; Youngs 2004) Therefore, sub-principles 
referred to human rights and democracy asking for “social cohesion, ethnic and 
religious tolerance, [and] multiculturalism”, and as “a critical element of democratic 
reform” sub-principles were required to ensure “civilian control over the military”. 
(Council 2003b: 12, see also Council 2004p: 14) Detailed sub-principles were also 
implemented in the conclusion on Angola, asking for:  
“a pluralistic democracy based on institutional strengthening of the parliamentary 
process and a multi-party system as well as capacity building to foster a dynamic, 
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participatory civil society; […] to reinforce overall administrative capacity, 
creating a coherent and functional country-wide administration and market 
oriented policies, and to strengthen capacities in the legal and judicial system”. 
(Council 2003m: V)  
All these sub-principles, which in the quote were applied to external partners, built 
up on EU’s core principles. They were meant to establish a “prosperous and stable” 
(European Council 2003b: 25, also Council 2004t: 23-4) state in which the civilian 
population could “live in freedom, dignity and prosperity” (European Council 2003e: 
32) “with a representative government and a thriving civil society” (European 
Council 2003b: 25; see Council 2004m: 24) which were “at peace with its 
neighbours and an active member of the international community”. (European 
Council 2003e: 32; Council 2004q: 8; European Council 2003e: 14) In all these 
examples, core principles were the reference point of sub-principles. For example, 
the meaning of justice referred to the rule of law; (see Council 2004q: 8; Council 
2004f: 12) strengthening the civil society and conducting elections referred to 
democracy; (see Council 2003m: IV; Council 2004g: 16) and tolerance and freedom 
of speech referred to human rights. (see Council 2003b: 12; Council 2003f: 9) 
The list of sub-principles could be expanded in ever more detail. The important 
aspect, however, was that core principles were equipped with sub-principles. In 
discourses, these sub-principles almost exclusively were constructed as the EU’s 
requirements to be implemented by external actors. Implementation was perceived 
necessary to solve crisis or conflict situations, although no single list of sub-
principles could be identified applying systematically to every conflict situation. (see 
Youngs 2004: 532) The construction of sub-principles, in reference to core 
principles, mutually constituted logics of appropriate behaviour. These changes were 
enabled mainly by three processes of change: first, in the aftermath of the identity 
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crisis of the EU, the EU had to strengthen its effectiveness and coherence of its 
external action and especially security policy. Second, the construction is a matter of 
continuity translating central aspects of EU identity into sub-principles leading its 
external action and security policy. And finally, as a matter of juxtapositioning, the 
meaning of EU’s actorness in the field of security became more dominantly defined 
facing the threat of international terrorism and dynamic threats more generally. In 
sum, this enabled the construction of sub-principles which enhanced core principles 
by detailed rules of how to translate them into action using civilian and military 
capabilities of ESDP. This can be demonstrated on the sub-principle ‘justice’. 
Justice 
The meaning of justice referred back to the core principles rule of law and 
democracy. The meaning itself was not differently defined from other European 
contexts, such as on national levels. (see Locke 1991; Montesquieu 1959) However, 
the meaning was introduced dominantly into European discourses on EU identity 
and rules of appropriate behaviour while highlighting its external dimension. 
Disregard of this principle by other states was perceived as potentially leading to a 
security problem. (see Council 2004g: 16) Hence, the use of civilian and sometimes 
military capabilities to re-establish order and the rule of law was understood to be 
generally appropriate. 
The Council’s declaration on the African Great Lake Region endorsed this meaning 
of justice: the EU intended to “create a just and lasting peace based on democratic 
principles, fostering truth and reconciliation while achieving justice.” (Council 
2004t: 23) It emphasised “the importance of combating impunity and of bringing 
criminals to justice”. (Council 2004t: 23) The EU highlighted that people who 
disregarded the law “cannot go unpunished”. (Council 2003f: 17) These claims were 
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as much self-referential, constructing EU identity, as they constituted the EU’s 
perspective of the world surrounding it. “The EU praises the determination of the 
authorities […] to bring the perpetrators to justice.” (Council 2003h: 7) Therefore, 
the EU supported authorities by implementing sub-principles, such as by the 2004 
EU rule of law mission in Georgia. (see Council 2004k: 14) By this operation, the 
EU did not only constitute its actorness but also the sub-principle of justice as an 
important part of its identity.  
In sum, the definition of justice was not innovative or different to other contexts but 
its applicability to the EU’s perception of the world was remarkable. It exemplarily 
showed that underlying core principles were translated to become more easily 
evaluable. Based on sub-principles, the EU was enabled to pin down distinct 
differences between its ‘self’ and the behaviour of other actors identifying their non-
compliance with EU core principles. When the EU condemned “in the strongest 
terms the atrocities recently committed”, (Council 2003c: 10) the EU implemented a 
rule which authorised the suspension of cooperation. Also, it allowed the 
implementation of sanctions, (see Council 2004c) or a structured approach in regard 
to multilateralism. (see Council 2004i: 6; European Council 2004c: 14) And finally, 
civilian and military capabilities were made available for state building operations 
which not only were used to implement justice, order and the rule of law but also to 
train national actors in third countries to make the state system more effective. (see 
Council 2003a: 8; European Council 2004b: 45) Through these responses, the EU 
stabilised its actorness.  
1.1.2 Conditional identity 
What I call ‘conditional identity’ of the EU built up on the sub-principles defined 
above. The notion can be translated into ‘conditions to become more self’, 
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constituting a border which had to be crossed by external actors in order to be 
considered a partner worth inclusion in EU’s external cooperation. This aspect is 
centrally important when it comes to the construction of threats or security problems. 
Conditional identities support the juxtapositioning of self and other leading to the 
construction of threats or security problems when the other is perceived as different 
or not willing to become more self. Accordingly, implementing “all the needed 
reforms” was perceived necessary in order to “rapidly further advance towards 
European structures and notably the EU”. (Council 2003h: 7) Although this example 
of the Western Balkans especially addressed what potentially could turn into 
enlargement policy, it showed the construction of conditional identity and the likely 
effect when the countries do not apply to the conditional identity. The process of 
advancing towards European structures was conditional, since “needed reforms” had 
to be implemented. The phrasing of ‘needed reforms’ exemplified the conditionality 
of this process. Needed reforms referred to a conditional identity including similar 
sub-principles as developed above. (see Council 2003o: VI)  
The EU core principles and sub-principles which constituted various connotations of 
conditional identities changed over time and space. Also, in the field of security they 
are not or far less formalised compared with the EC’s external relations in the field 
of economic or political cooperation where the EU intends to export its acquis 
communautaire. (see Petrov 2008: 35) But similar to that field, the EU applied 
different conditions to different contexts. They varied from Nigeria to the Western 
Balkans and again to Rwanda, for example. (see Council 2003o: VI; Council 2003h: 
7; Council 2003d: VII) In regard to Rwanda, these conditions encompassed “to 
ensure that all Rwandans can enjoy constitutional rights, including freedom of 
expression, and to promote the fully inclusive involvement of Rwandan society […] 
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in the country’s political development, which remains a precondition for real 
economic and social progress in Rwanda.” (Council 2003d: VII) In other words, the 
conditional identity recognised principles which had to be established by the 
Rwandan government in order to gain support for its economic and social progress 
by the EU. A similar logic was implemented vis-à-vis Belarus. (see Smith 2005: 
770)  
Even when this approach was not totally new to the EU’s external relations, (see 
Allen and Smith 1999: 100; Petrov 2008) the interesting aspect of these 
constructions was not so much to which principles they referred. The fact that the 
construction of EU identity included an external dimension openly requiring almost 
identical standards from external actors is a remarkable process. It is worth noting 
that in 1996-7, the EU perceived it inappropriate to point the way ahead to external 
actors. (see Council 1997k: Africa) Compared to that, the construction of conditional 
identities was almost revolutionary. The EU transferred founding principles of EU 
identity to be applicable to external actors and thereby argued others to apply to 
these principles. During the period 2000-1, the EU still focused on the 
implementation of responsibility, only. Following this logic, the EU considered its 
engagement after actors had taken up their responsibility. But the EU did not define 
in detail what the actors in question had to implement. In 2003-4, the implementation 
of EU core principles was understood to be “for the benefit of the people”. (Council 
2003h: 7) This perspective was enabled by the experience of the integration process. 
From the EU’s perspective, required principles already served the people of Europe 
for the better, and they would do the same for other people in other regions. When 
these core principles were not established the EU, by following its responsibility for 
the people, perceived it necessary to implement external action and if necessary and 
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appropriate security action. As I will argue in the section on rules, the situation had 
to meet certain criterions before the EU considered to be active. 
In order to enhance cooperation with the EU, states had to implement these 
principles – or at least show responsibility in trying to implement them. This again 
constituted change in the construction of EU identity. Whereas previously, 
responsibility was already a dominant meaning in the discourses, its disregard by 
external actors was not perceived as an act which made EU’s action necessary. This 
was not the case in the period 2003-4. The EU perceived non-compliance with, or 
disregard of, these principles as security relevant. Moreover, in some situations, the 
construction of conditional identities was pushed even further carrying an exclusive 
tone enabling self and other constructions more easily. The Council “encouraged 
intensified work […] to finalise, without any delay” the implementation of sub-
principles “in order to allow for further progress towards the EU”. (Council 2003c: 
16) It reaffirmed “that there is no alternative” to do so. (Council 2003c: 16) This 
established a very strong language arguing for the implementation of EU core 
principles without any conciliation to alternatives narrowing down the road of 
inclusiveness to enable  self/other constructions more easily.  
Even though the construction of exclusiveness did not dominate the discourses in the 
period 2003-4, the tone of exclusiveness was frequently used in EU’s external 
cooperation, such as with the Western Balkans, which established the admonition of 
potentially being excluded from the EU’s enlargement policy. This at least 
underlined the importance of what I call ‘conditional identities’ to the construction of 
the EU’s approach to the world surrounding it. By conditional identities, EU core 
principles and their sub-principles were translated into universally binding 
principles. External actors were required to implement them. If not, the EU was able 
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to perceive this as a threat to its identity and as irresponsible of the actors in question 
leading to the need to implement external action potentially including security 
measures. 
1.2 Cooperation 
The meaning of European integration added fundamentally to the construction of EU 
identity from the very beginning. In previous chapters I have shown that integration 
was understood to be a process of cooperation by which European states themselves 
were able to overcome their war shaken past. This meaning still existed in the period 
under review here. However, within discourses of European integration and 
international order, another underlying logic of both integration and cooperation 
became visible. Interdependence was perceived to be the result of integration and 
cooperation. The notion of interdependence probably leads almost every reader to 
immediately think of an economic and social process which was enabled or caused 
by globalisation. This is not the meaning here. In the discourses, interdependence 
was constructed as an effect of cooperation having a very positive connotation. It 
was understood as the guarantor of successful integration and cooperation because 
interdependence disabled free riding and turned actors’ benefits into mutual benefits. 
In this logic, actors were no longer able to act alone but had to work together to 
achieve successful integration or cooperation. This way of reasoning affected the 
EU’s security policy because security was not only defined as the absence of conflict 
or violence but real security was only reached through cooperation and integration 
leading to a prosperous development. This perspective was derived form the EU’s 
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past and strongly linked together security policy and development – the second being 
security policy by other means.1 
In general, the Council “highlighted the need to […] strengthening co-operation and 
interdependence”. (Council 2003i: 7) In this regard, enlargement was perceived to 
present “a unique opportunity to strengthen co-operation and interdependence”. 
(Council 2003i: 7) Interdependence was also welcomed in regard to military 
capabilities. Here, the Council recognised that “a degree of interdependence already 
exists in Europe as a result of current co-operation on major defence equipment 
programs”. (Council 2003b: III) Interdependence was also recognised in regard to 
transatlantic relations. In order to “reassert the fundamental importance of the EU-
US relationship”, the Council understood it as key to emphasise “the far reaching 
transatlantic interdependence linking our economies together”. (Council 2003p: 2)  
These quotes make explicit the link understood to exist between cooperation and 
interdependence. The meaning of interdependence was constructed as the logic and 
positive outcome of cooperation. This perspective was based on the rational that 
cooperation enabled peaceful and fruitful actors’ relations and hence a meaning 
which gained more support over time by dominant discourses on integration and 
cooperation. European integration was the most prominent example in this regard. 
Here, structures of cooperation were established which bound together actors who 
previously were divided in conflict. These structures led to interdependence, which 
disabled free riding but bound actors together in acting cooperatively in the faith of 
their mutual benefits. In this sense, interdependence was understood to be the very 
positive result of cooperation.  
                                                  
1 This perspective is not only based on the EU’s experience of overcoming its war shaken 
past. It is also reflected in the definition of poverty and led to the development conflict cycle.  
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From this perspective, gain for cooperation was simply the rational way to secure 
Europe “in a better World”. (ESS 2003) The meaning of interdependence thereby 
supported the perspective that cooperation was a feasible approach to establish 
peaceful relations among international actors, to solve conflicts on a regional and 
sub-regional level, and to establish development, wealth and prosperity. Since 
European integration secured these positive outcomes for Europe, and since 
cooperation was nothing else than the translation of externally applying integration, 
the EU necessarily opted for cooperation as the very concept for its external action 
including security policy. Therefore, cooperation with regional organisations was the 
prioritised choice of the EU to establish cooperation because they already bring 
about a certain degree of cooperation. (see Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 550)  
1.3 EU’s Actorness 
The EU constructed itself as an actor of international range with a distinct 
understanding of the world and its problems, interests directing its action, and 
capabilities establishing the EU’s actorness in the field of security on the ground. 
The meaning of actorness in the field of security was already introduced to the 
discourses on EU identity and European integration in 2000 and 2001. However, in 
the period under review here, the meaning of actorness was much more routed in the 
EU’s self-perception including a broader understanding of how this actorness could 
be practiced also in terms of security policy. This could be seen in the broader 
variety of established types of actors. For example, the EU constituted itself as an 
international actor, (European Council 2003e: 22) regional actor, (Council 2004j: 18) 
civilian actor, (Council 2003j: 8), security actor, (Council 2004g: 8-9), and economic 
actor. (Council 2003g: 8) All types of actorness required different action constituting 
the EU actorness in question. The most central and dominant meaning was that of 
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international actorness including security policy dimensions Overall, constructions 
of actorness had never before so clearly dominated the construction of EU identity. 
Two aspects were central to this new development. First, the EU used a very 
emotional and affective language to constitute its actorness. This included direct 
references to EU core principles and other constitutional aspects of EU identity. 
Also, it included the construction of an exclusive character of EU identity. Especially 
in regard to the discourses of international terrorism, the EU positioned itself as the 
good and lawful opposition of terrorism. This perception built up on the logic that 
the process of European integration was a success story, giving the EU the ability 
and duty to bring similar results to the people outside of the EU. First, I will discuss 
this aspect under the header ‘EU’s global pride’. Second, this self-perception 
resulted in a strongly constructed actorness which was equipped with different 
connotations, depending on the context to which the actorness applied. Although the 
meaning international actorness was the most dominant, types of actorness depended 
on the context of EU’s external action. These aspects of actorness will be analysed in 
the final part of this section while focusing on international actorness and security 
actorness as the most relevant to the meaning of security. 
1.3.1 EU’s Global Pride 
Probably the most powerful phrase by which the EU constituted itself as an 
international actor of good could be found in the ESS: “Europe should be ready to 
share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” (ESS 
2003: 1) The ESS was the first document by which the EU visibly announced its 
overall approach to international relations and security policy. It was developed in a 
situation of discord within the EU, when heads of states and governments of EU 
member states were divided on the question of the war in Iraq. From this perspective, 
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the ESS may well have been an initiative to publicly overcome these differences 
while highlighting common ground. But it would be wrong to understand the ESS 
exclusively in this way. In the previous chapter I have shown the robustness of 
European discourses and those relevant to the meaning of security enabling a 
security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Following this argument, the ESS 
was a product of the EU’s self-perception and its growing awareness of being an 
international actor. 
In the following, I will show that the EU’s actorness was constructed in reference to 
the integration process as a force of good not only for the European people, but as an 
ideal example to overcome conflict and crisis, and capable of initiating prosperity 
anywhere on the planet. From this perspective, EU’s actorness on the international 
stage was not only logical but necessary. I will also show that this perspective was 
further supported by the reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. 
The way in which international terrorism was perceived enabled the construction of 
EU’s actorness as its juxtaposition representing the peaceful, freedom orientated and 
integrating way of life. In this regard, the construction of actorness and the role of 
the reasoning on international terrorism was a matter of continuity. To show this, I 
will – where helpful – refer to moments of discourses on the immediate aftermath of 
the events of 11 September 2001. This served as the starting point of understanding 
this phenomenon. 
Within the ESS, the process of European integration was argued to provide the 
legitimacy and right of the EU to act on the international stage and to gain similar 
results for world wide. “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. 
The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace 
and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union 
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has been central to this development.” (ESS 2003: 1) In this quote, the European 
integration process was set in relation to the well being of European states and its 
people in today’s world. This was further approved in the document while claiming 
actor status for the EU, based on EU’s capabilities. These capabilities were 
understood to be the outcome of the successful process of cooperation and 
integration. “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a 
quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of 
instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player.” (ESS 
2003: 2) And finally, these aspects were understood by the EU to become an 
international actor in the area of security and stability. “The increasing convergence 
of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us 
a more credible and effective actor.” (ESS 2003: 1) 
Apart from the ESS, the language used within the Athens Declaration of the 
European Council celebrating the signing of the accession treaty of the new members 
constructed EU’s actorness on similar grounds.  
“This Union represents our common determination to put an end to centuries of 
conflict and to transcend former divisions on our continent. This Union represents 
our will to embark on a new future based on cooperation, respect for diversity and 
mutual understanding.” (European Council 2003c: 1) 
Although the declaration reproduced the understanding of the successful integration 
process as the reason for the EU to play an active role externally, it also was busy in 
constructing EU identity as contrasting a significant ‘other’. This significant ‘other’ 
was constituted by international terrorism. The declaration read: “We are proud to be 
part of a Union founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. 
A Union committed to furthering respect for human dignity, liberty and human 
rights. A Union devoted to the practice of tolerance, justice and solidarity.” 
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(European Council 2003c: 1) All these aspects clearly referred to EU core principles, 
and it was difficult up to this point to see that they were used for boundary drawing. 
This only became clear later in the text when, in reference to “challenges of 
tomorrow”, the text read: “We will continue to uphold and defend fundamental 
human rights, both inside and outside the European Union, including the fight 
against all types of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion 
or convictions, disability, age or sexual orientation.” (European Council 2003c: 1) 
Here, international challenges were constructed as jeopardising the cornerstones of 
EU identity. This way of threat construction was unprecedented. One of the most 
prominent international challenges of that time was international terrorism. The 
quote above referred to challenges caused by international terrorism. In order to fully 
understand the meaning of these challenges, it is necessary to analyse the 
construction of EU identity vis-à-vis the processes of reasoning on the events of 11 
September 2001 and others ascribed to the phenomenon of international terrorism. In 
order to do so, it is central to briefly describe how the events were perceived by the 
EU. This section will add to what has been analysed in chapter IV. However, the 
section on threat constructions later in this chapter will analyse the processes of 
sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism in further detail. 
The phenomenon of international terrorism was constructed as unpredictable, 
disregarding any established rule of peaceful coexistence. (see Council 2001n: 6; 
Council 2001m: 3; European Council 2001d: 10; Council 2001l: challenge for 
development) It was juxtaposed by the well being of Europe and the world prior to 
the terrorist threat. (see European Council 2001e: 20) Based on this unequivocal 
reasoning on the phenomenon of terrorism, EU identity was re-constituted regarding 
the construction of EU actorness and actor-like capabilities. In general, European 
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core principles and other aspects of EU identity remained the same. But the 
constitution of EU actorness was never as strongly argued as following the events of 
11 September 2001. EU identity was still based on democratic principles, the rule of 
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the argument had changed 
dramatically how EU core principles added to the meaning of international actorness. 
“Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new 
world order, that power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point 
the way ahead for many countries and people?” (European Council 2001e: 20) In 
that sentence, the EU was constructed as the origin of democracy and human rights 
referring to the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the French Revolution. The EU 
presented itself as a valuable actor who had the right and the obligation to turn the 
world into a better, more equal, peaceful and prosperous place. This position referred 
to actor-like capabilities constructed within the period 2000-1. They included the 
ability to learn and to use experience for future action, making it more effective, 
coherent and just. “Constant renewal, while learning from our rich traditions and 
history, is our very nature”. (European Council 2003c: 2) The perspective of being 
an actor which had the right and obligation to make the world ‘a better place’ was 
also reflected in the ESS title. Such a construction of obligation or duty to act 
internationally did not exist prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Also, the EU 
never declared itself dedicated to advising other actors on their way forward. 
The EU constructed itself as an international actor not merely by choice but by duty. 
“The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, 
all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s 
heartrending injustices.” (Council 2001l: 20) This perspective did not only occur as 
an impulsive reaction to the “horrific attacks” in 2001. (European Council 2001d: 
 
Barnutz Chapter V – Settling in Actorness 254 
 
10) However, in 2003 and 2004, this perspective shaped EU identity. “We are 
committed to facing up to our global responsibilities.” (European Council 2003c: 2; 
see European Council 2004a: 1) In regard to international terrorism, the EU wanted 
to “continue to fulfil as a first priority its responsibility to prevent and eradicate this 
threat”. (Council 2003c: 25) From the EU’s perspective, terrorist violence was 
understood to be “unjustifiable in any place or under any circumstances. No pretext, 
be it political, ethnic or religious, can be invoked to condone it.” (ibid) This is the 
reason why the EU claimed that “the fight against all types of discrimination on the 
basis of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or convictions, disability, age or sexual 
orientation” (European Council 2003c: 1) was necessary. 
At this point, EU identity turned out to at least be equipped with an exclusive 
moment. By strengthening actorness through juxtapositioning, EU identity was more 
than ever about boundary drawing. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the 
EU strengthened its perspective to be a just and valuable international actor whose 
duty was to “point the way ahead” (see above) for other actors on the international 
stage. It also limited its cooperation and openness “only to countries which uphold 
basic values”. (European Council 2001e: 20) EU identity constructions included 
boundaries between the EU and those who refused EU core principles. 
Consequently, on the one hand, EU identity was marked by an exclusive moment 
which more clearly enabled the differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’. On the 
other hand and more generally, the EU strengthened its self-perception of being an 
international actor arguing the success of its integration process as legalising its 
external action.  
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1.3.2 Types of Actorness 
Within the discourses of EU identity, different types of EU actorness were 
constructed. They affected the way in which the EU perceived the world surrounding 
it. In general, the EU most often perceived itself as an international actor. This type 
of actorness corresponded with the meaning of cooperation, EU core principles and 
conditional identity as well as effective multilateralism. For example, effective 
multilateralism was perceived as the only logical way to organise cooperation among 
the international community, following the logic of the European approach to 
integration. Also, another type of actorness was important in regard to the meaning 
of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The EU 
constructed itself as a security actor conducting crisis-management operations 
outside of the EU by using military and civilian capabilities. The meaning of security 
actorness established the link between ESDP and development policy, understanding 
the use of military and civilian capabilities to (re-)establish state structures in order 
to prevent crisis situations which could jeopardise improvements of development 
policies. (see Faust and Messner 2005: 425; Chapter III: 2.1) The way in which 
ESDP was to support development policies was explicitly constructed for the first 
time during the period 2003-4. The use of military and civilian capabilities did not 
only focus on the support of development policy, rather it was constructed as an 
equal tool of the EU’s foreign policy. This change can be categorised as 
development in the sense that the EU followed a grand design of a well established 
and recognised international actor. This grand design led the EU to reach for a 
security policy and autonomous capabilities to support it. Also, as I will show in the 
section on rules of appropriate behaviour, this construction became possible in 
reference to the underlying logic of security challenges as being dynamic.  
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These two aspects of EU actorness, i.e. international and security, did not cover all 
but most relevant to the thesis in the period 2003-4. Although an even greater variety 
of types of actorness was implemented in the discourses, the named two especially 
added to the meaning of security institutionalised with ESDP. They will be analysed 
in the following sections.  
International Actor 
The meaning of international actorness was already introduced into the discourses of 
2000 and 2001. Its basic meaning remained the same in the period 2003-4. However, 
the construction of international actorness became more dominant over time by a 
process of contestedness which led to the dominance of the interpretation of the EU 
as an international actor. This can be exemplified by the fact that national foreign 
policies of EU member states were presented as counting for EU’s external action. 
This aspect will be addressed in the following. 
A very interesting turn in the construction of EU’s actorness was the perception that 
EU member states’ foreign policy added to the EU’s external action. Although this 
perspective did not dominate the construction of EU actorness, the reference to 
member states’ foreign policy was frequently implemented in the discourses of 
actorness. This way of constructing EU actorness was remarkable especially in 
relation to member states’ involvement in post war Iraq and Afghanistan. (see 
European Council 2004b: 46; European Council 2004c: 20) The presentation of 
member states’ action as constituting EU’s actorness was enabled by the 
understanding of effective multilateralism as a special form of cooperation. The logic 
went as follows: EU member states, while supporting the UN, helped to implement a 
constitutive moment of the EU’s international actorness, e.g. effective 
multilateralism. Since the implementation of effective multilateralism was a general 
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goal of the EU, member states’ support of UNSC resolutions was easily presented as 
falling in line with the EU’s objectives. Afghanistan was a prominent example in this 
regard. EU member states’ action was presented as contributing to EU’s international 
actorness. EU member states’ engagement in Afghanistan in contributing to the 
“importance of the international military presence” was perceived to pave the way 
for “future EU involvement” in state building. (Council 2004o: 14; see European 
Council 2004c: 20) Therefore, member states’ engagement was constructed as a 
pretext of EU involvement by which member states implemented the EU’s policy 
approach through their national policies. 
This way of constructing EU actorness was new in the period 2003-4. Even if 
references to EU member states’ action could be found in earlier periods, it was 
never related systematically to the EU’s objectives. (see Bono 2004: 452) This way 
of constructing demonstrated change in the construction of EU actorness as a 
meaning starting to dominate not only the EU but also the member states level. Also, 
this argument was very helpful for presenting the ability and capacity of the EU to 
apply to its own standards of being an international actor in the field of security. In 
previous times, the EU’s external action and security policy was perceived to be 
different from the individual member states policies. By arguing for the inclusion of 
individual foreign and security policies, the EU’s approach became a stronger 
outlook.  
Security Actor 
Growing self-confidence was also visible in the construction of security actorness as 
the type applying to the context of using military and civilian capabilities. This type 
was reflected in the institutional developments and capacity building which enabled 
the EU to act externally using its military and civilian capabilities. The first military 
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and civilian operations supported the construction of this type of actorness. (see 
Ulriksen 2004: 469) 
In 2003, the EU conducted its first military and civilian operations. The first military 
operation (Artemis) was deployed in the DRC in order to implement an UN mandate 
to stabilise the Ituri region in the north-east Congo and to support the UN mission in 
the DRC (MONUC) which facilitated the Lusaka Peace Agreement. (see Ulriksen et 
al. 2004511-2) The conditions of the operation were defined as explicitly limited to 
prevent the risk of confrontation with unexpected violence. (see Biscop 2004b: 7; 
Missiroli 2003b: 99) Overall, the military and civilian operations were used to 
construct the EU as a security actor. For example, the Council underlined “that the 
year 2003 has witnessed remarkable progress in the field of ESDP, notably by the 
successful launch and conduct of three crisis management missions” (Council 2003j: 
7; see Menon 2004: 642), not only including the military operation Artemis but also 
the civilian operation in Macedonia (Concordia) and the European Union Police 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPOL).  
The starting point for these policies was that state building, conflict resolution, 
conflict management, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement were the central aims of 
the EU’s security actorness. (see Council 2003j: 8; Council 2003g: 11; Council 
2003c: 8; Council 2004g: 8-9) These aims were reached by i) financial support and 
therefore through development policy, (see Council 2004l: 13) or by ii) providing 
support for state building by civilian means, such as the integrated police units (IPU) 
or by iii) the use of military capabilities to establish security or (re-)construct state 
structures. (see European Council 2004c: 20) The Council “confirmed that the EU 
now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks”. (Council 
2003c: 8) In other words, the EU’s civilian and military operations finally pushed the 
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EU to apply to its self-perception as capable of preventing situations of conflict to 
harm achievements of its development policies. The necessity of this ability was 
already identified in the period 2000-1 and during the identity crisis following the 
IGC in Nice. But, it is still being contested by the EU’s indifference on how to 
conduct conflict prevention and crisis management. The ability to conduct an 
operation like Artemis finally stabilised the meaning of security which was 
previously contested. The rules applying to this type of actorness will be analysed in 
the final section of this chapter dealing with the construction of rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity, including those applying to the use of civilian 
and military capabilities.  
Summary 
During the period 2003-4, the EU’s level of self-awareness was very high. This 
could be read from different aspects of the construction of EU identity analysed 
above.  
First, the construction of EU identity was not only based on core principles. 
Discourses included more detailed sub-principles which further developed core 
principles. Sub-principles were more easily implemented because they were defined 
on a lower abstract level. It was easier to identify if an actor applied to these 
principles or not. Also, they enabled the construction of – what I have called – 
conditional identities which had to be recognised by external actors in order to be 
included in the EU’s external cooperation as defined in previous chapters. 
Second, EU identity was still based on the understanding of integration and 
cooperation as a successful way to overcome differences and gain mutual benefits. 
The analysis has shown that cooperation and integration were related to the meaning 
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of interdependence which bound actors together, disabling free riding or conflict and 
turning individual into mutual benefits.  
Third, the historical dimension of European integration and the conduct of military 
and civilian operations enabled the construction of a much stronger meaning of EU 
actorness, compared with the period of 2000-1. As I will argue in the next section, 
this strengthened perspective was also affected by the way of reasoning on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism and the events of 11 September 2001. 
Overall, in the period 2003-4, the EU’s self-perception as an actor included a huge 
variety of aspects. The construction of being an international and a security actor was 
most central in regard to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU 
level and within ESDP.  
These three changes can be explained by three different aspects. First of all, the 
identity crisis which took place in the aftermath of the IGC of Nice and which 
resulted in the Laeken declaration and the inauguration of the Convent on the Future 
of Europe created the need to re-constitute the EU’s identity and its way of 
conducting actorness in the field of security. Second, as a matter of continuity the 
EU’s external action and security policy had to be reconsidered in the line of the 
terms of appropriate behaviour defined by the EU identity. This led for example to 
the construction of sub-principles making core principles more explicit. The final 
aspect explaining change in the period of 2003 and 2004 is the processes of 
reasoning following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international 
terrorism. Basically, this led to a re-constitution of the EU identity by processes of 
juxtapositioning of self and other. This aspect will be further analysed in the 
following section on the construction of threats. Overall, changes in the construction 
of EU identity were based on these three processes of change. 
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2. Construction of Threats 
In this section I will analyse the construction of threats to European security. The 
purpose of this chapter is to identify new aspects of these constructions and 
comparing the findings with those of earlier periods. In regard to the construction of 
threats, two aspects were central: international terrorism and dynamic threats. Both 
aspects were closely interlinked. The reasoning on international terrorism enabled 
the construction of dynamism as a structural problem of threats. This enabled a shift 
in the understanding of threats by regarding them as interconnected. The 
intersubjective meaning of dynamic threats constructed other, already known threats 
as interlinked and negatively affecting each other. This included violence, 
development, organised crime, human trafficking, and proliferation, to name a few. 
In 2000-1, the concept of dynamism was already introduced in the discourses while 
reasoning on the development-conflict cycle. During that time, two aspects were 
different: i) the development-conflict cycle was not labelled as a dynamic threat and 
ii) the understanding of dynamism did not structurally dominate the construction of 
threats and security problems. This changed in the aftermath of the events of 11 
September 2001 and the discursive crisis which occurred as a result. Processes of 
reasoning corresponded with those of other discourses, for example within NATO, in 
the transatlantic area and within the US administration. However, the EU way of 
reasoning led to other results. (see Berenskötter 2005; Berenskötter and Giegerich 
2006; Shepherd 2006b) In any case, the reasoning on the phenomenon of 
international terrorism was important for the construction of threats in two ways. 
Terrorism was not only constituted as the first ever serious threat to European 
security. Also, it enabled the construction of dynamism as a structural problem. In 
the following section I show that processes of sense making on international 
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terrorism almost inevitably enabled the introduction of dynamism as the dominating 
character of threats. This section is followed by the analysis of different dynamic 
threats ranging from poverty, development and conflict to bad governance, fragile 
states, unstable international environment, and weapons programmes as the most 
relevant dynamic threats in regard to the meaning of security enabling the 
institutionalisation of ESDP. 
2.1 Terrorism 
The reasoning on the events of 11 September 2001 was responsible for a remarkable 
interruption in discourses on security and threat constructions. In the following I not 
only focus on the period of 2003-4 but expand the time frame of the analysis in order 
to identify dominant meanings in the context of terror, terrorist attacks and terrorism 
since the events of 11 September 2001 in order to check whether they remained 
dominant for a longer period of time. Apart from discursive moments of 2003-4, I 
include those of the immediate aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 up 
until December 2001. Therefore, this section builds up on the analysis of meanings 
of international terrorism conducted earlier in this chapter, as well as in chapter IV.  
Following the events of 11 September 2001, the language which was used within the 
European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies became stronger in 
juxtapositioning ‘self’ and ‘other’, when issues of security were concerned. Up until 
then, no security threat had been constructed so decisively and so understood to 
attack the very foundation of the EU’s identity. (see Council 2004b: 29; European 
Council 2004c: 8) Only the development-conflict cycle had been constructed as a 
security problem. This cycle was reconsidered in the aftermath of 11 September 
2001. International terrorism was understood to threaten EU identity by harming 
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democratic principles while targeting not only the institutional structure of its society 
but innocent civilians. Combined with the understanding that the world following the 
Cold War was more fragmented, international terrorism was understood to be a 
problem of global proportions, causing other security problems and worsening their 
already negative impact on a peace loving international community. (see ESS 2003: 
17) 
Terrorism was perceived as acting outside of any boundaries of rationality or human 
responsibility. In the section on EU’s global pride and earlier in chapter IV, I have 
provided some quotes referring to this way of reasoning. The picture painted by 
these quotes established terrorism as acting outside of the bounds of rational 
behaviour, constituting a threat which was previously not only unknown but 
unimaginable. This was most clearly stated in the Laeken Declaration and the ESS. 
Terrorism was juxtaposed to peaceful times prior to the events of 11 September 2001 
and thereby showing the seriousness of the discursive crisis. The events themselves 
were considered as a rude awakening. (see European Council 2001e: 20) 
“Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the 
openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to 
the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, 
connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to 
cause massive casualties.” (ESS 2003: 3) 
The interesting point in this quote was how forcefully terrorism was constructed as 
the ‘other’, juxtaposing every aspect of EU identity including EU core principles, 
cooperation, and integration. Terrorist acts were labelled “horrible and barbaric” 
which “brutally confirmed the fact that terrorism […] represents an increasing threat 
against democracy and against international peace and security, from which non 
country can consider itself free or safe.” (Council 2003c: 25) This decisive 
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construction of the ‘other’, in contrast, enabled the glorification of the EU ‘self’. A 
bright picture of the self was painted by the Laeken Declaration by describing the 
world prior to the events of 11 September 2001 as one without conflict but effective 
human rights. (see European Council 2001e: 20) Thereby, the EU’s actorness as a 
gate keeper of this peaceful world was strengthened. However, the myth of earlier 
times being peaceful did not fit ways of reasoning on conflicts in Africa and the 
separation wars in Ex-Yugoslavia, for example. But the myth helped to forcefully 
construct terrorism as the ‘other’ opposing the very foundation of the EU, its 
responsibility to protect and its actorness in the field of security.  
The seriousness of the threat of terrorism was perceived as being caused by its 
indifference in selecting targets. From the EU’s perspective, terrorism intended to 
attack every part of public and private life: it negated democratic principles and 
human rights, it caused negative economic consequences internationally, (see 
European Council 2001d: 2) and its main targets were innocent individuals world 
wide. (see European Council 2001c: 1) Especially the last point was perceived as 
being outside of any established rule of appropriate behaviour. This understanding 
was linked to the meaning of responsibility and democracy. Even if individuals had 
to take up their responsibility by following democratic rules on the domestic level, 
they were not responsible for defending the basic structures and foundations of their 
society against external actors. Hence, if terrorists wanted to challenge the basic 
political structure and normative standards of any society they were expected to 
attack their representing institutions, e.g. states and state institutions. (see Wilkinson 
2005: 14-5) This perspective referred to basic rules of the international system in the 
Geneva Conventions, for example. In contrast, international terrorism not only 
disregarded these rules, they were also indifferent to causing “a large number of 
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casualties among civilians of various nationalities” (Council 2003c: 25) and “faith”. 
(European Council 2003e: 15) This indifference in the selection of targets seemed to 
be remarkable, not only because civilians rather than state authorities or institutions 
were targeted but also because no difference was made between nationalities, 
ethnics, and religions. (see European Council 2004c: 19) 
The fact that the EU highlighted this aspect said a lot about its understanding of 
terrorism. Terrorism was perceived as ‘irrational’, ‘horrible’ and ‘barbaric’ because 
terrorists did not even differentiate among national, ethnic or religious boundaries – 
which would have been rather rational from the EU’s perspective. But the EU’s 
threat perception was inconsistent because it understood root causes of terrorism to 
build up on these boundaries of nationalities, ethnicities and so forth. This may well 
be the case because the EU had no other explanation at hand. Consequently, acts of 
terrorist groups were explained as “fanatical” (Council 2001l: 7) based on “national, 
racist and xenophobic” drifts (European Council 2003a: 4) and “anti-Semitism”, 
(Council 2003o: IV) even though this could not explain why terrorists did not 
differentiate between targets  
Additional root causes were also identified. They ranged from development, poverty 
and other social problems to weakness in the rule of law, fragile statehood and 
conflict. (see Council 2004r: 8; Council 2004b: 26; European Council 2004a: 12, 16) 
The variety of root causes highlighted the complexity of the problem. It was this 
complexity which led the EU to consider international terrorism as a dynamic threat 
interlinked and interwoven with other security problems. This aspect will be further 
analysed in the next section. 
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2.2 Dynamic Threats 
The reasoning on international terrorism as a phenomenon based on complex root 
causes was influenced by, and did influence, other perceptions of security problems 
which were understood to be linked or intertwined. This perspective was further 
supported by the understanding of the world as being “highly fragmented”, thereby 
enabling to regard former disconnected security problems as interrelated. (Council 
2003g: 9) One prominent example in this regard was the combination of terrorism 
and WMD; international terrorism was understood to search for biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons as well as their delivery systems. (see European Council 
2003b: 37) The ESS stated very clearly that a terrorist attack using WMD or related 
material was the “most frightening scenario”. (ESS 2003: 4) Hence, international 
terrorism was not only understood as a global threat in itself, it also seemed to be 
connected or interrelated with other security problems, here the proliferation of 
WMD. (see Council 2004v) The logic behind this reasoning understood security 
problems – which previously were perceived individually – as being intertwined, 
resulting in more dangerous threats. This aspect was discussed, for example, in the 
Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003. “Key threats […] included international 
terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed States and organised crime. They were 
significant threats by themselves but their combination constituted a radical 
challenge to security”. (European Council 2003b: 9; see Council 2004g: 28) This 
meaning of dynamic threats was enabled by processes of reasoning on the 
phenomenon of international terrorism based on the understanding that terrorism 
arose “out of complex causes”. (ESS 2003: 3; see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006)  
The meaning of dynamism did not only work when international terrorism was 
concerned. It ‘travelled’ to affect other threats without even being related to 
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international terrorism. The logic of dynamic threats constituted the link between 
different security problems which previously were not understood as being 
connected. It introduced a link between poverty, regional instability, conflict, or 
WMD and understood some problems as the root causes of others. One example was 
the development-conflict cycle. 
“Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, 
deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of 
countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.” 
(ESS 2003: 2) 
The quote again refers to conflict as negatively affecting development and economic 
relief. In the period 2000-1, the dynamism of this cycle was not constructed as 
dominating every aspect of security challenges. This changed during the period 
under review here, when dynamism generally dominated the construction of threats 
as a result of processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. 
(see Council 2004b; Council 2004m: 18; Council 2004g: 27; European Council 
2004c: 18) For example, in 2004, the Council agreed on a Common Position which 
exclusively focused on “structural root causes” of conflict and how conflict 
prevention, management and resolution could be dealt with. (Council 2004b: 26). 
These structural root causes included illicit trafficking, an unstable and unpredictable 
international environment, economic factors, the behaviour of non-state actors, the 
availability of small arms and light weapons, the fragility of states, and widespread 
transmittable diseases. (see Council 2004b; European Council 2004a: 12) Conflict 
was perceived to affect other security problems. It could lead “to extremism, 
terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime.” (ESS 
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2003: 4) All these root causes added meaning to dynamism, since they were 
constructed as mutually affecting each other. 
The ESS was one source which presented in a very condensed way the 
understanding of dynamic threats by listing possible scenarios. “Bad governance – 
corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil 
conflict corrode States from within. […] State failure is an alarming phenomenon 
that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.” (ESS 2003: 4) 
“Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD.” (ESS 2003: 4) And finally, 
organised crime, primarily a domestic problem, was understood to have “an 
important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal 
migrants and weapons account for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It 
can have links with terrorism.” (ESS 2003: 4) Through these framings, the meaning 
of dynamism, by which security problems negatively affected each other, was 
constructed in its purest sense. In the following I will focus on the most relevant 
dynamic security problems in more detail. 
Fragile States and Regional Instability 
Dynamism was applied to fragile states. Domestic instability of any given state was 
perceived to potentially destabilise its regional and international surrounding, which 
again could lead to conflict. (see Council 2003o: V) In regard to small arms and light 
weapons, the Council reported that “[t]he inability of state and civil society to ensure 
the rule of law is possibly the main underlying cause of insecurity.” (Council 2003q: 
8) Here, both sides were understood to potentially destabilise the other: i) state 
internal instability or domestic conflicts were understood to have a knock-on effect 
on the surrounding region; (see Council 2004s: II) the Council also noted ii) “that 
regional instability may play a part in jeopardising the achievement” (Council 
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2003d: VII) of “reconstruction, poverty reduction and development”. (Council 
2003d: VI) In the EU’s perspective, Iraq and the Middle East served as an example 
of how state internal problems and instabilities mutually affect the regional level and 
vice versa. “The Iraqi crisis makes it all the more imperative that the other problems 
of the region be tackled and resolved. The Israeli-Palestine conflict, in particular, 
remains a cause of great concern.” (European Council 2003i: 34)  
Unpredictable and Unstable International Order 
This example leads to a more general perspective which became clear in the 
Council’s Common Position on conflict prevention. From this perspective, an 
unpredictable and unstable international environment was understood to have the 
potential of dynamically leading to conflict. Knowing this perspective, it can explain 
why the EU intended to establish effective multilateralism. Effective multilateralism 
was perceived to establish “conditions for a stable and more predictable international 
environment, and comprehensive and balanced aid and developmental assistance 
programmes to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent conflict”. (Council 2004s: 
26) This would ensure stable states which again would ensure a stable international 
society because the latter “depends on the quality of the governments that are its 
foundation.” (ESS 2003: 10) By making the international environment more stable 
and predictable, the dynamism affecting fragile states and instable regions would be 
reduced. 
Weapons Programmes 
Finally, weapons programmes were understood to cause regional instability as well 
as instability on the domestic state level. The European Council addressed “the 
problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie 
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behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a 
vacuum.” (European Council 2003b: Annex II) In this quote, vacuum referred to the 
understanding that weapons programmes were almost exclusively implemented in a 
situation of tensions between at least two opponent states. However, weapons 
programmes were also related to state internal dynamics. Financing these 
programmes was perceived as potentially leading to domestic instability or conflict. 
Based on this understanding, for example, the Council called “to introduce a 
certification system for trade in rough diamonds with the aim of breaking the link 
between diamonds and the arms trade.” (Council 2003n: II) Here, the understanding 
of dynamism became apparent: trade regimes for diamonds were able to reduce the 
sources enabling actors to procure weapons and thereby reduced the potential of 
domestic and regional conflict. And finally, the existence of unofficial or 
paramilitary fighters was perceived as a dynamic threat. This explicitly introduced a 
sub-state level as being relevant in regard to dynamic threats. For example, the 
Council recognised “the close link between the reintegration of fighters […] and the 
success of the peace process”. (Council 2003d: VIII) Furthermore, these 
dependencies were linked to the fight against poverty and thereby closed the 
dynamic cycle of weapons programmes, instability, conflict, poverty, and 
development. 
Summary 
In sum, the EU constructed almost all security problems as having the potential to 
dynamically affecting other security problems and threats. In previous periods the 
development-conflict cycle was perceived as a dynamic process, but it was not 
labelled as such. The meaning of dynamism did not become dominant as a general 
character of every security problem. The meaning of dynamic threats became 
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dominant in discourses on European security in the aftermath of the discursive crisis 
on the events of 11 September 2001 leading to processes of reasoning on 
international terrorism. Processes of reasoning on international terrorism enabled the 
construction of dynamism as a general character of threats. This way of perceiving 
international terrorism was informed by the understanding of the development-
conflict cycle which already had introduced something similar to dynamism to two 
separate problems. Following this already established understanding, the meaning of 
dynamic threats became transferred and generalised as being the generic character of 
each individual threat. This would lead to a complex set of security problems which 
could be only tackled if all areas of EU’s external action were engaged. As I will 
show in the next section, this explicitly included a link between development policy 
and security policy while especially focusing on state building. Although this link 
was already established in 2000 and 2001 it was more forcefully constructed and 
stringently applied in the period under review here.  
3. Rules of Appropriate Behaviour 
In this section, I will analyse how rules of appropriate behaviour were constructed 
based on the relational construction of EU identity and perceived threats. These rules 
served as the foundation of the institutional development of ESDP. The analysis can 
be organised in two sub sections which focus on a particular set of rules. The first set 
deals with rules of cooperation. In particular, rules on cooperation were constructed 
based on the meaning of integration and cooperation as a central part of EU identity. 
In contrast to the rules on cooperation, the second set of rules deals explicitly with 
the capacities and institutional development of ESDP. Here, rules addressed how 
ESDP’s capacity, including military and civilian capabilities, should be used, how 
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capacities related to the first set of rules and how capacities were to be further 
developed.  
3.1 Rules on Cooperation 
From the EU’s perspective, cooperation was perceived as the most appropriate way 
to deal with third actors, international institutions and other actors, as well as how to 
solve security problems. Rules on cooperation could be sub-divided into three 
categories: i) cooperation with(in) multilateral structures and institutions – meaning 
effective multilateralism. Although these rules were re-constituted under a new 
header – that of effective multilateralism –, rules within this category were already 
introduced into the discourses on appropriate behaviour in 2000-1. Therefore, the 
section discussing these rules will be presented in a very condensed way. Effective 
multilateralism is central for the EU’s security policy because the EU’s security 
action is required to be mandated or accepted by the UN as the main body of 
multilateralism. (see Article 11, no. 1 of Nice Treaty on the EU) Rules on ii) 
structured approaches constitute the second category. Basically, these rules asked for 
external cooperation to be organised along formally fixed agreements including an 
agreed plan of how to solve international or regional problems step by step. The last 
sub-category of rules on cooperation can be labelled as iii) state building. Whereas 
the sub-category on multilateral cooperation focused on the international and 
regional level, rules on state building followed the understanding that a stable 
international system “depends on the quality of the governments that are its 
foundation.” (ESS 2003: 10) The rule on state building asked for the implementation 
of EU core principles, including good governance, and international law on the 
domestic level by the use of civilian and military capabilities of ESDP. These rules 
will be analysed in the following sections. 
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3.1.1 Effective Multilateralism 
The concept effective multilateralism was most prominently introduced into the 
discourses on EU identity and appropriate behaviour by the ESS. (see ESS 2003: 9-
10; Lindstrom and Schmitt 2003: 90; Quille 2004: 427-8) Certainly, multilateralism 
was not a European or EU idea but the EU actively engaged in making 
multilateralism the dominant understanding of what constitutes appropriate action at 
the international level.  
The concept translated integration and cooperation, as well as EU core principles in 
order to apply to the international level. Basically, effective multilateralism built up 
on the understanding that through cooperation, interdependence could be created and 
peaceful and supportive coexistence would be implemented. Also, it translated 
democracy and the rule of law as applying not only to the domestic state level but to 
the international level in order to establish a stable and predictable international 
environment. This could be read in the ESS: “The development of a stronger 
international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order is our objective.” (ESS 2003: 9) By examining the sentence, it 
becomes clear how EU core principles were translated. The ‘rule-based international 
order’ clearly referred to the understanding of the rule of law. Institutions were 
required as arenas of decision-making processes of the international society which 
referred to democratic rules. And finally, the call for an international society was 
related to the meaning of society available on the domestic state level. The logic of 
effective multilateralism followed the same root in saying that stability of the 
international environment could only be secured by a strong and effective 
engagement of its constituting units, e.g. states which constitute the international 
society. (see ESS 2003: 10) In this regard, the meaning of effective multilateralism 
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was informed by the meaning of integration and cooperation, as well as by EU core 
principles transferring their meanings to the international level. 
The most central rule of effective multilateralism asked for cooperation with the UN 
as the archetype body of multilateralism. This also applied to the EU’s security 
policy. For example, the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ALTHEA) had to be authorised by an UNSC resolution. (see Council 2004w: no 8) 
In this regard, the Council reaffirmed “the deeply rooted commitment of the 
European Union to make effective multilateralism a central element of its external 
action, with at its heart a strong UN.” (Council 2003d: II; see Eriksen 2006: 260) 
Cooperation with the UN was perceived as important in order to make 
multilateralism more effective and to make the international system more stable and 
predictable. (see Council 2004g: 28; Quille 2004: 428; Duke 2004: 474) Stability 
and predictability of the international system already falls into the area of security 
policy, although without military means. An instable and unpredictable international 
environment was identified as a root cause of conflict, underdevelopment and 
poverty. (see Council 2004y; European Council 2004b: 12)  
However, the need to cooperate with the UN and engage in multilateralism applied 
to all areas of security policy, ranging from combating terrorism to non-proliferation, 
conflict prevention and human rights abuses. (see European Council 2004a: 14; 
Council 2004j: 10; European Council 2003e: 23; Council 2004q: 11; Biscop 2004a: 
509) It also included the rule to follow and help to implement UNSC resolutions. 
(see Council 2004a: 50; Shepherd 2006a: 74) Accordingly, all civilian and military 
operations of the EU were authorised by the UN. Furthermore, the EU was 
“determined to play a major role within the UN”. (European Council 2004c: 17) This 
engagement did not end with the main UN bodies but included affiliated 
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organisations, such as the IAEA and ICC as well as ad hoc bodies like the ICTY. 
(see Council 2004v; Council 2004t: 23; Council 2004x: 14) 
3.1.2 Structured Approach 
Another rule was implemented in discourses on EU identity and appropriate 
behaviour asking for structured, formalised initiatives to solve crises and conflicts, as 
well as to organise peace and state building processes. What I call formalised 
initiatives were the attempt to agree with third actors, preferably on a multilateral 
basis, on a plan including individual steps to solve a problem, crisis or conflict. 
When the EU perceived a certain situation as being a security problem, such as 
human rights abuses, fragile state structures, or conflict, its attempt at resolution was 
to agree on a plan to solve the situation with the actors involved. (see Council 2004d: 
10) For example, in regard to the question of how ESDP could support the African 
states, “the Council agreed on the Action Plan for ESDP-support to Peace and 
Security in Africa”. (Council 2004p: 13) Also, ALTHEA was requested to ensure a 
coherent approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina addressing not only the initiatives of 
the COM but also the cooperation with the government and thirds states. (see 
Council 2004w: Article 7)  
The construction of this rule included the reference to the meaning of effectiveness 
and coherence asking for an objective analysis of conflict situations in order to find 
the most effective way to solve the problem. This way of constructing the rule was 
visible in the discourses on appropriate behaviour referring to “fact finding 
missions” conducted previous to ESDP operations which were implemented to 
identify underlying causes of security problems. (European Council 2004b: 45) The 
language of ‘fact finding’ strongly constructed the rule of a structured approache as 
being informed by the EU’s rationality and objectivity. Thereby, the EU constituted 
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itself as a rational actor which did not act on self-interest but on objectively given 
facts to solve problems or crisis situations by using its civilian and military 
capabilities.  
Apart from this rationality, structured approaches had to take into consideration the 
perspectives of third actors. Agreements had to be found in consultations “with the 
partners in the region”. (Council 2004j: 17) This perspective referred to the rule 
asking for political dialogue as the very basic rule of cooperation. This rule of 
consultation also translated the meaning of responsibility and ownership into a rule, 
meaning that those actors who were directly affected by a problem had to take action 
and had to be included in any approach by the EU. Based on this perspective, the EU 
tried to find international or regional agreements, rather than bilateral. The latter 
would not necessarily correspond with the meanings of responsibility. In contrast, 
the adoption of an agreement by all responsible actors was perceived by the EU as a 
“major event”. (see Council 2004g: 19) In regard to civilian and military operations, 
this included not only a mandate of the UN and the cooperation with the state of 
deployment but also the cooperation with third states and other organizations such as 
NATO in conducting the opertion. (see Council 2004w: Article 11) This view 
logically followed the rationality implemented in discourses on EU identity and rules 
of appropriate behaviour which understood integration and cooperation as the best 
possible way to solve problems and implement stability and predictability. 
3.1.3 State Building 
The final sub-section on rules of cooperation deals with rules for state building. The 
EU constructed state building efforts as appropriate behaviour in order to establish 
regional and international peace and security. This rule was constructed more clearly 
than in previous periods and it clearly included the reference to, and use of, the EU’s 
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civilian and military capabilities. The rule was also to establish a stable and more 
predictable international environment. This perspective was rational from the EU’s 
point of view because it perceived a stable state as the precondition for a stable 
international environment. (see Council 2004s: 26; ESS 2003: 10) The second 
dimension of the rule on state building expected states to implement what most 
frequently has been called good governance. This perspective became clear in the 
Council’s conclusion on how governance could help to increase development. 
(Good) Governance was perceived as “a key component of policies and reforms for 
poverty reduction and global security as well as for the promotion of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law” which were “essential elements in the EU 
relationship with third countries”. (Council 2003j: 28) 
This second dimension of state building included the rule to strengthen and support 
the civil society. Through this support, civil societies were perceived as capable of 
accepting their responsibilities to stabilise the state in question and ensure that core 
principles were established. (see Council 2004g: 17; Council 2004o: 13; Manners 
2006: 186) This was the reason why elections where perceived as central to establish 
well functioning states respecting EU core principles and the international law. 
Elections were understood to be the tipping point of implementing core principles 
because they evidenced whether or not a given state did implement democratic rules 
and whether or not the state respected the attempt of its population to take up their 
democratic responsibility by going to the ballots. (see Council 2004f: 16; Council 
2004i: 14; Council 2004m: 15) In this way, elections were perceived as a measure to 
evaluate the transition process from instability to stability, predictability and finally 
democracy. (see Council 2004d: 11; Youngs 2004: 536) After all, the EU established 
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a rule which asked for the implementation of a constitution as the final step of state 
building. (see Council 2003h: 7; European Council 2003d: 18; Council 2003l: 14)  
In regard to the rules discussed above, the EU perceived appropriate the support and 
assistance of third actors in taking up their responsibility and implementing 
appropriate structures as defined by these rules. Support and assistance by the EU 
was implemented along the full spectrum of capabilities available, ranging from 
financial support, development policies, to civilian and military means. (see Council 
2004l: 14; Council 2004s: II; Council 2004q: 9; Council 2004f; 17-8) For example, 
the EU used its military capabilities to implement order and stability in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during the operation ALTHEA. (see Council 2004w) The same holds 
true for civilian and military operations in the DRC and other countries. (see Council 
2004y; Council 2003r; Council 2003s) Therefore, the rules discussed above could be 
considered as falling in line with earlier meanings. The following section especially 
focuses on the rules of civilian and military capabilities, as well as rules requiring 
further development and institutional reform. These rules, at least in their detailed 
outlook, were unprecedented. 
3.2 EU/ESDP Capabilities 
The rules discussed in the section above defined appropriate behaviour in regard to 
external action broadly understood. In contrast, this section focuses explicitly on 
rules applying to ESDP defining appropriate behaviour in regard to the use of 
civilian and military capabilities. The construction of rules in this regard was already 
apparent in the years 2000 and 2001. I have shown that in the period 2000-1, rules of 
security policy allowed the use of ESDP’s capabilities as a last resort in the case of 
development policy and other forms of support, such as financial aid, failed to ensure 
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conflict prevention and crisis management. At that time, these rules existed in an 
empty space because the meanings of conflict prevention and crisis management 
were contested, which was evident by the lack of capabilities at the EU’s disposal. 
Conflict prevention and crisis management were almost exclusively regarded as a 
matter of long-term policies and therefore covered by development policy. This 
perspective changed in 2003-4. (see Stewart 2008: 233-4) By then, a rule existed 
which allowed for civilian and military capabilities to be used for conflict prevention 
and conflict resolution, as well as crisis management- not only as a last resort but as 
an equal tool of foreign policy alongside development policies and financial aid, for 
example. “The envisaged ESDP operation will add in a significant way to the 
Union’s political engagement, its assistance programs and its ongoing police 
missions”. (Council 2004f: 17; see Ulriksen et al. 2004: 522) The rule allowing use 
of ESDP’s civilian and military capabilities as an equal tool of external policy was 
an innovation which did not exist in the period 2000-1.  
In the following I will focus on rules dealing with the use of ESDP’s capabilities, 
starting with a basic rule defining the conditions under which the use of ESDP’s 
capabilities was perceived appropriate. This logic built up on three meanings: 
responsibility, conditional identity and cooperation. This rule can help to understand 
the EU’s regional focus on Africa and especially the Great Lakes Region as well as 
the Western Balkans in its security policies. Another rule directly addressed how the 
civilian and military capabilities should be implemented. Both rules will be 
discussed in the following.  
3.2.1 Preconditions to Use ESDP’s Capabilities 
The EU established a rule defining appropriate preconditions for the use of ESDP’s 
capabilities. In addition to defining the tipping point of when to deploy ESDP 
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operations, this rule helped to understand the limited regional spread of ESDP’s 
operations. ESDP military and civilian operations were implemented in only two 
regions of the world: Africa, and especially the Great Lakes Region, and the Western 
Balkans. (see Larsen 2002) The EU later deployed an integrated rule of law mission 
to support the Iraqi police and judiciary. (see Council 2005) The police mission in 
Afghanistan was deployed even later. (see Council 2007b) This limited regional 
spread disregarded the fact that similar conflicts and crises took place in other 
regions at the same time. (see Dobbins 2005) But the EU did not engage in these 
situations. Three meanings help to understand this: responsibility, conditional 
identity, and cooperation. The use of ESDP’s capabilities was perceived appropriate 
only when all three meanings were thought to be applicable to a situation. In order to 
clarify this argument, I first develop the logic of the rule based on these three 
meanings. This will be done mostly by referring to their internal logics developed 
above in the section on EU identity. This will be followed by the discussion of two 
examples in which the rule was applied: operations in the Western Balkans and the 
Great Lakes Region. 
The rule on preconditions built up on the logic of three meanings. First, EU’s 
identity included the meaning of responsibility which defined an important character 
of actors. Responsible actors actively engaged in changing circumstances for the 
better. If the EU perceived actors as not actively engaging in solving ‘their’ crises or 
conflicts, the use of EU’s military and civilian capabilities was perceived 
inappropriate, since they were only implemented as a means to support responsible 
actors. Second, the EU perceived the implementation of its core principles and the 
international law – or at least the attempt to implement them – as a necessary 
precondition for cooperation. The construction of what I have called conditional 
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identity was the result. If actors did not apply to the conditional identity, direct 
involvement of the EU by using its civilian and military capabilities, for example, 
was again considered inappropriate. And finally, the meaning of integration and 
cooperation dominated the EU’s self-perception and thereby affected its approach to 
the external, including policies towards crises and conflict situations. In regard to 
conflict and crisis, cooperation could help to overcome these situations, since 
cooperation was perceived to lead to interdependence disabling free riding, violence 
and conflict. Based on the EU’s understanding of cooperation, regional organisations 
were perceived as responsible to solve crisis and conflict and bring similar results to 
the region as done by the EU. (see Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2005: 258) From 
the EU’s perspective, regional organisations had to push for cooperation among 
regional actors who were drowned in conflict. Hence, if regional organisations were 
taking up their responsibility to solve regional conflicts or crises, support by the EU 
was perceived appropriate, including the use of its military and civilian capabilities. 
This last aspect did not only include regional organisations but also the UN. (see 
European Council 2004c: 13) Put together, these three meanings constituted a 
precondition which had to be implemented prior to the deployment of ESDP’s 
capabilities.  
The regional focus of the EU’s action could be argued in reference to these three 
meanings. This can be demonstrated by two examples, e.g. the Western Balkans and 
the Great Lakes Region. First, in regard to the Western Balkans, the EU defined 
conditions which had to be implemented by regional states of the Western Balkans 
so that they became more ‘self’. (see Youngs 2004: 528) These states had to 
implement EU core principles and the international law, including the recognition of, 
and cooperation with, the ICTY. (see Council 2003k: 8) Since the countries of the 
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Western Balkans had shown their willingness to apply to this conditional identity, 
the EU perceived their behaviour as responsible. (see Council 2003c: 16; European 
Council 2003e: 13) This perception enabled a shift from security policy to 
enlargement in the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans. This was based on two 
logics: first, states applied to the EU’s conditions which made them more self. As a 
result, they were eligible for cooperation, including the possibility of membership. 
Second, the EU perceived itself as the responsible regional organisation which had to 
be active in solving the conflict or crisis in the Western Balkans. Following both 
logics, the use of military and civilian capabilities was perceived appropriate. It 
resulted in the operations CONCORDIA and PROXIMA, for example. 
Second, these preconditions were also met in the Great Lakes Region. The EU 
defined conditions on the basis of EU core principles and international law to which 
regional actors had to apply. Actors tried to do so, although they were not always 
successful. (see Council 2004d: 11) As developed above, the attempt to implement 
EU core principles was perceived as an act of responsibility, even when the 
implementation of these principles was weak. However, probably more important 
than the attempt of individual states, the AU as a regional organisation actively 
engaged in conflict resolution and thereby tried to implement core principles. “The 
promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent is one of the objectives of 
the African Union and the peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States is 
one of the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU.” (Council 2004b: 
25) Therefore, the AU was taking up its responsibility in the field of regional 
security and conflict resolution, which made the AU a suitable partner for 
cooperation. As a result, the use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived 
appropriate because regional states and the AU were perceived to act responsible in 
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applying to the conditional identity, including the attempt of the AU to establish long 
term regional cooperation. If the AU, together with other regional actors, had not 
taken up their responsibility, the EU would not have engaged in the region. The case 
of Sudan could serve as an example. Action within the framework of ESDP was 
understood inappropriate, since the Sudanese government missed out on every 
chance to act responsibly. (see Council 2004h: 7) the EU started to reconsider its 
engagement only after the AU, together with the UN, took up responsibility in a 
‘Hybrid-operation’. (see Council 2007c; Council 2007a: 8) 
Overall, the three meanings discussed above defined preconditions for whether or 
not the use of civilian and military capabilities was appropriate in the first place. 
Only when all three meanings applied, was the use of ESDP’s capabilities in conflict 
resolution, crisis management or post-conflict management understood as 
appropriate.  
3.2.2 The Use of Military and Civilian Capabilities 
The rule discussed above addressing the appropriateness of using military and 
civilian capabilities pointed to a remarkable change in the construction of 
appropriate behaviour for the EU’s security policy. In 2000-1, the EU constructed a 
rule arguing for the use of ESDP’s capabilities in order to prevent crises or conflicts 
from jeopardising positive effects of development policy and financial aid. (see 
Chapter III: 3) This rule neither dominated the discourses on security action nor did 
it explicitly define conditions on usage of ESDP’s capabilities but implemented the 
logic of last resort – or as Hill put it in 2001, the approach of using civilian and 
military capabilities was “still in the process of gestation”. (Hill 2001: 316) In 
contrast, in the period 2003-4, very precise rules existed on when and how the use of 
military and civilian capabilities was appropriate. The construction of these rules will 
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be analysed in this section. It will start by showing how the construction of dynamic 
threats affected the reasoning on the use of ESDP’s capabilities in general, followed 
by the analysis of the rules at work.  
The EU’s understanding of conflict and crisis remained the same during the periods 
of 2000-1 and 2003-4. Conflict and crisis could be avoided by a long term strategy of 
development policy addressing all fields of social and political life, the eradication of 
poverty and finally, economic growth. (see Chapter III: 3) Compared with this 
continuity, the perception changed of how the EU could and should react in a crisis 
or conflict situation. In 2000-1, ESDP’s capabilities were understood to prevent 
crisis and conflict from jeopardising efforts of EU’s development policies. The use 
of ESDP’s capabilities followed the logic of last resort – knowing that the build up 
and use of ESDP’s capabilities was contested. Development policy and financial aid 
was understood to be the most promising long term strategy for conflict prevention 
because the EU perceived poverty and development as the most central root causes 
of conflict. (see Chapter III: 2.2) As a result, conflict prevention was a matter of 
development policy focusing on the goal of eradicating poverty. This perspective 
also applied to crisis management. This perspective left little room for the use of 
ESDP’s capabilities which also – or as a result – had not been implemented. 
This perspective was different in 2003-4. Here, the construction of threats was 
dominated by the meaning of dynamism as an underlying logic of all security 
problems and threats; this included the meaning of conflict and crisis. Although the 
basic understanding of conflict and crisis did not change, the potential of dynamic 
processes to worsen security problems made changes in the EU’s approach of 
dealing with these problems necessary. Accordingly, the EU’s understanding of an 
appropriate response to conflict and crisis situations changed from a rather 
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development policy orientated approach in 2000-1 to the use of civilian and military 
capabilities of ESDP in 2003-4. (see Stewart 2008: 235)  
Following this logic, new rules on how and when to use military and civilian 
capabilities were established on the EU level. Previously, discourses on ESDP’s 
capabilities most frequently used the Petersberg Tasks as their reference point to 
define the appropriate use of civilian and military capabilities. This reference point 
still existed in 2003-4 but it was neither dominant nor the only one. Rules defining 
the appropriateness of ESDP’s capabilities addressed a broader spectrum of possible 
tasks. (see Council 2004k: 13) The Petersberg Tasks followed the logic of using 
civilian and military capabilities as a last resort. (see TEU Nice, § 17 P. 2) According 
to this logic, appropriate ESDP operations would have focused only on the actual 
conflict situation and hence on peace-making – or bringing violence and conflict to a 
standstill. Even when crisis management remained at the centre of ESDP’s tasks, the 
use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived appropriate not only in the 
actual situation of violence and conflict but also in a slightly longer timeframe prior 
to and following the actual crisis situation. This included situations potentially 
leading to, as well as following, a crisis when security was re-established. The longer 
timeframe of engagement did not mean that operations themselves had a long term 
perspective. ESDP operations required rules in order to re-establish statehood by 
supplementing or re-establishing state structures.  
Overall, operations no longer exclusively followed the logic of last resort, which 
would have focused purely on crisis management, peace-making and peace-keeping. 
(see Council 2004q: 9; Council 2004g: 8; Stewart 2008) The EU’s military and 
civilian capabilities were perceived appropriate tools of crisis management and state 
building to re-establish security. (see Council 2004w: 10) They were supposed to 
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implement effective state structures, such as an accountable military, an effective 
police, and a functioning judicial system, as well as other parts of public 
administration. Operations included the “implementation of support measures to 
capacity building; […] planning support; disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of combatants; security sector reform and EU internal and external co-
ordination”. (Council 2004p: 12) The aim of these operations was to establish 
security. Here, the meaning of security was positively defined as pubic order 
established by responsible state actors respecting EU core principles and the 
international law. For example, the EU was exploring options to engage “in the 
civilian crisis management areas of police, rule of law and civilian administration as 
well as elections”. (see Council 2004i: 12) The goal was to provide “security to the 
[…] government and institutions” to the country of deployment. (Council 2004g: 9) 
Therefore, aspects of development policy became institutionalised within ESDP in 
favour of responsibility to be carried out by the Council and its supplement bodies, 
rather than by the COM. (see Gourlay 2004: 416-7)  
ESDP’s capabilities were used to implement and stabilise state structures and to 
enable states to comply with EU core principles and the international law. (see 
Council 2004h: 8-9; Council 2004b: 21-2) In regard to the civilian capabilities, goals 
of operations included structural support and knowledge transfer to implement public 
administration, a working police and an effective judiciary system. (see European 
Council 2003b: 17; Council 2004o: 21; Gourlay 2004: 414-5) For example, the 
Union Police Mission PROXIMA in FYROM was to support “the development of an 
efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing”. 
(Council 2004r: 17) In contrast, military capabilities were used to stabilise situations 
of insecurity, initiate security sector reform (SSR) or implement operations gaining 
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for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). (see Council 2004k: 13) 
Furthermore, the EU used its knowledge in military as well as civilian crisis 
management to help the AU to develop effective conflict prevention and 
management capabilities and structures. (see Council 2004e: 7; Council 2004n: IV) 
Overall, the use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived appropriate in 
regard to almost all levels of crisis and conflict. The implementation of both 
capabilities did not vary much in regard to the level of escalation of a conflict or 
crisis situation. Again, preconditions had to be met prior to the deployment. Whereas 
the preconditions defined the earliest starting point of operations, their 
implementation focused on rather short or medium term goals, (see Cornish and 
Edwards 2005: 808) although operations were perceived as beginning to “sustain 
[…] long term objectives of a stable, viable, [and] peaceful” state. (Council 2004g: 
8) But these long term objectives fell under the responsibility of other policy fields, 
such as development policy, economic aid, and external cooperation. 
Summary 
Overall, the period under review in this chapter was affected by two important 
aspects. On the one hand, it demonstrated the stability of earlier processes of sense 
making because most of the meanings discussed were constructed in the spirit of 
their ‘earlier versions’. On the other hand, processes of reasoning on international 
terrorism boosted the EU’s perception of threats. This change can be explained based 
on three aspects; first the EU faced an identity crisis following the IGC of Nice 
which enforced a process of re-constituting its identity and ensuring the compliance 
of its security policy to established meanings of EU identity and inherent rules of 
appropriate behaviour. Second, the EU had to construct meanings to more concretely 
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pin down how to apply to its identity in the light of continuity with earlier shared 
understandings and by keeping in line with the earlier identified grand design of an 
international actor capable in the field of security. Third, the discursive crisis 
following the events of 11 September 2001 led to processes of sense making which 
had to contextualise the new experience of international terrorism to earlier defined 
threat constructions. 
This again resulted in two processes. First, EU identity built up more strongly than 
ever on boundary drawing and the juxtapositioning of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Second, 
dynamism was defined as a structural problem of security threats. Although a 
meaning of dynamism was already implemented by the meaning of the development-
conflict cycle, it was dominantly implemented in discourses on global challenges 
through processes of sense making on international terrorism. This strongly affected 
the definition of rules on how to implement ESDP. 
The rules on the use of ESDP’s capabilities were first drawn up in 2000-1. At that 
time, discourses did not include dominant meanings which could forcefully establish 
robust rules on how to implement and deploy military and civilian capabilities. 
Discourses on conflict and crisis were dominated by the understanding of the 
development-conflict cycle which made long-term engagement of development 
policy and financial aid necessary. These perspectives still existed in 2003-4 but at 
this time, discourses on security were dominated by the meaning of dynamisms, 
which was perceived as a structural character of all security problems. From this 
perspective, the EU had to develop tools for crisis management which could produce 
results on shorter notice and measurable success. This was because crisis and 
conflict not only negatively effected development policy but could also potentially 
 
Barnutz Chapter V – Settling in Actorness 289 
 
lead to other security problems, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional 
conflict, and organised crime.  
Differences in the construction of EU identity served as another explanation as to 
why rules on the use of civilian and military capabilities had been more firmly re-
constructed. In the period 2003-4, the construction of EU’s actorness was forcefully 
implemented, dominating the EU’s approach to its external. This dominance resulted 
out of processes of sense making in the light of the identity crisis and the discursive 
crisis. Also, in order to apply to its self-perception as an international actor capable 
of acting in the field of security as the grand design, ESDP operations were welcome 
to support this image. (see Cornish and Edwards 2005: 808; Andersson 2006: 9) 
Furthermore, as I have argued above, EU core principles were equipped with an 
external dimension. Core principles were perceived as not only applying to the 
internal sphere of the EU but more generally to almost every external actor. This 
changing perspective began to be visible in 2000-1, only to be dominant in the 
period under review here. It led to the construction of conditional identities defining 
the very core of EU principles which were perceived to be indispensable and which 
had to be implemented by actors of a certain region.  
In general, these changes in the EU’s self-perspective and its understanding of the 
world surrounding it enabled a shift in the EU’s external behaviour. In the field of 
security policy, it enabled the construction of rules defining appropriate ways of 
using civilian and military capabilities in crisis and conflict situations. Thereby, the 
EU equipped itself with a short term approach to establish security and engage in 
state building which was supposed to add to its already established, long term 
approach of conflict prevention using tools of development policies and financial 
aid. (see Stewart 2008) 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I analysed the social construction of security in order to answer the 
research question of how the meaning of security, its rational, have been established 
and did change over time to enable the institutionalisation of a security policy at the 
EU level at the turn of the 21st century I argued that the meaning of security was 
linked to processes of reasoning on security at the EU level. Security needs to be 
understood as a relational concept by which identities are related to the perception of 
threats and security problems derived from this intersubjective perspective. The 
relation of identity and threats leads to the construction of rules of appropriate 
behaviour in the case of insecurity. To analyse these processes, the thesis focused on 
social interaction of relevant EU actors within the EU bodies responsible for 
formulating, reorganising and deciding in the domain of the EU’s security policy. 
The EU level is important because it provides an institutionalised arena in which a 
group identity is formed, the role of the EU on the international level defined, 
informal and formal institutions established and policies discussed and agreed upon. 
This perspective is supported by the literature on European integration which 
identified socialisation processes at the EU level which shifted the loyalty of actors 
to that level. From a discursive perspective, socialisation processes can be 
considered as processes of social interaction through the use of language. They can 
best be studied utilising discourse analysis. This argument was derived from Onuf’s 
work, which most plausibly conceptualises the role of language in the construction 
of social reality. The complex of security needs to be understood as being part of this 
social reality, as a meaningful structure relating identity constructions to perceptions 
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of threats from this intersubjective position leading to the construction of rules of 
appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The thesis puts forward the 
theoretical argument that these rules are formally and informally institutionalised 
within ESDP. Following this argument, I analysed discourses within three fields: i) 
European integration, ii) global challenges, and iii) international order. The analysis 
was separated into three periods which were central for the institutional development 
of ESDP, as well as for the implementation of its policy tools.  
The thesis established a concept of change with two main categories including 
further specifications. The first main category is change as development. Here, 
change does not take place at one particular moment of time but rather as a 
development over a period of time. First of all, development takes place based on the 
discursive nature of contestedness. Meanings battle for dominance through 
discursive practices by which marginalised discourses may gain more support in a 
certain period of time. Second, the relational concepts of security establishes a 
moment of reflexivity by which threat constructions can lead to a re-constitution and 
hence change of the identity in question. Third, agents reach for support of their 
policies through arguments of continuity. This affects the way in which actors can 
talk about security at the EU level, for example. It had to stay in line with already 
established policies such as development or with the basic characters of EU identity 
more generally. Fourth, actors are influence by grand designs while reasoning on 
security policies. For example, the grand design for the EU was to reach the status of 
a recognised and valuable international actor. Such an actor is expected to be capable 
and able to act autonomously at the international level in the field of security. In 
order to reach this goal, a security policy at the EU level was more or less inevitable. 
The second main category is change in the moment of crisis. I have identified two 
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different types of crises. The first type is discursive crisis in which existing 
interpretations are not able to cope with new phenomena. This leads to processes of 
reasoning likely to change established meanings. The second type is identity crisis. 
An identity crisis occurs when members of a group realise that their group and its 
institutions undergo a system crisis which is when the institutions of the group in 
question suffer from internal contradictions and steering difficulties. An identity 
crisis leads to a recalibration of the identity and its inherent rules. This was the case 
during and following the EU identity crisis enfolding after the IGC in Nice which led 
to the Laeken Declaration and the EU reform process which was institutionalised 
within the Convent on the Future of Europe. Overall, these six concepts of change 
are important not only to identify but also explain moments of change in the periods 
under review in this thesis.  
I was able to show that throughout the periods concerned core concepts of EU 
identity remained stable, although relevant meanings changed over time. Processes 
of sense making enabled the stabilisation of the EU’s self-perception as an 
international actor responsible for security policy on the international level. These 
processes were supported mainly by the grand design of becoming an international 
actor, by the identity crisis following the IGC in Nice and by a discursive crisis 
which enfolded after the events of 11 September 2001. Especially this crisis led to a 
rising self-awareness through juxtapositioning of self and other, and equipped EU 
identity with an exclusive tone unheard before. Prior to the crisis, the EU perceived 
security as being almost exclusively related to development and the understanding 
that situations of underdevelopment and poverty were likely to lead into conflict and 
crisis, thus harming the achievements of development policy and disabling 
prosperous developments. Based on this development-conflict cycle, situations of 
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development and poverty were perceived as being security relevant. Following this 
rationale, appropriate policy tools had to support development policies in the case of 
conflict and crisis as a last resort. This perspective initiated a huge debate on how to 
develop and implement not only civilian but also the military capabilities of ESDP. 
However, since the concept of crisis management and conflict prevention was still 
blurred as to the line separating the use of ESDP or development policy tools, the 
EU was unable to agree on the type and structure of military capabilities. This 
inability can be explained by the identity crisis which the EU underwent. In 2000 
and 2001 the EU was aware that its foreign and security policy was not as successful 
as expected and that the EU had to reconsider its policies and strengthen its 
capabilities and procedures. In this period the EU was still suffering from its identity 
crisis and the time had not yet come in which problems were solved. 
In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, the logic of the link between 
development and security was widened by the understanding that dynamism was a 
constitutive character of security problems. Dynamism was understood to affect 
previously unattached problems and to make them worse in quantity, quality and 
rapidness of occurrence. Different problems became interdependent. Therefore, the 
meaning of security was somewhat emancipated from solemnly addressing the 
development-conflict cycle. The rising in the seriousness and complexity of security 
problems incorporated the necessity to implement and use civilian and military 
capabilities deployable on a short notice to prevent dynamic processes from taking 
effect. As a result, the EU was enabled to agree on military and civilian capabilities 
and deployed a number of civilian and military operations in 2003 such as Atemis, 
its first military operation in the DRC, or ALTHEA, a military operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The perception of dynamism as an underlying characteristic of all 
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security problems resulted from the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of 
international terrorism which was in itself perceived as a dynamic threat. 
The decisions to implement civilian and military operations in 2003 and 2004 
marked the operability of ESDP which was a huge achievement at the end of a long 
process institutionalising a security policy at the EU level. This process was visible 
within discourses on EU identity, the perception of threats and security problems, 
and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. It 
resulted in a robustly defined meaning of security, building up on a strongly defined 
EU identity, constructing the EU as an international actor responsible for solving 
international problems, including those which were perceived as security relevant. 
Indeed, the EU implemented military operations as crisis management and conflict 
resolution through its security policy structure. This must be understood as a clear 
change in the EU’s external behaviour, compared with the period prior to the 
implementation of ESDP.  
With regard to the empirical findings, I have argued for a gap in the literature to 
understand the EU’s security policy as qualitatively reaching beyond purely national 
constraints. Therefore, I have analysed the rationale of security at the EU level. I 
have shown that EU identity became more stably defined over time. Finally, the 
EU’s self-perception included a dominant meaning of actorness which enabled the 
EU to perceive security policy as a necessary field of politics following its grand 
design of a full-fledged international actor who had to be able to act autonomously in 
the field of security. In other words, the EU had to implement a security policy in 
order to apply to its own characters and categories of being an international actor. 
This changing perspective was visible in the periods under review in this thesis. In 
1996 and 1997, the EU did not perceive itself responsible for security policy outside 
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of its own territory. Accordingly, rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of 
insecurity did not exist in that period but developed over time through processes of 
sense making on the meaning of security influenced by the different ways of change, 
e.g. contestedness of discourses, reflexive construction of threats especially vis-à-vis 
international terrorism leading to juxtapositioning of self and other, arguments of 
continuity by which the meaning of security had to correspond with earlier 
established policies, grand design of an international actor capable of autonomous 
action, the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism and the 
identity crisis following the IGC in Nice. 
Finally, these processes led to a dominant meaning of security which enabled the 
institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level leading to ESDP and 
implemented by a number of civilian and military operations deployed since 2003. 
During the development of this meaning of security, the EU understood the 
development-conflict cycle as security relevant, and tried to implement a security 
policy accordingly. This attempt was not successful because the concepts of crisis 
management and conflict prevention were blurred in the sense of whether they were 
a matter of development policy or of ESDP’s security policy. Finally, processes of 
sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism enabled a firm 
construction of EU identity, including the use, for the first time, of an exclusive tone. 
Based on this slightly modified EU identity as an international actor responsible for 
security policy on the international stage, the EU perceived security problems as 
being dynamic. Through this understanding, the meaning of security emancipated 
itself from the meaning as the tool of last resort in the domain of development 
policy.  
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However, the first half of 2003 seemed to manifest a crisis for this evolving rationale 
of security. This, at least, has been argued by some authors. But I have shown that 
the meaning of security itself was robustly defined, and did not seriously suffer from 
the discursive crisis enfolding in the run up to the war on Iraq in early 2003. The 
crisis of discourses did not take place within discourses on the meaning of security. 
Rather, it enfolded on the disregard of established rules and procedure of interaction 
and cooperation at the EU level. The discourse on the meaning of security remained 
almost unaffected – at least in the longer run. Shortly following the crisis, almost all 
propositions made in the domain of security policy that seemed to be un-agreeable 
during the crisis were finally implemented. I was especially able to support this 
argument in the final empirical chapter focusing on the period of 2003-4 by showing 
the robustness of the discourses on the meaning of security, which were in line with 
earlier interpretations. Finally, the operations of ESDP prepared and implemented in 
2003 and 2004 were a strong sign for stability in the meaning of security. 
EU’s growing self-awareness 
In the following I will summarise the above listed findings in more detail starting 
with those on EU identity, followed by the constructions of threats and the 
construction of rules of appropriate behaviour. At the end I will again summarise the 
argument of the robustness of discourses on the meaning of security before I reflect 
on the research approach of this thesis.  
The very foundation of EU identity remained unchanged during the periods under 
review here. Core principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
international law, the central role of civil society and people as well as the meanings 
of responsibility, cooperation and integration were very central to the construction of 
EU identity. Furthermore, the construction of the European past as the evil ‘other’ 
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was constitutive for its construction. In this regard, European integration was 
constructed as a success story to overcome Europe’s war shaken past.  
All these constituting elements remained stable over time and constructed EU 
identity as inclusive. In contrast to this stability, change took place in regard to the 
following: in 1996-7 the EU did not perceive itself responsible for acting in the field 
of security policy, in 2000-1 this had changed but by a still contested self-perception 
of being an international actor. This change can be explained by the grand design of 
an international actor capable in the field of security. At the same time, the EU 
realised discrepancies in stepping up to this grand design during the identity crisis 
following the IGC in Nice. In 2003-4 the EU identity construction dominantly 
included a meaning of actorness enhancing the EU’s self-awareness and to recognise 
its abilities and potentials of acting on the international stage and in the field of 
security. This change was mainly enabled by the juxtapositioning of self and other 
following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism which 
further supported the process of the EU to come to terms to the grand design of being 
an international actor. 
In 1996-7, the EU did not consider itself responsible for acting on the international 
stage, due to a consensus on the meaning and implications of the term duplication. 
By this meaning, the EU considered it inappropriate to duplicate structures and 
functions of other international or regional institutions as well as of nation states. 
The meaning of duplication disabled the EU from perceiving itself as responsible to 
act in the field of security policy because this policy domain was already covered by 
nation states, NATO, the UN and the OSCE. Duplicating theses structures was 
perceived to be an inappropriate course of action. Also, in 1996-7, the meanings of 
coherence and effectiveness still contradicted each other, because the meaning of 
 
Barnutz Conclusion 298 
 
coherence was contested. On the one hand, coherence meant that the EU’s external 
relations, including the EC, EU and member states level, had to be commonly 
organised. On the other hand, reaching coherence in the field of foreign policy 
explicitly required member states’ individual points of view to be taken into account. 
This contradicted the understanding of effectiveness, which required simplicity of 
decision-making procedures, for example. As a result, the EU’s foreign policy was 
affected by member states’ individual and potentially contradicting stand points 
because it was perceived inappropriate to undermine their importance as a whole.  
During 2000-1, the meaning of coherence was contested no longer, as it no longer 
contradicted the meaning of effectiveness, but rather supported the overall 
understanding of the EU as a rational actor as a matter of establishing continuity of 
security policy with earlier established policies. The EU acted rationally in the sense 
that it was looking for effective and coherent policies. This character was also 
applied to the EU’s security policy.  
Another reason why duplication was a dominant meaning and why coherence 
contested the meaning of effectiveness in 1996-7 can be found in the meaning of EU 
actorness. In 1996-7 the EU was only equipped with actor-like capabilities but not as 
a full-fledged actor on the international level let alone in the field of security. In 
2000-1, the meaning of actorness was in the process of becoming more widely 
intersubjectively shared and hence becoming dominant. This process was supported 
by the EU’s grand design of an international actor but also by discourses on the 
meaning of responsibility to protect which dominated the UN level at that time and 
influenced discourses within the EU accordingly. The EU perceived it its 
responsibility to not only support and foster people at home but also to protect 
people in other states and regions. The EU perceived itself responsible to protect and 
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support the people, especially those who suffered from development and poverty and 
hence from situations which had to be understood as contradicting core principles of 
EU identity on a very essential level. Parallel to this perspective, the EU defined 
more clearly what had to be understood as appropriate living conditions, including 
detailed meanings of poverty and development. As a result, the EU perceived it its 
responsibility to act at the international level supporting or changing the living 
conditions in situations where poverty and (under-)development was prevailing. This 
perspective affected not only the EU’s development policy but enabled the 
perception of situations of underdevelopment and poverty as security problems since 
they were understood to be likely to lead into conflict and crisis.  
EU identity constructions were finally stabilised within the period 2003-4. The 
dominant self-perception defined the EU as an international actor responsible for 
solving international security problems and take up its responsibility to protect. The 
successful implementation of this meaning was also supported by processes of sense 
making on the events of 11 September 2001. Through processes of sense making on 
the phenomenon of international terrorism, EU identity was re-constructed by 
juxtapositioning of self and other. This equipped EU identity with an exclusive tone. 
This resulted in the construction of ‘conditional identities’ which more explicitly 
than ever before included inevitable rules to which external actors had to apply to in 
order to participate in cooperation and association with the EU. ‘Conditional 
identities’ included sub-principles which were defined on a lower abstract level and 
which could be more easily checked for actor’s compliance. Here, the meaning of 
interdependence enhanced the meanings of integration and cooperation which were 
central to the EU’s external approach including its security policy. Cooperation was 
understood to lead to interdependence which disabled free riding or conflict, turning 
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individual into mutual benefits. This understanding was applied to the EU’s security 
policy. The EU cooperated with international, regional and national actors in the 
field of security and by deploying civilian and military operations as a matter of 
appropriate behaviour.  
In sum, the EU was more self-aware of its abilities and potentials of acting at the 
international level in the field of security which led to the constructions of more 
detailed rules of appropriate action in security which the EU had to follow not at 
least in order to apply to its own ‘standards’ of being an international actor in the 
field of security and avoiding another identity crisis. 
Emancipation of security 
Throughout the periods under review here, the EU never perceived a security 
problem as threatening its existence regarding the construction of threats. The EU’s 
perception of threats dealt almost exclusively with problems which were security 
relevant, which could potentially lead to security problems for a greater region, or 
which contradicted or threatened core principles of EU identity. For example, 
poverty and development were perceived as a problem with which the EU had to 
deal because it contradicted core principles of the EU’s identity, and clearly defined 
standards of living in reference to these core principles. Situations of development 
were finally perceived as security relevant because it was understood that they could 
easily lead to crisis and conflict. Therefore, they could jeopardise achievements of 
development policies, which again was understood as a problem of the EU’s 
effectiveness. These situations were perceived as a security problem because they 
caused sufferings for the people. In other words, compared with classic definitions of 
security implemented in the international relations literature, the meaning of security 
which enabled the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level by ESDP 
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began much earlier. Problems became security relevant when they opposed or 
questioned basic rules of EU identity. Also, these problems were perceived as not 
necessarily require the use of force. Appropriate responses to these security problems 
can start as early as agenda setting but can reach until the use of military force. This 
is a very important aspect in order to understand the meaning of security enabling a 
security policy at the EU level. It was less about defence and more about a wider 
definition of security, including non-military threats or security problems. In the 
following I highlight the most important steps in the development of the construction 
of threats which were constitutive for the meaning of security.  
To start with, during the period 1996-7, threat constructions did not take place at the 
EU level, since the EU did not perceive itself responsible for acting in the domain of 
security policy. The meaning of duplication disabled the construction of threats 
because it was not understood appropriate to duplicate structures and policies of 
existing international or regional organisations, let alone member states. Also, the 
inclusive identity construction – which expects association from other actors – 
enabled the EU to perceive actors previously involved in conflict as becoming more 
‘self’ to the EU as soon as they started to take up their responsibility in solving the 
crisis. And finally, the EU did not perceive itself responsible in the field of security. 
The only area of threat construction was that of WMD and landmines. But security 
policies addressing these problems were organised by already established 
international structures and institutions. The EU did not implement a new policy on 
its own due to the meaning of duplication.  
In contrast, in 2000-1, when the meaning of EU actorness became more dominant 
and the EU established a meaning of responsibility to protect, threats or security 
problems were constructed. Situations of (under)development and poverty were 
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perceived as problematic because EU identity required higher standards of living as 
defined in detail by discourses of poverty. In 2000-1, the EU perceived itself 
responsible not only for its own people but for those people who suffered from 
development and poverty, and whose standards of living were thus lower than those 
defined by the EU as minimum. This led the EU to further implement its 
development policies. However, situations of development and poverty were 
perceived to significantly increase the likelihood of crisis and conflict. Accordingly, 
the EU perceived situations of development and poverty as security relevant and 
started to design policy tools to be used when achievements of its development 
policies were jeopardised by crisis and conflict. These tools were still contested 
within discourses. On the one hand, conflict prevention as well as crisis management 
was understood to be a matter of a security policy using military and civilian 
capabilities. However, conflict prevention and crisis management was still more 
dominantly constructed as being part of development policies.  
This was different in 2003-4. Processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of 
international terrorism enabled the implementation of dynamism as a general 
character of security problems. From this perspective, the EU perceived a much 
higher number of issues as security relevant because every single security problem 
was understood to carry the potential of worsening others. In general, this led to a 
much stronger and dominant construction of threats. As a result, security policy 
experienced a much higher relevance in the EU’s external relations and emancipated 
itself from the status of a last resort development policy. Overall, the introduction of 
the meaning of dynamism enabled the construction of rules for appropriate 
behaviour in situations of insecurity on a much higher level of firmness and 
elaborateness. 
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In accordance with the developments in the constructions of EU identity and threats, 
rules of appropriate behaviour in situations of insecurity enfolded in quality and 
became more robustly and dominantly defined over time. Since there were no threat 
constructions in 1996-7, no rule was necessary to apply in situations of insecurity. 
This was different in 2000-1. Since the development-conflict cycle was perceived as 
a security problem, the EU understood security policy necessary to support its 
development policies by civilian and military means. They were to be used when 
achievements became jeopardised by conflict and crisis. This newly defined purpose 
enabled a huge debate on the effectiveness of the existing military and civilian 
structures, including the aspect of what was necessary to further develop the EU’s 
ability as an international in the field of security.  
However, rules on how to deal with situations of crisis and conflict were still very 
much contested. Thus, military and civilian means were not implemented or used 
because an agreement was lacking on the type of capabilities and the way of using 
them.  
This again was different in the following period of 2003-4. Here, the EU had to 
implement more clearly defined rules on how and when to use civilian and military 
capabilities, based on a more dominantly defined meaning of actorness and the 
perception of threats as being dynamic. This was not only necessary to face up to 
more serious threats and security problems, but to apply to the EU’s own standards 
as an international actor. Finally, these firm and elaborated rules of how and when to 
use civilian and military capabilities enabled the development, implementation and 
deployment of the very first civilian and military operations within the structure of 
ESDP.  
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Robustness of Discourses 
In contrast to the findings of existing literature, I have demonstrated that this 
meaning of security was robustly defined and remained fairly unaffected by the 
discursive crisis which enfolded on how to proceed in Iraq in the first half of 2003. 
Authors recognised a paradox of crisis and success which seemed to take place 
almost simultaneously in the EU’s foreign and security policy. On the one side, the 
EU and its member states were divided over the question of whether or not to disarm 
Iraq and change the Iraqi regime by war. This disunity seemed to affect the basic 
agreement of a common European security and defence policy. On the other side, 
successful steps in institutional developments, as well as policy implementations, 
already were discussed and finally taken during and in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis.  
At first glance, both aspects contradict each other. But by taking into account the 
findings of the empirical chapters of this thesis and deconstructing relevant speech 
acts from the first half of 2003, I was able to do away with the impression of a 
paradox. I deconstructed key texts of the discursive crisis such as the letter of eight, 
the press conference of Jacques Chirac following the Extraordinary European 
Council in Brussels on 17 February 2003, and the final document of the so called 
Chocolate Summit of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg. In doing so I 
referred to the following three aspects. First of all, ESDP and its underlying meaning 
of security could not be meaningfully linked to the argument of disarming, or 
changing, the Iraqi regime by force. This was never part of the rationale of security 
established at the EU level enabling the institutionalisation of a security policy by 
ESDP. The question of going to war could not be related to ESDP, which made the 
discourse on the war on Iraq different and unattached. Second, controversies over 
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proposals in the domain of security policy during the crisis could not explain the 
intensity of the crisis because they were almost completely immediately 
implemented after the crisis. This again supports the argument that the discursive 
crisis did not represent a dispute over matters of EU security policy. The third and 
main argument is that the crisis enfolded on the disregard of established rules of 
interaction and cooperation at the EU level. In reference to the well established 
literature, I have shown a number of rules which were disregarded during the crisis. 
This included for example, the rule to at least inform if not consult all EU heads of 
states or government before addressing a potentially controversial position publicly. 
Indeed, the crisis enfolded on the non-compliance of relevant EU actors with at least 
informally established rules. The disregard of these rules can explain the fierce 
reaction of other European actors and can thus explain why the crisis took place. 
Disregarding established rules always and necessarily leads to strong reactions by 
the other actors of the group who intend to re-enforce the relevance of the broken 
rule.  
The interim chapter on the crisis, especially, supports the argument of this thesis that 
processes of sense making led to a robustly defined meaning of security. Indeed, 
even the highly intense battles during the discursive crisis were not able to change, 
let alone destroy, the social construction of security established at the EU level. In 
other words, the first half of 2003 proved to be ‘a hard case’ for the meaning of 
security.  
Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the EU’s security policy became 
possible due to a stable and robust construction of EU identity based on core 
principles, the meaning of integration and cooperation It was also due to the EU’s 
growing self-awareness of being an international actor and capable of autonomous 
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action in the field of security. The process of change in which this meaning of 
international actorness became dominant can be explained by the influence of the 
grand design and the identity crisis which made explicit that the EU was not able to 
apply to its own expectations. Furthermore, the discursive crisis on the phenomenon 
of international terrorism did not only lead to the construction of more serious threats 
but enforced identity constructions by juxtapositioning of self and other. Whereas 
first, the development-conflict cycle was perceived as the main security problem of 
the EU, discourses on the meaning of international terrorism led to the perception of 
terrorism as a serious threat and to the perception of dynamism as being a general 
character worsening individual security problems. This finally led to the construction 
of rules which defined the use of military and civilian capabilities as being 
appropriate to prevent dynamism from taking effect.  
In sum, these processes of sense making led to the construction of the meaning of 
security and enabled the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level and 
within ESDP. These processes took place within discourses and affected the 
construction of EU identity, the perception of threats and the construction of rules of 
appropriate behaviour in its particular way.  
Evaluating the theoretical approach 
The research project was able to produce these findings based on its research 
approach applied throughout this thesis. The approach enabled the researcher to 
systematically focus on the discursive construction of reality, namely the 
construction of EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. The 
rigorously applied methods helped to explore the constructions of subjects, objects 
and their relations within discourses on European integration, global challenges and 
international order. The approach also included a concept of change and research 
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techniques which enabled the analysis to identity dominant discourses, separate them 
from other forms of interpretations and explaining how changes in dominant 
discourses occurred. Both provided access to underlying, non-dominant discourses 
by shifting the focus of the analysis to forms of interpretations which were different, 
or which contradicted, dominant meanings. For example, the slight change in the 
meaning of coherence from the period 1996-7 to 2000-1 was only recognisable 
through the concept of change. In the first period, coherence explicitly stated that 
member states’ individual points of views were to take into account in order to reach 
a common decision. In the second period, coherence required stepping down from 
individual stand points for the sake of a common policy across all EU levels. This 
change as development was explained by argument of continuity which applied 
meanings already established in other policy fields of the EU such as at the 
supranational level to the ‘new’ policy of security action. And finally, the research 
strategy provided the tools to distinguish between periods and analyse them 
separately by a structured mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques in order 
to identify dominant discourses and change over time more easily. Therefore, the 
development of the meaning of security could explicitly be addressed, which again 
was particularly important for answering the research question. In sum, the approach 
proved to be very handy in analysing the meaning of security and its development or 
change over time, and it may be argued that the approach could be very fruitfully 
applied to other empirical situations. 
However, in order to check the productiveness of this approach more generally, 
further research is necessary to apply this approach to other contexts. In order to 
sharpen the focus of the analysis, the approach could also profit from further 
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theoretical and methodological discussions. These discussions need to focus on the 
following four points:  
First, within this thesis I have hypothesised a link between identity constructions and 
the design and implementation of institutions. This link was developed throughout 
the theoretical part and endorsed in the empirical chapters. But further theoretical 
discussions and research is necessary to thoroughly conceptualise this link and 
generalise its assumptions. To focus on this hypothesis more firmly, an approach is 
necessary which combines discourse analysis and institutionalist approaches. Within 
a discursive approach, it is difficult to differentiate between rules of appropriate 
behaviour constructed through processes of sense making and regulations and 
procedures formally and informally institutionalised within the structure of interest. 
Here, an institutionalised approach could be used to discover the institutionalised 
practices while using different assumptions and methods than those of a discursive 
approach. Findings could be used to systematically support the hypothesised link 
between identities and institutions. 
Second, the approach applied within this thesis builds up on a heuristic concept of 
inclusive vs. exclusive identities. The heuristic concept was linked to the overall 
discursive approach by the argument that it is a matter of political contestedness as to 
whether identities are constructed as inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the concept 
can be connected to the concept of how discourses produce dominant meanings. 
Meanings are contested as long as they are not or only weakly intersubjectively 
shared. However, further conceptualisations are necessary to make the concepts of 
inclusiveness and exclusiveness more fruitful for the analysis of identity 
constructions and the construction of threats. 
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This aspect directly leads to the third point. With reference to international relations 
theory, I have conceptualised security as a relational complex, relating identity 
constructions to the construction of threats which then lead to the construction of 
rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. However, it remains under 
theorised as to how and when identity constructions lead to the construction of 
threats or when they make them possible. This aspect needs to be addressed in more 
depth. To start with, the research findings of this thesis can serve as one case in 
which a certain type of identity enabled particular threat constructions. Further cases 
need to be analysed in order to systematise the conditions which make threat 
constructions possible. In this regard, the final point is also relevant. 
Finally, the findings of this thesis show that the meaning of security starts much 
earlier than assumed by traditional approaches which understand security as a matter 
of (military) defence and hence insecurity as a (military) threat against the pure 
existence of the referent object. In contrast, I have shown that threat constructions or 
the perception of a problem as security relevant include those phenomena which are 
understood to be different to, contrasting or negating aspects of the identity in 
question. Therefore, a security problem or threat is not only understood as a threat of 
force. I have demonstrated that the meaning of security starts as early as a 
phenomenon questions, contradicts or seems to be an act against aspects of the 
identity in question. For example, the EU perceives situations which potentially 
jeopardise achievements of its development policies, namely crisis and conflict, as a 
security problem, knowing that these situations do not threaten the existence of the 
EU itself. However, this aspect of differentiated and distinguished types of threats, 
security problems or risks needs to be further conceptualised. Discursive research 
may well be helpful here because it can inductively search for types of threat 
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perceptions in order to distinguish general structures of threat constructions. The 
thesis provided interesting insights in this regard. 
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